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Hints and guesses: 
Legal modes of semio-logical reasoning
Dinda L. Gorlee
Van Alkemadelaan 806, NL-2597 BC 
The Hague, The Netherlands 
e-mail: gorlee@xs4all.nl
Abstract. Legal semiotics is an internationally proliferated subfield of general 
semiotics. The three-step principles of Peirce’s semiotic logic are the three 
leading categories: firstness, secondness and thirdness, grounded on the 
reverse principles of logic: deduction, induction and — Peirce’s discovery — 
abduction. Neither induction nor abduction can provide a weaker truth claim 
than deduction. Abduction occurs in intuitive conclusions regarding the possi­
bility of backward reasoning, contrary to the system of law. Civil-law cultures 
possess an abstract deductive orientation, governed by the rigidity of previous 
written law, whereas the actual fragility of a common-law system with cases 
and precedents inclines to induction, orienting its habituality (habits) in moral 
time and space. Customary law gives credit to abductive values: relevant 
sentiments, beliefs and propositions are upgraded to valid reasoning. The 
decision-making by U.S. case law and English common-law is characterized 
as decision law with abductive undertones.
Inquiry of analysis: Holmes and Peirce
The term “logic” was understood by Charles Sanders Peirce (1839— 
1914) in two senses: “In its narrow sense, it is the science of the 
necessary conditions of the attainment of truth” but in “its broader 
sense, it is the science of the necessary laws of thought, or, still better 
(thought always taking place by means of signs), it is general se- 
meiotic, treating not merely of truth, but also of the general conditions 
of signs being signs” (CP: 1.444). Metaphorically, the first sense is 
viewed as “cold”, the second as both “cold” and “hot”; semiotically, 
Peirce spoke of “hard” and “soft” in his crucial article “How to make
our ideas clear” (CP: 5.403 = W: 3: 266 f.). If we discuss the language 
of the decisions and language of the law, we deal with w n en 
thought-signs, sign-events and sign-phenomena from a lega ^ e w  
point, where the law is said to “treat of second intentions as app l to 
first” (CP: 1.559) and thereby dealing with semiotics and its finding 
and judging the facts of interpretation of experience and rules. Peirce 
stated that “the rules of logic hold good of any symbols, of those that 
are written or spoken as well as those which are thought” (CP: 1.559).
Legal semiotics discovers and analyzes fact and law in written 
laws, proceedings, tribunals, judges, and verdicts, bringing facts and 
law together “with a concern for procedure, a concern for rules, and a 
concern for legal categories” (Lempert 1988: 161, see 162-165). 
Legal semiotics embraces both the broad and the narrow sense of the 
“formal conditions of the truth o f symbols” (CP: 1.559) where lawful 
and unlawful conclusions, exchanged between the parties, are derived 
from premises with varying success, as will be discussed in this 
article. Following Weston’s division into a various subclasses or sub­
registers, the language of the law is “really a blanket term covering 
several varieties or subregisters” (Weston 1991: 14) in the following 
legal interactions:
(1) professional discussions between sollicitor or barrister and client 
(mode: spoken; functions: e.g. exposition, advice, sympathy; for­
mality: neutral/formal);
(2) professional discussions between legal practitioners among them­
selves (mode: spoken; functions: various; formality: usually 
neutral or informal, maybe formal between junior and senior);
(3) judge giving judgment in court (mode: spoken or written-to-be- 
spoken; functions: information, exposition, possibly literary; for­
mality: formal);
(4) advocate pleading in court (mode: spoken; functions: persuation, 
exposition, possibly flattery, provocation, etc.; formality: neutral/ 
formal);
(5) legislation (mode: written; functions: regulation o f conduct in­
junction, archaism, etc.; formality: very formal). (Weston 10Q1- 
14-15)
The kaleidoscopic variety in mode, formality, and functions of 
speech includes legal language in activities such as leg i^ ia ^
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courtroom activities, lawyer-client communications, legal literature, 
etc. influencing and determining the sense of the linguistic genre and 
style used by individuals of a particular legal status in the actual 
exercise of their role as such.
The concept and the external sign of the semiotics of law has no 
Peircean roots. Peirce, a polymath scientist, was no lawyer, but 
between 1870 and 1874 Peirce had jurists-friends in the Metaphysical 
Club, particularly the famous forefather of American law, Judge 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, jr. (1841-1935).1 Holmes’s legal theory 
aimed to provide a general view of the common law, offering a 
pragmatic account of criminal punishment and civil liability (Millar 
1975, Valauri 1991). In his efforts to redact the new proposal in The 
Common Law (1881), his main oeuvre, Holmes was probably in­
fluenced by Peirce’s standards of the 1870s, when Peirce wrote the 
celebrated articles “The Fixation of B elief’ (CP: 5.358-5.387 = W: 3: 
242-257) and “How To Make Our Ideas Clear” (CP: 5.388-5.410 = 
W: 3: 257-276; see Fisch 1986a: xxix-xxxvii) (in both articles in W: 
3, the footnotes of CP, written later, are excluded). Whereas Peirce’s 
standards go back to the underlying properties of the subject’s 
behavior and then grow into the duty and obligation to the community, 
Holmes’s legal rules are equally public (not private) and external (not 
internal) habits. The shifting senses of fundamental terms in our real 
world correspond to the changeable, moral or ethical properties of 
legal acts which eventually tend to develop order out o f the “chaos” of 
legal behavior. This evolutionary change, advocated by Holmes, is the 
touchstone of later jurisprudence in common law, and agrees with 
ideas from Peircean semiotics. The community makes contact with 
social reality, but also distorts reality by the circumstances of the legal 
action (on reality and human “reality”, see Gorlee 2004: 146, 224-225 
note 1).
In contrast to “European” or Continental law, there is no general 
theory of liability in American law. The court needs to assess each 
specific case to evaluate which kinds of “bond of necessity exist 
between the wrongdoer and the remedy of the wrong” (Black’s 1999: 
925). The shifting and interactive senses of observation and
1 See Fisch (1986a, 1986b) and Menand (2001) for the vital account of the 
intellectual meetings of Holmes and Peirce in the company of William James 
(1842-1920), John Dewey (1859-1952, who was twenty years younger than 
Peirce), and other associates of the Metaphysical Club.
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experience (viewed in Peirce’s view, the semiotic meanings) indicate 
different modes of reasoning, discussed by Holmes who asserted in 
the beginning of The Common Law that ’’The life of the law has not 
been logic: it has been experience”, adding that the law finds its 
philosophy in “consideration of what is expedient for the community 
concerned” (after Menand 2001: 341). Following Holmes’s doctrine 
of legal obligation or debts to pay to another or to society, enforceable 
negligence can be relevant or irrelevant, fixed or contingent (Gorlee 
1999), depending on which doctrine of laws applies. To justify the 
nature of the criminal responsibility, Holmes’s theory of legal liability 
requires the presence of a will before the act (or its omission: a defect 
of will). Holmes stated in The Common Law  (1881) that “an act 
implies a choice, and that is felt to be impolitic and unjust to make a 
man answerable for harm, unless he might have chosen otherwise” 
(Holmes 1963: 46). This will to bridge a breach of trust does not come 
from valid logic but, rather, is a re-evaluation of the concept of 
Holmes’s “felt necessities” (Holmes 1881: I, 35; see Pohlman 1984: 
212). Holmes referred here to extralegal concepts: experience and 
feeling, integrated into legal decision-making, which will be discussed 
in this article.
According to the pragmatic interpretation, introduced by Peirce, 
law is created by single jurists (subjective law) but with its action 
belongs to communal property (objective law). Advised by observa­
tion and experience, law is created, as Holmes stated in the beginning 
of The Common Law :
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt neces­
sities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of 
public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share 
with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in 
determining the rules by which men should be governed. (Holmes 1881: I, 35, 
after Schwartz 1993: 191)
These words begin a new area o f jurisprudence with “new logic”, 
moving from the traditional process of deduction towards induction 
and some grounds of abduction —  focusing on the terminology of 
nonrational and irrational elements of human reasoning. Holmes used 
new and radical words in legal science: “experience”, “expediency” 
“necessity”, and “life”. From Holmes’s proposal, the values o f the 
experiences of the nation affect and stimulate further developments in
the nation. These values are phrased in the interactive framework of 
Peirce’s laws of inference (discussed in this article). To build 
standards and legislation in American law, Holmes could derive from 
Peirce’s pragmatic principles and his teleology of descriptive and 
analytical semiotics, and his ideas regarding legal realism. Peirce’s 
teleology can be applied to Holmes’s empirical legal science con­
cerned with the “real” facts of the legal sign-situation, connecting the 
legal rules and standards as a necessarily objective reservoir of 
observation and experience of the community (Fisch 1986b).
The experience and the logic of a Peirce-linked inquiry in legal 
semiotics are beginning to influence legal semiotics and its future 
developments, which has become now an internationally proliferated 
subfield. The former International Association for the Semiotics of 
Law, now replaced by the International Roundtables for the Semiotics 
of Law, do mainly follow the semiotic school of Paris regarding 
Greimassian semiotics (Algirdas Julien Greimas 1917-1992). This 
legal direction follows the tradition of Course o f  General Linguistics 
by Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913), in which comparative 
methodology, verification-falsification process, diachronic and 
synchronic approaches, and the semiotic narrativity are deployed. The 
Peircean inquiry on legal semiotics was the life-work of Roberta 
Kevelson (1931-1998). She founded the Center for Semiotic Research 
in Law, Government and Economics at Pennsylvania State University 
in Reading, Pennsylvania. She considered in her prolific writings on 
legal semiotics that worldwide law is “really a system of signs — 
types of an iceberg whose bulk is eclipsed but assumed, or known to 
exist” (Kevelson 1982: 162). The approach to Peirce’s legal semiotics 
is argued in Kevelson’s books (1988; 1990; 1991; her articles 1986; 
1982; 1993; and other work). Kevelson speaks here about Peirce’s 
acuteness on three semiotic points: the real semiotic definition with 
inherent sign, inherent and extrinsic object(s), and extrinsic 
interpretant(s) resting on the philosophical categories, corresponding 
to the evolutionary inward-and-outward sequence of terms: firstness, 
secondness, and thirdness — in their semio-logical changes and 
exchanges. This semiotic tradition including an (in)determinate legal 
semiosis, will be followed further in this article.
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Peirce’s three categories
Peirce stated that “First is the conception of being or existing inde 
pendently of anything else; Second is the conception of being relative 
to, the conception of reaction with, something else; Third is the 
concept of mediation whereby a first and a second are brought into a 
relation” (CP: 6.32). Firstness is pure potentiality (CP: 1.422), which 
is “predominant in the ideas of freshness, life, spontaneity, freedom” 
(CP: 1.324). Firstness means instantaneous emotion, direct “suchness” 
of feeling, raising an elementary question with its direct “maybe” (or 
“maybe not”) not dependent to nothing else beyond its own qualitative 
understanding of the possible meaning of the sign without thought. 
Firstness is undivided and undividable oneness, where thought is still 
absent, only the current instantaneous shiver of emotion ran through 
human life. Secondness is dynamic motion, orienting oneself in time 
and space, taking one’s stand in the moment of “here and now”, and 
maintaining one’s moral place over time. Secondness thinks about the 
discrimination of good and evil of manysided actuality, it sents 
messages with action and reaction as a response to a stimulus which 
may cause a change of state from firstness to movement. Thirdness 
states the set of habits and habit-changing previously formed, which 
control the changing cognitive activity of human experience with 
respect to its response to stimulus.
Thirdness (Peirce’s symbolicity) involves bringing states of 
firstness and events of secondness together in a mutual friendship of 
intellect. Whereas firstness rests on the idea of independence and 
secondness is the idea o f oppositions, thirdness rests on the idea of the 
complexities of cognitive relationship (CP: 1.297). Among the cate- 
gorial characters o f thirdness are therefore mediation, thought, rules, 
habits, and law (the latter as general term, but also applied to legal 
studies) (CP: 1.345f, 1.405f). These symbolic-cultural terms are 
always infinite, borderless, and never fixed. Peirce argues the 
changing characters of thirdness, changing according to different 
convenience in human “reality”. State o f feeling can be changed the 
(re)action can also be changed, and there we deal with a new sign and 
a new meaning. Semiosis or forceful sign-activity changes with time 
and space, and entertains successfully new doubts, new beliefs and 
new persuasions. Under duress of moral time and space a new hab' 
formation cycle is generated to fit back into the renewed sem' *
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process. This relationship was experienced by Judge Holmes in his 
day when he defined liability not as our right, power nor liberty, but as 
its own “vinculum juris  [which] is not one of mere duty or obligation; 
it pertains not to the sphere of ought but to that of m ust’ (John 
Salmond quoted in Black’s 1999: 925, emphasis as in the original) — 
as its own symbol in its own social, psychological, economic, ethical 
elements of experience, functioning in a changing legal semiosphere.
In Peirce’s categorial scheme we characterize the final category of 
thirdness, semiotic symbolicity, referring to the plural variety of 
disciplinary terms used in general inquiry: representation, mediation, 
branching, cognition, synthetic consciousness, theory, processuality, 
habits, reason, transuasion, transaction, betweenness, continuity, 
regularity, evolution, as well as God. In the bizarre juxtaposition 
bridged by Peirce’s thirdness, we perceive the generality of the law, as 
well as the language of the law. The different perspectives of rational 
thirdness can be explored from different angles chosen in the 
discussion of rational, nonrational and irrational elements of legal 
semiotics to create a human experience, the sociological and psycho­
logical secondness of life. Peirce’s categoriology includes thirdness, 
but thirdness appears preceded by secondness and firstness, and 
includes the symbiosis between three categories. Semiosis (in the 
overall terms of thirdness) organizes and integrates the data of human 
experience: in legal terms, the human mind makes the formless 
universe into liveable objects and events, that is, it creates a structured 
dynamic, and never static, organ of law and lawfulness. The function 
of legal language is to guide and stimulate inquiry into human 
“reality”, and make “reality” a structured and reasonable medium.
We see this phenomenon of inquiry in the structure and effect of 
the legal contract (on Peirce’s contractually, see Gorlee 1994: 197— 
223). As contractual agreement between interacting parties the 
contract implies a value through mutual consent. As third the contract 
is given a meaning with consequences in human experience: the 
meaning is not virtual but happens in actual life-experience (including 
no thirdness but secondness and even firstness). A contract is thereby 
an interpersonal conception of a bargain, considered as a process of 
maintaining a synergetic relationship. Peirce’s basic entity of a first, 
the possible sign, the second, the semiotically real but no actually real 
object(s), and the third, the interpretant(s), roughly the meaning(s) of 
the sign-event, are all based on Peirce’s categorial methodology, as
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applied to law. Peirce’s laboratory inquiry, solved by experiments 
leading to consistent, common-sense results in reality illusttates t e 
collective habit in three interactive phases (discussed in Gorlee 2004).
Semio-legal logic and truth
Legal logic and therefore legal thinking and language consist not of 
monolog, but of a secret or hidden dialog pronounced in silent and/or 
outspoken words of commands, geared toward a question/answer 
relation. The verbal speech creates what Peirce called the “fixation of 
belief’ (CP: 5.358ff = W\ 3: 242ff) and leads towards a performance 
in a future time. In Peirce’s days, it inspired Holmes’s prediction 
theory of law (Fisch 1986a; 1986b) involving a choice and possibility, 
changing from age to age. Peirce’s theory of rational knowledge 
formation signifies a justified emendation of future actions. Legalese 
(the language of the law) has therefore a changing, contractual basis, 
corresponding as all semiotic processes to language as symbolic 
thirds, but based on cultural and linguistic signs. Legal logic offers 
legal acts, but is generally a social theory of logic dealing with 
complex linguistic signs — doctrines in both words, paraphrases, and 
definitions rooted in thought-signs, and interpreted variously by a 
community of inquirers, appealed to today and in the future. In 
semiotic terminology, the doctrines have become non-doctrines and 
are called vocabulary, phraseology, and textology (Gorlee 2004: 159, 
197f). The legal parties (Peirce’s inquirers) are not flesh-and-blood 
individuals but are either skilled legal brains — those of a legally 
trained individual —  or unskilled legal brains — of legal illiterates, 
lacking formal training in legal studies, ostensibly fated to be a legally 
silent majority of potential “victims” of the law (Boasson 1966: 65ff; 
Gorlee 1999: 246).
Legal reasoning rests on a relatively closed set o f legal premises 
that can be known and argued by human individuals with legal 
training. It is both an open and a closed system based on previous 
logical thought (thirdness), yet the system is infinite and has no finite 
closet set of legal premises. The conclusions —  or interpretant(s) of 
the legal inference — remain open and present unpredictable pos­
sibilities. This is the legal openness in Peirce’s semiotic “dial ” 
(CP: 3.172, 3.197, 3.623), meaning that the decisions and choSe^n
logical thought can give both predictable and impredictable senses of 
the interpretive results: namely, either adding to the law system or 
even jeopardizing it. This is contrary to the desired closeness of legal 
language, and would seem a negative perspective on the effects of 
legal language itself. It is also a positive point of view, because it pro­
duces relative openness for interpreters to consider and evolve new 
developments inside the present data. In this way, the legal rhetoric 
generates further with time and space into a legal pluralism, still 
rooted in the target: spontaneous order in society, as is the require­
ments in Peirce’s final concept of community.
If we study legal semiotics according to Peirce’s sign theory, 
thought-signs are indeed not entirely rational and logical. They also 
embrace practical and intuitive knowledge, constantly trying to 
integrate them into reason. Legal logic and language (thirdness) then 
attempts to integrate signs of fact or experience (secondness), based 
on signs of feeling or emotion (firstness). The fact and feeling are, 
however, invisible but still present in the discourse referring to 
absent—  that is deleted, neglected, or abandoned — outside items. 
Reason is therefore relatively present in legalese, a reason that is still 
fixed and definite but despite its generality embedded in abductive 
thought. The practical feeling brings vagueness to reason, but 
eventually brings it eventually closer to the reality of truth (also called 
certainty within philosophy, as opposed to uncertainty) as humans like 
to live and survive by it. Peirce stated that
The purpose of every sign is to express “fact”, and by being joined with other 
signs, to approach as nearly as possible to determing an interpretant which 
would be the perfect Truth, the absolute Truth, and a such (at least, we may 
use this language) would be the very Universe. (NEM: 4: 239, Peirce’s 
emphasis)
Yet legal truth does not exist, since cases after final ruling (verdict) 
can be appealed to a higher court and in this new proceeding for re­
versal are taken anew with the same of different circumstances. It 
means that “the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth” 
becomes a degree of non-truth.
Language, including legal language, is basically a third and formal, 
but engaged in the working process of its multiple “drive for 
reference” (Mertz, Weissbourd 1985: 262, 268, 276, 283). Language 
has a truth but has no absolute truth value. Given, moreover, that its
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right thinking “depends unconditionally upon the relation of the fact 
inferred to the facts posited in the premisses” (CP: 5.270 — W. 2. 215), 
its truth is wholly a function of this relation, so that “as long as the 
premisses are true, however other facts may be, the conclusions will 
be true” (CP: 5.271 = W: 2: 215). For the argument here it is important 
that all the modes of reasoning, even truth-giving deduction, which is 
Peirce’s first symbolic sign leading to valid mechanical reasoning, 
does not question the validity of the hypotheses contained in its own 
premises; instead, it is simply taken for granted that they are correct 
because they represent our whole knowledge of the matter.
Three modes of reasoning
Reasoning is the logical desire to reach the unknown through the 
known, organized by Peirce in his semio-logical method of inquiry 
(Rescher 1978), linked to the classical logical principles but 
transposed in other working forms (abstract and concrete shapes) in 
order to grasp and drive the dynamics of thought. Scientific inquiry is 
always inspired by intellectual curiosity and is based on reasonable 
thirds (thought-signs, conclusions) which need to have, however, 
seconds and firsts involved in them. A phenomenon, event, or fact, is 
interesting to a certain investigator, and becomes for him/her a 
semiotic sign-phenomenon challenging his/her inquirer’s ingenuity. In 
order to explain and analyze the sign in its historical and present facts, 
and to make predictions about its future nature or behaviour, the sign- 
phenomenon is carefully seen, observed, and reflected upon. Man-as- 
a-scientist seeks to enhance the scientific value and the validity of the 
conclusion(s) o f the laboratory inquiry, by adopting a policy in right 
thinking which is hoped to minimize the risk of subjectivity and 
provide maximum objectivity. To achieve this purpose of seeking 
truth, the data obtained of the sign-phenomenon are grounded by infe­
rential reasoning. This is the three-step methods of reasoning, which is 
expected to yield true conclusions now or eventually.
The three-step principles fits o f logic was traditionally either 
deductive or inductive reasoning. Peirce revolutionized the traditional 
dichotomy which he expanded and re-defined as a trichotomy by in­
cluding his abduction (1867). Peirce’s decision-making distinguished 
between explicatory (or analytic) reasoning — deduction __ H
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ampliative (or synthetic) reasoning —  induction and Peirce’s ab­
duction. Explicatory (or analytic) reasoning corresponds to deductive 
inference, like in this example taken from Peirce’s beanbag:
It simply substitutes for the facts presented in the premiss, what is 
implicit in them. Like inference from the known whole to the parts, it 
does not draw upon the unknown or the partially unknown. This 
makes deduction the only form of “necessary” (that is, explicatory) 
reasoning to reach truth in itself, since deduction forecloses critical 
(re)examination and (re)evaluation of its premises and does not 
engage in the introduction of new insights, nor in the rejection of 
hypotheses already adopted.
On the other hand, non-inductive (ampliative or synthetic) 
reasoning does not lead to necessary conclusions, but to conclusions 
which are probable or merely plausible. In Peirce’s words, “Deduction 
proves that something must be”, and “Induction shows that something 
actually is operative”, yet “Abduction merely suggests that something 
may be” (CP: 5.171, Peirce’s emphasis). Induction — the traditional 
reasoning about signs in reality — as well as abduction (also called 
hypothesis or retroduction by its “inventor” Peirce himself) — which 
is logic from the known parts to the unknown whole —  are temporary 
guidepost to logic. Induction and abduction are “statistical inference” 
according to Peirce, who explained: “Out of a bag of black and white 
beans I take a few handfuls, and from this sample I can judge 
approximately the proportions of black and white in the whole” (CP: 
5.349= W: 2: 268).
The shift between a legal monolog (meaning a question: law, writ 
of summons, court decision, will, testimony, plea, oath, bank 
statement) to the intended dialog (meaning a answer and question 
relation: a request for advice, marriage settlement, interrogation 
report, police inquiry, cross-examination) requires the removal of 
explicatory arguments. Instead of arguing a verbal legal text we argue 
what is implied in it: decisions, commands or orders, and rules 
(Friedman 1977: 24). In a court case, we deal with mixed cases 




All the beans from this bag are white. 
These beans are from this bag.
These beans are white. (CP. 2.623 = W: 3: 
325)
3
250 Dinda L. Gorlee
defense, cross-examining a witness, a jury verdict, and similar items. 
In a court case, deduction is replaced by ampliative, or synthetic, argu 
ments. Inductivist character of legal reasoning rests on what actua у 
is” (CP: 5.171), Peirce’s signs of secondness:
Rule These beans are from this bag.
Case These beans are white.
• Result All the beans from this bag are white. (CP: 2.623 -
W\ 3: 325)
Inductive inference gives “a course of experimental investigation” 
(CP: 5.168). It assumes that “what is true for a whole collection is true 
of a number of instances taken from it at random”(CP: 5.275 = W: 2: 
217). Induction is, as said, a statistical argument, the sign points 
outside itself to the object referred to; it is a second, giving “a 
fragment torn away from the object, the two in their Existence being 
one whole or a part of such whole” (CP: 2.230). Induction establishes 
a clear cause-consequence relation between premiss and conclusion 
(between sign and interpretant) which requires the investigator to 
follow it “blindly”. There can be no absolute certainty in induction, 
because the inquirer, spurred by intellectual curiosity (CP: 5.584) is in 
fact making predictions and thereby judging the unseen by the seen. 
New knowledge is inferred by extrapolating it from actual fact toward 
the unknown. Induction is therefore a “practical truth” (CP: 6.527), 
bringing the inquirer halfway the path which, in the Peircean view, 
must eventually lead him or her from interrogation and doubt to 
certainty and truth.
This classification can be applied to the two prominent systems of 
law and to legal reasoning in the Western world, the latter now 
integrating the emerging ex-Communist legal world. Civil-law (origi­
nally the Latin ju s  civile) cultures possess a deductive orientation, 
governed by written laws, statutes, and constitutions imposed by the 
state through a parliamentary procedure (deriving from the sovereign), 
while a common-law system (derived from the Old French commen 
ley) is in itself “inarticulate until it is expressed in a judgment” 
(Patrick Devlin quoted in Black ’s 1999: 270). Common law consists 
of the interpretation o f the judges whose formal decisions form 
precedents in respect of succeeding cases. Common law is a body of 
rules concerned with the authority of cases and precedents The 
statutary law inclines to reasoning according to inductive thought
Judicial decisions can overrule — that is: change —  its binding codes 
in new statutes according to changing standards of time and space. By 
this strategy or power involving the strict judicial “oracles of the law” 
(Holmes 1897: 457), the judges leave a legacy to future ages.
Civil law emphasize a moderate standpoint of legal positivism and 
is ruled a judicial decisions rather than legislations. Civil law tends to 
give more prominence to the imperative idea to reasoning by a law­
making organ than common law with their more legal realist and 
empirical orientations, is inclined to do. European law has a strong 
rigidity and stability, and offers through its written form some 
resistance to manipulation. The repeatable regularity in continental 
law is the conclusion of its deductive habit: its real logical syllogism 
goes from legal ideas to real ideas. Probable reasoning is the inductive 
syllogism, which moves from ideas to things, the latter are material 
(extralegal) things existing in human experience.
Anglo-American legal theory is today a mixture of two legal 
elements, not considering so-called “equity” (a third system of English 
law, responding to ideas of natural justice, now part of common law; 
see Williams 1982: 25-29, Black’s 1999: 560): (1) the so-called 
common law, judicial law based on court decisions within the legal 
framework of cases and precedents, differing fundamentally from 
Roman law (filtered through Napoleon code) which governs most 
Western legal systems, and (2) statute written law, which is written 
law based on previously codified law. Common law, deriving its force 
through the rigidity of its reasonableness and truth, is more adaptable 
than the actual fragility of the fixed form of statute law, oriented to the 
changing needs to society. Peirce would call common law a system of 
habituality, a habit-transforming strategy, where new habits are 
constantly enforced (and denied). New habituality ensures a way to 
avoid conservatism and create new meanings in the law. Both statute 
law and common law are in fact rule-forming institutionalization rules 
and eventually —  or as Peirce wrote: in the long run — proceed from 
induction (seconds) to deduction (thirds).
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Abductive beliefs
Every inquiry, scientific and practical, needs to formulate and adopt 
certain hypotheses on which to further build the argumentation. It uses 
instinctive reasoning, or hypotheses — also called abduction by the 
term’s discoverer, Peirce himself [see Gorlee 1996 (English version), 
2000 (rev. German version), 2004: 114-132 (2nd rev. English 
version)]. In the abductive inference, we catch a new “case from a 
rule and result’ (CP: 2.623 = W: 3: 325, Peirce’s emphasis). Peirce 
added: “On the table there is a handful of white beans; and, after some 
searching, I find one of the bags contains white beans only. I at once 
infer as probability, or as a fair guess, that this handful was taken out 
ofthat bag” (CP: 2.623 = W: 3: 325):
Rule All the beans from this bag are white.
Case These beans are white.
• Result These beans are from this bag. (CP: 2.623 = W: 3: 326)
Abductive mannerisms are contrasted with deduction and induction, 
and are backward reasoning. Abduction is based on hunches and 
guessing, and the emotional overtones build intuitive opportunities 
stating “may” and “maybe not”. This gives through the abductive 
experience, new surprises and information.
O f the three modes of reasoning, abduction is the only to “open up 
new ground” (NEM: 3: 206) and to introduce novelty into the 
intellectual (or pseudo-intellectual) inquiry. Induction moves from 
ideas to things, whereas abduction is a reverse operation: abductive 
syllogism moves from things to ideas, from outside to inside. Inquiry 
seems to start from catching the inquirer’s flavors, tastes, and 
expectancies until it reaches his or her hypotheses on the case. Weak 
as the absolute truth value of abduction may be and in fact is — at 
least when compared to the probative force o f its stronger 
counterparts: deduction and induction — it is nevertheless the creative 
force breathing the air o f originality into what would otherwise be a 
“reasonable” (CP: 5.174) but utterly rationalistic and, thereby, lifeless 
process.
Peirce relabeled a mode of thought, which for all his conjectural 
tentativeness, was often plausible. It suggests more than gratuitous 
guesswork, and is the lightning flash breaking through logical analysis 
to shed light on the underlying instinctual feeling. The tentative
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explanation is iconically prefigured in the premises. The first premiss 
describes what the beans must be like to qualify as beans from this 
bag. The interpretant (the legal conclusion) of an abduction is an icon, 
here whiteness. The rest is guessing based on rational instinct, creating 
feeling. It is believed that abduction looks somehow into the unseen 
universe and tries to make some hypothesis concerning it. Abduction 
corresponds to Peirce’s firstness, which is “represented” by the 
unthinkable (but feelable) iconic image, since it seems to stand for its 
object in virtue of its analogy with it.
The abductive overtones of logical reasoning is unsuited to legal 
systems and legal acts, because its judgment gives no certainty: the 
decisions are of an emotional nature and happen in the form of 
intuitive perceptions: “It seems to me that . . .” Abductive judgments 
offer personal values and build the signs to acquire their genuine and 
collective meaning(s) through self-control and settling of doubts 
within, firstly, induction and subsequently, deduction. This is the 
evolution of Peirce’s “fixation of belief’ (mentioned before) and 
abductive beliefs are the first and essential steps further on the way 
toward final reasonableness. Abduction is not included in the 
cognitive laws and dispositions (such as common law and statute law, 
discussed above). Abductive forms are not (or not yet) inquiry but, 
rather, forms of inchoate questioning out of which legal discourses 
may possibly emerge in the long run of history. We speak here about 
the emotive, religious or political values, integrated into explicit law, 
but a “hidden” but real abductive rationale in common law and statute 
law, where feelings are mentioned or, as the case may be, un­
mentioned. Take, for instance, Peirce’s and Holmes’s “felt neces­
sities”, the social and individual intuitions, which are the seed of every 
growth of law. Take liability as a legal act, a human experience which 
implies a human choice, where man (woman) decides to make himself 
(or herself) answerable for harm or no.
The discovery of acceptable premises in abductive backward 
reasoning clearly occurs in non-written law, transmitted via oral 
tradition and through the power of memory. Non-written law includes 
religious-based or political-based sentiments, beliefs, or propositions 
(following the order of Peirce’s categories). In European law systems 
we find the system of the law in four progressive terms: firstly in laws, 
secondly in treaties, thirdly in jurisdiction and fourthly in customary 
law. Laws belong primarily to deduction; treaties have a deductive-
inductive character; jurisdiction is primarily an upgraded inductive 
character. The latter, customary law is unwritten law, established by 
long use of local rules, which is still considered as a valid right 
affecting openly and clearly the inhabitants of districts or regions, and 
legally affecting the outsiders. These traditional rural rights, and their 
acts, perform a repeatable tendency toward a regularity in the existing 
legal situation. The local rules are probably the historical remains of 
traditional customs of trade and commerce in provincial regions, and 
do not come from central authority. Customary law gives credit to 
abductive values: relevant sentiments, beliefs and propositions are 
upgraded from a sense of customary rights to valid thought, probably 
due to practical and ethical circumstances in culture, geography, and 
climate. An example would be the Norwegian custom of dugnad 
(“community self-help” and “joint efforts”), meaning the voluntary 
and cooperative work carried by members of clubs, schools, and 
organizations for the purpose of helping the neighbours living in the 
isolated, mountainous countrylife in Norway. Despite coming from 
personal witnesses (notaries, police, noblemen, counselors, lay judges, 
elders, and wise men and women) testifying to the certain real 
existence of customary law, old customs have gained the status of 
written law in a particular area and have acquired a common 
acceptance.
Legal examples can be drawn from commerce in agriculture, cattle 
raising, fishery, forestry, and associate branches. In British case of 
law, in Wilson v Willes (1806), the tenants of a manor claimed the 
customary right to take as much turf as they needed for their lawns 
from the manorial commons. This was in legal terms held to be too 
vague, since there appeared to be no limit to the amount of turf which 
could be taken. In Mills v Corporation of Colchester (1867), it was 
held that a customary right to fish had no legal force where the right 
had always depended on the granting o f a licence, even though such 
licences had traditionally been granted to local people on request. In 
(inter)national business cases, customary law mostly provides for 
irreconciliable grounds of decision-making. In a modem case, North 
and South Trust Co v Berkeley (1971), goods transported from 
Buenos Aires arriving in Asuncion arrived in shortage. To settle the 
case of claim, the insurance with Lloyd’s was inspected by the agent
acting here for both parties. This long standing practice o f Lloyd’s __
inspecting and defending both policies of insurance —  raised issues of
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impartiality and bad faith (in legal terms, fraud and non-disclosure). 
The custody of customary law used by insurance brokers worldwide 
remained unsuccessful in the Courts. Customary law is only exercised 
as of right when it is a clear and certain practice. The judicial decision 
in North and South Trust Co v Berkeley (1971) uses independent 
asessors to inspect the case for both parties; clearly breaking away 
from customary prerogatives or “privileges” toward the principles of 
valid morality of commercial law.
Enforceable law in Western and non-Western countries is also due 
to abductive differences in historical and cultural facts and pheno­
mena. If we perceive the current classification of legal systems, which 
is neither biological nor geographical, but dogmatic and undogmatic 
(breaking out of the discussed pattern of inductive common-law and 
deductive statute law), we encounter a large variety of legal systems in 
which we see the triadic symbiosis of abductive, inductive, and 
deductive principles maintaining a synergetic relationship with one 
predominant element and the two subyacent elements. When the 
abductive element is the dominant idea, the result may be half­
conscious and undeveloped, and hence a false problem-solving 
method — called “degeneracy” in Peirce’s terminology; see further in 
this article and discussed in Gorlee (1990). The target of this process 
is, however, the formation of evolutionary law systems — Peirce’s 
valid thirds — as right thinking now and in the future.
Practical examples would be like the disappearing socialist law — 
which sought to transform the legal community in accordance with the 
original Marxist-Leninist school of thought, based on state govern­
ment, a classless society, and no right to individual property, since the 
right of legal rights (capital production) is replaced by common 
ownership by the state; Islamic law — based on doctrines of 
obligations called Sunna giving prophetic pronouncements and rules 
from Sana and Koran in which religion and law are one; the law 
system in Israel — a mixture of common law and the Hebrew Bible, 
the Torah, plus commentaries by rabbis plus the commentaries made 
of the Five Books of Moses, the Misnah and Talmud; the African law 
systems —  based on principles of animism embodied in totems, 
shamans, idols, and awes of ancestor worship; as well as other mixed 
law systems in which room for intuitive judgments plays a legal role. 
Varieties of such archaic customs are also the main characteristics of 
the law of tribes inspired by African metaphysical thinking (abstracted
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from the original French-oriented, and English-linked, statute law) as 
well as the “primitive” (but sophisticated) law of Saami people 
(formerly called Lapps), Australian aborigines, and Indian populations 
in Brazil, cultivating their own spiritual or sacred initial beliefs which 
are regarded to bring reasonableness, against the struggle with the 
authority. Local customs are an active juridical layer chiefly but safely 
spreading under the enforceable rights of the Norwegian, Australian, 
Brazilian, etc. official laws, where political and religious practices are 
considered a trusted belief of the entire national community.
Abductive sign-action
Peirce, not a trained lawyer but a talented thinker, logician and 
scientist, did not expand the abductive idea for legal purposes, and its 
significance will require some interpretative extrapolation. In his 
reviews in The Nation (1869-1908), Peirce reviewed scientific and 
philosophical literature, and could use his reviews for exploring some 
intricate problems in many areas and disciplines, which in the 19th 
century were not so hyperspecialized as universities and colleges are 
today: a stroke of good fortune for the interdisciplinary (or trans- 
disciplinary) semiotician then and today. In a hidden paragraph (writ­
ten in 1901), Peirce editorialized in his essentially negative, even 
alarmist review on the book on Ethics: Descriptive and Explanatory 
written by Sidney Edward Mezes, professor of philosophy at the 
University of Texas (CTN: 2: 149), as follows:
A judge, let us suppose, has brought before him a case in which a case in which 
a man has suffered injury for which he claims damages of another. Whether 
damages ought to be paid in such a case is often, as we know, a delicate and 
puzzling question. We will follow Professor Mezes in using a much too simple 
illlustration, which ought to puzzle nobody. “Take”, he says, “the case where 
A’s cattle break out of their enclosure, in spite of A’s having used all the care he 
reasonably could have used, or learned to use, and could learn to use, and 
destroy B’s valuable crop in an adjoining field”. This case (or rather another far 
more difficult) puzzles the judge, and he takes it under advisement. He naturally 
looks into the works on ethics, and, finding nothing pertinent in modern books, 
is driven to the scholastic treatises. Now, there is nothing in the whole scholastic 
logic more justly an object of derision for any modem thinker than its weak 
confusion of thought in its doctrine of causes; not in that whole doctrine is there 
any more manifest absurdity than the distinction between a proximate and a
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remote cause. When we meet with an application of it in the scholastic 
commentary on the Sentences, it stands out as so much more nonsensical than 
the rest as to be comical; but that anybody should be made to suffer because of 
any consequence of such metaphysical jargon is outrageous flippancy. Yet it is 
just this outrage that the judge us driven to commit, or to pretend to commit, 
because the ethical writers have not expounded right and wrong in a sufficiently 
luminous and reasonable form.
Professor Mezes follows them. He maintains that A, the owner of the 
cattle, ought to reimburse В for the injury one by them to his crop, because A 
is the proximate cause of B’s suffering. If he would not follow the decisions 
of Texas courts as the ultimate evidence concerning right and wrong; he could 
not fail to see that the real reason why the judge awards damages to В is that 
to allow a private person to undertake a business humanly sure in the long run 
to injure his neighbors (and all the more so if he “cannot learn to use” suitable 
preventive measures), and then allow him to pocket all the profits, and make 
his neighbors pay for incidental losses, would be to bring himself and his 
court into public contempt and into no little danger. That was the judge’s real 
reason. But in days gone by (perhaps not yet in Texas) if a judge could decide 
a case justly, and yet by a process of metaphysical reasoning the less 
intelligible the better, he was regarded with awe by the vulgar; and that was 
one motive for his seizing upon that argument when he could get no modem 
light. (CTN; 3: 51-52, Peirce’s emphasis)
It is significant that Peirce’s problems in this scholarly review 
necessarily had to abstract from his own theory of signs and his 
doctrine of categories, both of which were unfamiliar to the audience 
of The Nation and unwelcome to the editor (Bernstein 1975; Gorlee 
2004: 187, 230). Yet Peirce’s example brought to life in his delicately 
farcical elaboration of the pragmatic adventures of legal ethics, as 
lessons in legal morality (Gorlee 2004: 187, 230) and approaches 
himself to Holmes’ theory of liability, as described.
A sure sign of semiosis, “a sequence o f inferences or a train of 
thought” (CP: 7.583), put into deliberation by the judge, words and re­
words the action of a legal semiosis — including the triad of a sign, its 
object, and the interpretant — all of them providing clarity as well as a 
degree o f vagueness to the case. The complex fate of the sign, which 
consists in Peirce’s “puzzling” details or facts of the case, or otherwise 
requires someone’s special attention suggesting it means something 
other than itself, or something more than itself, thereby inviting, even 
requiring some further information in the form of new information — 
here, no real but transworded, legal information — about the “real” 
sign-event. The sign-action still remains indeterminate and uncertain,
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and continues to “puzzle the judge”, since two objects determine the 
sign and what happened to it. One object, the “immediate object” as it 
is represented by the sign and can be a quality, an existent, or a law 
(PW : 33). The immediate object is the object “inside” the sign at face 
value, whereas we also have to deal with the “dynamical object”, 
absent in the immediate object and in the sign, but found in the real 
context of the sign relation. The dynamical object is “the Object 
outside the Sign [...]. The Sign must indicate it my a hint; and this 
hint, or its substance, is the Immediate Object” (PW: 83). The visible 
and invisible objects are suggested in Peirce’s distinction between 
Peirce’s “proximate” and a “remote” cause, both of them determining 
to blur the process of semiosis — suggested by a “hint”. The 
differences between three interpretants —  immediate, dynamical, and 
final interpretants — join the object in determining the modalities of 
the circumstances of the primary sign in its histority, but the final 
effect of the case serves to illustrate a model of precedent cases in 
Peirce’s “luminous and reasonable form”. As stated by Ransdell:
There are occasions when the dynamical interpretant — that is, the actually 
occurring interpretant — of a sign which is the law is not definitely 
identifiable because the law is to vague in the relevant respect: the facts of the 
case may be clear enough but the meaning of the law is not, and the judge 
must, as we say, exercise real judgment in the matter (which is to say that the 
judge must recognize something as being the relevant dynamical interpretant 
without benefit of recourse to any ascertainable basis in the immediate 
interpretant that would justify that recognition). The conscientious judge 
makes a guess, in effect, at what the final interpretant includes when he or she 
recognizes something as being a dynamical interpretant of that law at that time 
relative to that case. But it is the course of future legal interpretation of that 
law (in courts of appeal, in future juridical practice, and so on) that will 
determine whether the judge was or was not right in his or her attempt to 
anticipate the relevant content of the final interpretant — or, as we would 
ordinarily say, in the attempt to set a precedent that will be honored. (Ransdell 
1986: 682-683, Ransdell’s emphasis)
The at least partial indeterminacy of the possible meanings of the 
primary sign makes the sign relation a powerful but fallible instrument 
of logical discovery of familiar and unfamiliar elements of the facts 
related to the knowledge of the (un)criminal sign and its contextual 
meaning. Surprisingly, in the bastion of legal reason, the judge’s 
speculations introduce to deduction and induction a sphere of 
abduction with hints and guesses, which are self-controlled to
discipline the rationality of its beliefs and give rise to discussions and 
debate.
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Judicial decisions
Decision law is seen as “organic” law with a human(ized) meaning (in 
common and non-legal terminology (Gamer 1987: 395). Therefore, 
judicial decision law will have life and grow in diversity and indivi­
duality from outside inwards, and is far from dogmatic, but “skep­
tical” law. Judicial decisions are “self-multiplied, self-shaping and 
self-regulating”, but with “shades of irritability and sensitivity” 
(Rottleuthner 1988). Their premisses are not full grown, but can be 
revised, denied, changed, and overruled according to the corpus and 
qualities of the case law technique (Williams 1982: 67-96). Their life 
and growth, “set in motion by the emotion of surprise” trigger “violent 
response” (Kevelson 1985: 204), thereby adding mimetic and repro­
ductive elements to the interpretation of the original sign (Mendell 
1994: 629, note 25). The intermittent mundus imaginalis of judicial 
decisions are viewed not only in deduction and induction, but also in 
half-glimpsed abduction.
Decision law is a legal response to a claim, a reaction to an action, 
or a response to an answer. Technically, in the U.S. judges are said to 
write opinions to justify their decisions or (in English terminology) 
judgments in courts of law; they write decisions or judgments. The 
actual written judgments or opinions giving formal(ized) judgments in 
court are cold files or pieces of official writing in deductive form, kept 
for recordation in the U.S. judgment-book and English judgment-roll 
for appeal procedures and otherwise. The prior decisions are mental 
communications (formal messages) of an authoritative nature 
according to the size of the audience:
Many commands, orders or warrants are issued directly to one person. The 
decision in a court case binds the immediate parties — two people, sometimes 
more — and a small circle of officials who may have to help carry it out. The 
indirect message, of course, runs to a wider group. Orders, warrants, and 
commands are usually less important than more general messages — doctri­
nes, laws, principles, or rules. (Friedman 1977: 58)
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The legal burden of proof are directed to Peirce s community, 
(re)affirming a “proposition whose falsity can never be discovered and 
[...] contains [...] upon our principle, absolutely no error” {CP. 5.311). 
The underlying decisions with its abstract deductive contents are 
preferred as having inductive forms. The inductive forms refer to the 
case suggesting the provisional (and questionable) intention in the light 
of judicial policy (William 1982: 97-111). William speaks of dealing 
with standard and “fringe” meaning, the context and “mischief’ rule in 
the wording, the literal rule and room for differences of opinion, stating 
that “the literal rule is a rule against using intelligence in understanding 
language” (William 1982: 105), significantly adding that
Anyone who in ordinary' life interpreted words literally, being indifferent to 
what the speaker or writer meant, would be regarded as a pedant, a mischief- 
maker or an idiot. One practical reason for the literal rule is that judges are 
now deeply afraid of being accused of making political judgments at variance 
with the purpose of Parliament when it passes the Act. (Williams 1982: 105)
The inductive shapes obey the economic trends and social forces. The 
judicial meanings support their policy lines and instrument the judge’s 
values. The pressure of this liberal and conservative “scaling” techni­
que (Friedman 1977: 172), pinned on a “scale” of public opinion, is a 
commonly accepted and socially acknowledged technique in order to 
end the legal uncertainty and create a degree of order out of chaos 
(Ricoeur 2000: 127-132).
The abductive background of legal decisions serves as a trouble- 
saver in the coldness of the just solution. The right solution is 
manysided and may convey different interpretations, both usual and 
unusual meanings repeated as errors and crude mistakes, and hardly 
understood as existing power or force working in human reality or 
“reality”. Are there tentative signs of emotive and emotional genres 
within verdicts and other legal decisions, where personal or ideolo­
gical intuitions are acknowledged as being more than an open and 
secret space? Take the case (or maybe the vision) o f the judge who 
decides by his or her feeling, and not by judgment or rationalization, 
conducted in a scientific and public debate o f the “hunch” theory as a 
powerful feature o f judicial reasoning and decisions; see Hutcheson 
(1929), Wasserstrom (1961), Mendell (1994). Recently, take the 
“puzzling” pronouncement of Posner (2001) about the presence of
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emotion in law, suggesting Peirce’s abduction within legal decision­
making.
The abductive argumentation is claimed in the judgment pro­
nounced, as opposed to the rationalization by the judge of the 
processes of his or her mind. After Peirce’s death and in the last years 
of Holmes’s life, Judge Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr. (1879-1973), a 
friend of Dewey, wrote a playfiil but spectacular article on “The Judg­
ment Intuitive: The Function of the ‘Hunch’ on Judicial Reasoning” 
(1929, see Mendell 1994: 627-629, note 17). In Hutcheson’s pejora­
tive words in his negative, even alarmist, essay on the judge’s mental 
connection between question and decision, a few hunches or guesses
[...] were recognized in four kinds of judgments: first the cogative, of and by 
reflection and logomancy; second, aleatory, of and by the dice; third, intuitive, 
of and by feeling or “hunching”; and fourth, asisine, of and by an ass; and in 
that same youthful, scornful way I regarded the last three as only variants of 
each other, the results of processes all alien to good judges. (Hutcheson 1929: 
275-276)
This leaves the intelligent speculation, deciding by feeling not by 
judgment, open for discussion in Hutcheson’s article. Behind the hidden 
truth in hard cases, the judge “being merely on his way [...] to fmd the 
just solution, will follow his hunch wherever it leads him, and when, 
following it, he meets the right solution face to face” (Hutcheson 1929: 
278) and enable him to pronounce his judgment. A hunch is the
[...] tiptoe faculty of the mind which can feel and follow a hunch which 
makes not only the best gamblers, the best detectives, the best lawyers, the 
best judges, the materials of whose trades are the most chancey because most 
human, and, the results of whose activities are for the same reason the most 
subject to uncertainty and the best attained by approximation, but it is that 
same faculty which has guided and will continue to open hidden doors. 
(Hutcheson 1929: 179)
The hidden door is abductive thought, revealing “the soul of the fact” 
in a “flash of luminous hypothesis” (Hutcheson 1929: 281).
Without mentioning Peirce and Holmes, but briefly naming their 
theological friend in the law-dominated Metaphysical Club, William 
James (Hutcheson 1929: 282, Menand 2001: x- xi), Hutcheson charac­
terizes intuition or imagination as a “lucky find” made at “apocalyptic 
moments” of professional life (Hutcheson 1929: 281). In contra­
262 Dinda L. Gorlee
distinction with the deductive and inductive models, the judge per­
ceives abduction as “this sensitiveness to new ideas, this power to cast 
in ever widening circles to find a fresh scent, instead of standing 
baying where the track was lost” (Hutcheson 1929: 280). The judge 
trusts his or her own imaginative response to an idea and takes his 
knowledge for granted. This article exaggerates the high formality of 
the judge’s status and applying to his mental posture the description of 
a tricky inventor to “trace the hidden equities of divine reward, and to 
catch sight through the darkness, of the fateful threads of woven fire 
which connect error with its retribution” (Hutcheson 1929: 288). 
Hutcheson’s parody may be regarded as an unique combination of 
both creative and cognitive criticism, entertained with a bit of comic 
effect.
Hutcheson’s mock-aesthetic illusion of 1929, however, prompted a 
valuable debate of self-expression among U.S. judges themselves. 
Later examples of the improvement in working practices to discover 
the truth, not the depleted truth but the real truth of emotion in law, 
include Richard Wasserstrom’s The Judicial Decision: Toward a 
Theory o f  Legal Justification (1961: 84—117, part. 89-96). Wasser- 
strom characterized Hutcheson’s intuitive comments as “rather mysti­
cal statements of approval” (1961: 184). Wasserstrom defuses the 
controversial issue of the hunch by suggesting that it involves a dual 
procedure: a process of justification and a process of discovery (1961: 
27). A process of justification has non-intuitive, evidential, and utilita­
rian grounds specified as a bifurcation of deductive and non-deductive 
reasoning. For Wasserstrom, deductive reasoning means mechanical 
reasoning, while non-deductive reasoning means inductive reasoning 
(not explicitly mentioned by Wasserstrom). The process of discovery 
seems based on instinct, emotion, and custom —  as discussed in 
Peirce's abductive reasoning used in law. Wasserstrom’s two proce­
dures of standard-and-rule are the elements of the “rational behavior” 
of a legal conclusion, building up the logic of right or wrong decisions 
(1961: 104—105). The process o f discovery is the topic of the “talk 
about judicial hunches, emotions and personalities” (Wasserstrom 
1961: 31) rather than publicizing serious scholarship.
The personal desire to integrate guesses into the decisions raises 
several points:
To begin with a trivial one: it is probably correct that the judge can select anv
factors he wishes and determining the characterization of the fact situation
Hints and guesses 263
[••■]• A more plausible interpretation of this thesis would construe it as 
asserting that there are no grounds upon which a given characterization may 
be criticized in other words, that there is no sense in which a particular classi­
fication could be termed “correct” or “incorrect”, “reasonable” or “unreason­
able”. (Wasserstrom 1961: 33, his emphasis)
Deduction is the irrational fallacy (Wasserstrom 1961: 33), judged as 
a utopian strategy. A positive strategy adopted to solve hard cases 
with a reasonable classification (Holmes’s and Peirce’s terminology) 
suggests that “a judge can extract a ratio decidendi of almost any 
order of generality from a particular case” (Wasserstrom 1961: 35, his 
emphasis) in order to judge the “vague and imprecise” (1961: 35) 
circumstances in the case at hand. The judge uses his or her own 
intuition to make the meaning fit the court’s opinion. This (ab)use of 
emotional tactics to reach formal reasoning means that “justice means 
the ‘natural’, ‘individualistic’, or ‘discretionary’ adjudication of each 
case as it arises” (Wasserstrom 1961: 85). Intuition is, for Wasser­
strom, “the most ju st [decision] fo r  the particular case” (Wasserstrom 
1961: 86, Wasserstrom’s emphasis).
Wasserstrom is a cautious writer, anxious not to be slaughtered 
himself. He defines intuition as “broader than ordinary philosophical 
usage” as “any process by which truth or correctness is directly 
apprehended'1 including “emotional apprehension” but excluding the 
“sense of justice” from a “sense of injustice:” “There may be diffe­
rences between the two approaches, but for my purposes they can be 
treated as being essentially similar” (Wasserstrom 1961: 89, his 
emphasis). This distinction is true to the elements and truth-claim of 
Peirce’s hypothesis of abduction, where in legal terms, decision is “the 
binding decision of the case” (Wasserstrom 1961: 92). The specula­
tion is hoped to be free from the “biases, partialities, and like peculia­
rities of the judges who render decisions” (Wasserstrom 1961: 93). 
The personal decision corresponds to three characteristics:
First, under such procedures there should be certain independent criteria by 
which the one who makes a decision can evaluate the conclusion reached or 
the course of action decided upon. [...] The second, and perhaps more 
significant, requirement is that the justification for any proposal should be 
submitted to and should be able to withstand public examination. [...] The 
third requirement [...] stipulates that all the grounds or reasons for the 
decision be both revealed and evaluated. (Wasserstrom 19671: 94)
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The three characteristics are also relevant for Peirce’s abduction wit 
its final “wisdom for the community”, the final purpose of the critical 
inquirers, as discussed above (Wasserstrom 1961: 94). Wasserstrom 
cites Dewey’s writings on the philosophy of law. Dewey’s article 
“Logical method and law” (1924) has thrown a bright light on the 
topic of the external grounds of the legal conclusions:
Courts no only reach decisions; they expound them, and the exposition must 
state justifying reasons. [...] Exposition implies that a definitive solution is 
reached, that the situation is now determinate with respect to its legal 
implication. Its purpose is to set forth grounds for the decision reached so that 
it will not appear as an arbitrary dictum, and so that it will indicate a rule for 
dealing with similar cases in the future. It is highly probable that the need of 
justifying to others conclusions reached and decisions made has been the chief 
cause of the origin and development of logical operations in the precise sense; 
of abstraction, generalization, regard for consistency of implications. It is 
quite conceivable that if no one had ever had to account to others for his 
decisions, logical operations would have developed, but men would use 
exclusively methods of inarticulate intuition and impression, feeling; so that 
only after considerable experience in accounting for their decisions to others 
who demanded a reason, or exculpation, and were not satisfied till they got it, 
did men begin to give an account to themselves of the process of reaching a 
conclusion in a justified way. However this may be, it is certain that injudicial 
decisions the only alternative to arbitrary data, accepted by the parties to a 
controversy only because of the authority of prestige of the judge, is a rational 
statement which formulates grounds and exposes connecting or logical links. 
(Dewey 1924: 24 after Wasserstrom 1961: 95; see also Merrell 1994: 577, 
624—626 and passim)
Intuitions are “private affairs ... difficult to obtain ... [and] even 
harder to repeat and thereby verify” (Wasserstrom 1961: 95). The 
external grounds “blur the divide between fantasy and fact, between 
wish and ideal” so that Wasserstrom needs to conclude that the “jud­
ges who think they have had infallible intuitions o f particular justice” 
(1961: 96) are not to be trusted.
Recently, this tradition of the fallibility of decision-making and the 
role of emotion in law has been continued by Richard Posner, Chief 
Judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and a dis­
tinguished legal scholar (1999, 2001). Originally a student of Hol­
mes’s skeptical legal scholarship (1992 and passim) and thereby of 
Peirce’s methods of right thinking, Posner interprets the law as the 
effect of an economic and moral system. He believes that judges base
their decisions on guesses and personal ideology, hiding behind a veil 
of precedent. In The Problems o f  Moral and Legal Theory (1999), 
Posner briefly touches on the judges’ moral intuitions with respect to 
the pain of the enforced punishment. What is the difference between 
three and four years spent in prison? The verdicts are not specific but 
general and social; they have “no fixed objects” and are “morally 
neutral” (1999: 38). Moral emotions on “numbers” in severe criminal 
punishments — one year’s probation, six month in jail, ten years in 
the penitentiary, a $5,000 fine (Posner 1999: 38) —  impose the emo­
tional judgments of the judges, “influenced by experience, informa­
tion, and imagination” and ’’disciplined by fact” (Posner 1999: 260).
Posner’s Frontiers in Legal Theory (2001) does not mention 
Hutcheson (1929) and Wasserstrom (1961), but develops his own 
belief in emotivism, rooted in emotion vs “emotionalism” (2001: 28- 
29). Judges have no access to moral truth, their emotionalist attitude 
means that they tend to give “undue salience to one feature of the 
situation and its associated stimulus” (Posner 2001: 228). The legal 
decision to discern the real circumstances of the case becomes a 
deviated form of mental, moral or spiritual “blindness”, where cogni­
tive feeling regards feeling and emotion is secondary to what we ex­
pect of judges: real cognitive thought. Emotionalism depends on the 
discussed “hard” and “soft” qualities of the object. Take the cruel ca­
ses of “cold-blooded crimes”, ’’crimes of passion”, “hate crimes” as 
well as crimes dependent on a psychiatric illness or drug addiction, 
where the accused claims no legal responsibility or guilt, without 
“programming” the evidence of extenuating circumstances or a 
depraved will. According to Posner, “enhanced” punishment, imposed 
by the judges, would nicely accommodate the pressure of social 
interest groups or a personal ideology; it creates the barbarous kind of 
“we-they” thinking that “can lead to barbarous prison conditions, sum­
mary justice, and savage punishments” (2001: 235, 240). The emo­
tional distress — transfigured by the direct affects of passion, fellow 
feeling and empathy —  becomes “one-sided, short-sighted, senti­
mental” penal practices (Posner 2001: 234, 248). Translated into 
Peirce’s semiotic terminology, it becomes raw emotion which gene­
rates false “degenerate signs”. Degeneracy displays no token for 
regeneration into logical valid reasoning (as discussed in customary 
law, see Gorlee 1990, 2004: 119, 136, 183).
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In dealing with the role of emotion in law, Posner (2001: 244-245 
and 1988: 101-110) mentions William Shakespeare’s moralistic- 
ethical play, Measure fo r  Measure (performed in 1604, first printed in 
1623) in which he wrestles with the solidarity with vice and the 
“measure” of punishment. The title Measure fo r  Measure comes from 
Saint Matthew’s account of Christ’s Sermon on the Mount: “with 
what measure ye mete, it shall be measured to you again” (Matthew 7: 
2) and alerts the reader and spectator to the heated power struggle for 
justice, experienced in the judges’ conscience. In Shakespeare’s 
tragicomedy, the virtuous heroine, Isabella, expresses what is morally 
and ethically good and bad, and in-between where good and bad 
mingle: “ Ignominy in ransom and free pardon / Are of two houses 
lawful mercy / Is nothing kin to foul redemption” (1987: 800) 
exclaiming “O perilous mouths / bear in them one and the selfsame 
tongue / Either of condemnation or approof, / Bidding the law make 
curtsy to their will, / Hooking both right and wrong to th’ appetite, / 
To follow as it draws” (Shakespeare 1987: 800). Law is rooted in the 
secret places in the soul, knocked or seeked or asked without com­
mitting errors in the emotional distance. Isabella turns the world 
upside down, reversing the moral maxims and devices of male judges 
who think that the purpose of life is to “get on” in strong formalism.
The temperaments of Posner’s male and female conceptions of law 
(1988: 108), felt by judges, semiotically called “hot” and “cold” mora­
lity, create a moral space for the hidden pitfalls of judicial tempera­
ments (Gorlee 2004: 210-211). Posner writes that in Measure for 
Measure, the legal terms
[...] suggest ways of minimizing the human factor, minimizing discretion, and 
maximizing “ruledness” or “legalism”. The emphasis is on professionalism, 
logic, strict rules, sharp distinctions, positive law, and “hard “cases (meaning, 
not as it has come to means, cases that are difficult, but cases that reach hard 
results, showing that head and heart are firmly separated); on abstracting from 
the specific circumstances of a case, from the tug of emotion, and from the 
personalities of the disputants. (Posner 1988: 107)
This passage is a mixture of the three modes of reasoning: deduction- 
induction-abduction. The judge, “though [he] errs like others” (Sha­
kespeare 1987: 797), still appears to trust his own forceful energy and 
boundless pride, but both qualities seem to be disconnected from their 
basis in pure emotionalism. The judge produces strong, if in the long
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run powerless, and fallible “quasi-signs”, relying in his art and craft. 
Peirce trusted his own “assurance of Instinct; assurance of Experience; 
assurance of Form” (CP: 8.374). But one can never be “cocksure” 
(Peirce s key term) of a feeling, belief, or persuasion, as Peirce 
assured in his theory of fallibilism (Gorlee 2004: 211 and passim). 
Peirce adopted his maxim of the force of the community, “Truth 
crushed to earth shall rise again” (CP: 5.408 = W: 3: 274).
Posner has a strong appeal to Peirce’s pragmatic thought and its 
reasoning of cases of doubt and his semiosic (in)determinacy — 
giving a tension with legal formalism. Posner only briefly mentions 
Peirce’s abduction as a “mysterious process” (1990: 105) and states 
that “Peirce may have been on the right track in suggesting that we are 
able to choose promising hypotheses to test because of our minds, 
being themselves the products of nature, have an intuitive grasp of the 
principle” (1990: 116 note). Concerning the future of this inquiry, 
Uusitalo’s article (1991) would suggest an abductive strain in our 
legal thinking, related to the reflexive rationality. Let us expect further 
clarification of the subject of abduction by other semiological 
defenders.
Abductive flashes and glimpses
In his pragmatistic article “The path of law” (1897), Holmes argued that
When we study law we are not studying a mystery but a well known 
profession. We are studying what we shall want in order to appear before 
judges, or to advise people in such a way as to keep them out of court. The 
reason why it is a profession, why people will pay lawyers to argue for them 
or to advise them, is that in societies like ours the commance of the public 
force is intrusted to the judges in certain cases, and the whole power of the 
state will be put forth, if necessary, to carry out their judgments and decrees. 
People want to know under what circumstances and how far they will run the 
risk of corning against what is much stronger than themselves, and hence it 
becomes a business to find out when this danger is to be feared. The Object of 
our study, then, is prediction, the prediction of the incidence of the public 
force through the instrumentality of the courts. (Holmes 1897: 457)
To “demystify” the fearful body of decisions of judges, I 
demonstrated the salience of Peirce’s three-step semiotics to the 
understanding of the ridigity and flexibity of the systems of law. Our
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modem, inductive patters of thought have made us concentrate 
inescapably upon reaching the deductive universe as the only object 
we can claim to reach. Legal activity is not entirely logical, it has 
strong links to personal beliefs and interpersonal communication, 
introducing abductive vagueness and slippery creativity in forms of 
national and international judicial reasoning. In situations of conflict 
and dispute, we fully realize that the legal norm is not just valid logic, 
but a variety of judgments variously linked to Peirce’s three cate­
gories, limiting and expanding the utilization of the law. Judicial 
decisions is not founded on inmutable abstract principles, but revealed 
the intermittent vision, seen in flashes and glimpses, of backward 
reasoning: abduction. This article revealed some of the semio-logical 
sources of this pia fraus, translated as pious frauds, “a symbol not a 
sign of justice” (Boasson 1966: 68-69).
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Подсказки и догадки: 
правовые формы семио-логической аргументации
Юридическая семиотика является быстроразвивающимся подразде­
лом общей семиотики. Трехступенчатые принципы семиотической 
логики Пирса представляют собой три ключевые категории Первич­
ности, Вторичности и Третичности, основанные на противоположен­
ных методах логики: дедукции, индукции и открытой Пирсом абдук­
ции. Ни дедукция, ни абдукция не могут претендовать на истинность 
больше, чем дедукция. В противоположность правовой системе, 
абдукция имеет место быть в интуитивных умозаключениях, кото­
рые касаются возможности т.н. обратной аргументации.
Правовые культуры континентального права характеризуются 
установкой на абстрактно-дедуктивный подход, который диктуется 
писаным правом, в то время как фактическая хрупкость системы 
англо-американского права, чьи судебные решения и прецеденты 
опираются на индукцию, переносит свои обычаи в моральное 
пространство и время. Правовые системы так называемого “обычно­
го” права предпочитают абдуктивные понятия: авторитетные мне­
ния, убеждения и утверждения в этой системе подняты на уровень 
юридически действительной аргументации. Юридическое принятие 
решений в англо-американском праве характеризуется как принятие 
решений с абдуктивными оттенками.
Vihjed ja oletused: semio-loogikalise 
argumentatsiooni õiguslikud vormid
Juriidiline semiootika on üldsemiootika kiiresti arenev allharu. Peirce’i 
semiootilise loogika kolmeastmelised põhimõtted kujutavad endast kolme 
võtmekategooriat (esmasus, teisesus, kolmasus), mis põhinevad vastavatel
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loogika meetoditel: deduktsioonil, induktsioonil ja Peirce’i avastatud 
abduktsioonil. Ei deduktsioon ega ka abduktsioon ei saa pretendeerida 
tõesusele rohkem kui induktsioon. Vastupidiselt Õigussüsteemile on ab­
duktsioon omal kohal intuitiivsetes järeldustes, mis puudutavad nn tagasi- 
mineva argumentatsiooni võimalust.
KontinentaalÕigusruumi kultuure iseloomustab suunitlus deduktiiv- 
abstraktsele lähenemisele, mida dikteerib kiijutatud õigus, samas kui 
angloameerika õigussüsteemi faktiline haprus, kus kohtulahendid ja 
kohtupretsedendid tuginevad induktsioonil, orienteerub haijumuslikult 
moraali aegruumile. Nn “tavaõiguse” juriidilised süsteemid eelistavad 
abduktiivseid mõisteid: autoriteetsed arvamused, veendumused ja väited 
on selles süsteemis tõstetud tegeliku juriidilise argumentatsiooni staatu­
sesse. Juriidiliste otsuste vastuvõttu anglo-ameerika õiguses iseloomustab 
abduktiivsete varjunditega otsuste vastuvõtt.
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Abstract. This essay is an analytical extension of Roland Barthes’ structural 
analysis of an excerpt from the Old Testament (Genesis 32: 22-32), known as 
“The Struggle with the Angel”. It thus continues the search for “the third 
meaning” of this enigmatic passage. In this essay, “The Struggle with the 
Angel” is undertaken in the phenomenological (xenological) register which 
situates it in the liminal sphere at the crossing of disclosure and concealment. 
Subsequent semiotic analyses of three visual renditions of Genesis 32: 22-32, 
Rembrandt’s “Jacob’s Struggle with the Angel”, Sir Jacob Epstein’s “Jacob and 
the Angel”, and Marc Chagall’s “Jacob Wrestling with the Angel”, show the 
“third meaning” of the passage to be predicated on the foundational relation 
between naming and facing, pointing to the understanding of “The Struggle” as 
the face-to-face relationship of love and responsibility grounded in ethics.
A little East o f Jordan,
Evangelists record,
A Gymnast and an Angel 
Did wrestle long and hard—
Emily Dickinson, 
“A Little East of Jordan” (Frl45B)
This essay considers an excerpt from the Old Testament, “Genesis 32: 
22-32”, known as the Struggle with the Angel. This excerpt exudes 
powerful allure, prompting many scholarly attempts at giving this 
complex passage exegetic sense.1 Among them we find Roland 
Barthes’ structural analysis that dissociates itself from theosophic
1 For a list of scholars who attempted an interpretation of “Genesis 32: 22-32”, 
see Desroche (1973).
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Biblical interpretations in an attempt to show that the extraordinary 
potency of the Bible lies beyond its religious import and is grounded 
instead in the primordial connection to the semiotic universe. As an 
archetypal text, the Bible discloses the transcendental dimension in its 
pure uncontaminated state. At the same time, the Bible does not 
confer this state to the single origin; no singularity should or can 
emerge from its reading. Its textual purity, notes Derrida, is but a 
condensate formed by many layers of mythological material of diverse 
origins.2 This is to say that the Bible itself is a semiotic universe par 
excellence. It thus can lead outside of its telos and into the realm of 
signitive becoming.
This would-be place of pre-formed possibilities can also be under­
stood as the liminal world. I take liminality in the Husserlian sense, as 
Zwischen, or new logos, an organization that features connecting 
nodes but lacks centralization.3 Liminality is therefore a paradoxical 
phenomenon. Importantly, this paradox is not logical but phenome­
nological, for it is firmly grounded in the living world. We discover 
limit phenomena in such empirical modalities as children, animals, 
etc. In addition to life forms, limit phenomena extend to mythical 
figures, such as spirits and demons. The encounter with limit pheno­
mena is both meaning-creative and self-altering. I therefore suggest 
that we co-join phenomenology and semiotics in order to investigate 
Jacob’s “Encounter with the Angel” as a limit phenomenon. For this 
examination, Barthes’ analysis provides a conceptual frame that I 
expand and texture with further material and analyses. The essay’s 
design reflects these intentions. First, I present the excerpt. I continue 
by giving a condensed summary of Barthes’ method as well as his 
findings. Then, I introduce the phenomenological structure of the 
alien, explain the alien typology and outline xenology as method. 
After a methodological orientation is set, I proceed with the analysis 
based on three artistic renditions of the Genesis episode, Rembrandt’s 
“Jacob’s Struggle with the Angel”, Sir Jacob Epstein’s “Jacob and the 
Angel”, and Marc Chagall’s “Jacob Wrestling with the Angel”. I end 
by evaluating the findings from the perspective of semioethics.
2 Derrida argues for the plurivocity of the Bible from the translation perspective 
in his 1992 article “Des tours de Babel”.
3 For an investigation of the in-between of known orders, see Waldenfels 
(1995).
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(22) And he rose up that night, and took his two wives, and his two women- 
servants, and his eleven sons, and passed over the ford Jabbok. (23) And he 
took them, and sent them over the brook, and sent over that he had. (24) And 
Jacob was alone; and there he wrestled a man with him until the breaking of 
the day. (25) And when he saw that he prevailed not against him, he touched 
the hollow of his thigh; and the hollow of Jacob’s thigh was out of joint as he 
wrestled with him. (26) And he said, Let me go, for the day breaketh. And he 
said, I will not let thee go, except thou bless me. (27) And he said unto him, 
What is thy name? And he said, Jacob. (28) And he said, Thy name shall be 
called no more Jacob, but Israel: for as a prince hast thou power with God and 
with men, and hast prevailed. (29) And Jacob asked him, and said, Tell me, I 
pray thee, thy name. And he said, Wherefore is it thou dost ask after my 
name? And he blessed him there. (30) And Jacob called the name of the place 
Penuel: for I have seen God face to face, and my life is preserved. (31) And as 
he passed over Penuel the sun rose upon him, and he halted upon his thigh. 
(32) Therefore the children of Israel eat not of the sinew which shrank, which 
is upon the hollow of the thigh, unto this day: because he touched the hollow 
of Jacob’s thigh in the sinew that shrank. (Genesis 32: 22-32)
Barthes (1977: 127) begins to analyze this passage with the following 
goals in mind: “show how the text is unmade, how it disseminates — 
by what coded paths it goes o ff’. The name of this analysis is indicial. 
This is to say, it is a form of sequential analysis that pursues the ways 
of metacategories through their sequential production. The search for 
meta-categories begins with two kinds of units: the state of the 
character (i.e., indice) and the state of their actions (i.e., epithet). The 
correspondence between the two produces meta-meaning. Barthes’ 
main focus is not the metacategories themselves, however, but their 
disseminating potential. From this perspective, his analysis proceeds 
progressively, that is, it seeks to identify those sequential positions 
and content categories that are responsible for “the abrasive frictions, 
the breaks, the discontinuities,” in sum, various ambiguities of inter­
pretation (Barthes 1977: 140).
For the key sequences in this passage Barthes takes: (1) the Cros­
sing, (2) the Struggle, (3) the Namings. A close examination of 
Sequence (1) produces the first indetermination. Correctly, Barthes 
points out that the passage does not tell us whether the encounter with 
the Angel began before or after the crossing. This determination is 
essential, however, for the reading of the text: the character’s position 
means that the struggle could be either for the right of passage or as 
the price for passage: “(23) And he took them, and sent them over the 
brook, and sent over that he had. (24) And Jacob was alone; and there
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he wrestled a man with him until the breaking of the day”. The friction 
between the two meanings creates structural ambiguity, puts the text 
in suspension. The second sequence, The Struggle, is equally ambi­
guous. The personal pronoun “he” is placed in the text in such a way 
as to refer to both the Angel and Jacob: “(25) And when he saw that 
he prevailed not against him, he touched the hollow of his thigh; and 
the hollow of Jacob’s thigh was out of joint as he wrestled with him”. 
The position is remarkable in its narrative potency: observing fighting 
men, can we say for sure who dealt what blow to whom? The 
movement is chaotic, it changes the course too quickly for an ordinary 
eye to understand. Would this opacity not be exacerbated manifold in 
the case of an omnipotent entity such as God? But, then, again, can we 
say for sure that it was God? Or, rather, was it God in the Angel’s 
body, or was it the Angel who represented God? This ambiguity is 
crucial for the understanding of the extent of Jacob’s strength and 
therefore his ability to win.
According to Barthes (1977: 135), the markings might explain 
God’s or Angel’s pseudo weakness, for it was employed as an item of 
exchange for what follows, the Namings: “The mark is a creative of 
meaning.” And not only meanings, we might add, but new sub­
jectivities. God marks Jacob so that he knew that he was chosen, 
submitting Jacob to his league. Importantly, the touch of God had no 
violence in it: God’s marking should not be confused with branding. 
God only touches to bless. But, the blessing came before Jacob had 
requested for it. What he received instead was a new name: “What is 
in question in each naming is a change — of place, parental line, 
name, alimentary rite [...] a transgression of the rules of meaning” 
(Barthes 1977: 136). It is there, in the detachment of meaning from its 
signified that Barthes finds the text’s signifiance. The frictions, the 
breaks, the discontinuities — they are all paramount to the text as they 
make for the combinatory effect of binding. For us, the realm of 
significance serves as the point of departure into the realm of 
xenology. My task for what follows is to connect the disseminations 
of significance with the ethics of liminality.
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Xenology
There are problems emerging here o f 
creating concrete understanding and mu­
tual understanding — to somehow ac­
complish a making home o f the alien, as 
i f  it were home. O f course, there is also 
the question o f  the limits o f  such know­
ledge and the question o f justifying the 
idea o f complete understanding.
E. Husserl (1973: 625)
No doubt, the term xenology is cumbersome. It is made of two equally 
loaded components, xenos and logos, and each of these components 
carries much historio-philosophical weight. For now, I would only 
like to state that xenos refers to the unfamiliar and unknown, in 
short, — the alien, while logos to word as in speech but also in reason. 
One may say that xenology deals with the experience o f  the alien. I 
thus approach the issue of the alien, the encounter with the alien 
being, and the ethics of being-with-the-alien in the phenomenological 
register. Below, I would like to explain xenology in terms o f its philo­
sophical roots first and then in terms of its methodological implica­
tions.
When Husserl refers to the concept of the alien in his 1931-1933 
manuscripts, he introduces it through two senses: (a) as transcendental 
structure, and (b) as empirical modality. Since Husserl’s own writings 
on the intersubjective dimension of the alien are sketchy and unsyste­
matic, interpretations are required. According to Steinbock (1995), the 
structure of “alienworld/homeworld” is one of the three transcendental 
structures, that is, it is foundational for the constitution of all expe­
rience. The other two mentioned by Husserl in various later texts are 
“earth-as-ground,” “world-as-horizon.” Although the three structures 
are intimately connected and can be considered со-determinate, the 
explicitly intersubjective dimension of the alien as well as the physical 
limitations of my investigation force me to focus on the last structure. 
Briefly, the relationship between the homeworld and the alienworld is 
a relationship between what belongs to the recognizable “home” or 
sphere of ownness and the experience of the unrecognizable “alien” 
that encompasses everything that is constituted by a world other than 
my homeworld. The homeworld is therefore a parallel structure that
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co-constitutes the alienworld, and it is through this co-structure that 
normatively significant lifeworlds are constituted. In sum, the struc­
ture alienworld/homeworld is transcendental and non-foundational, 
which makes the relationship between the home and the alien an 
overreaching model for understanding the genesis of all, but especially 
social experience.
The socio-symbolic dimension of the alien is embodied symbo­
lically in alien cultures and empirically in the Alien being.4 For Hus­
serl, the original category Alien is comprised of children, foreigners, 
and animals. In this list he sometimes includes the savage and the 
madman. All these types are abnormal in a sense that they respond to 
the paradoxical mode of givenness: the alien is “accessible in genuine 
inaccessibility, in the mode of incomprehensibility” (Husserl 1973: 
631). This makes us experience the Alien as a heterogeneous being, 
that is, completely on its own, reflectively outside of our constitutive 
comprehension. Unlike rational and culturally familiar adults, Alien 
types prevent incorporation into the sphere of ownness. We no longer 
experience the world as children; nor can we experience it as the 
insane do before actually having got mad; likewise, foreign modes of 
constitution irrevocably separate us from other cultural subjects. 
Coming from and with a world of their own that is delimited from our 
own world, Alien types are shadowy or, to put it in phenomenological 
terms, liminal phenomena. It is for this reason that Husserl calls them 
Limes-Subjekte. Limit-Subjects help us со-generate our world as 
always already evolving. One way to understand our experiences of 
these generative encounters, we bring them out as narratives. Ac­
cording to Steinbock (1996: 219), “mythical narratives attempt to give 
an account of a ‘genesis’ that is genetically impossible to know, but 
generatively possible to experience in the generative density of a 
tradition.”
It is at this point that we can usher the figure of the Angel into the 
Husserlian typology. As a Biblical personage, the Angel can be 
experienced as both the liminal subject and liminality itself. Together 
with other alien types, it is equally incomprehensible and inaccessible. 
This is not to say that the Angel is in/significant. In the Bible, a lot of 
times, the Angel performs as a harbinger of God’s will, a messenger.
4 To be consistent with the common convention used to distinguish Other and 
other, I consider Alien (with a capital “A”) to be the alien person. The use of alien 
(with a lower case “a”) refers to alienness generally.
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In this respect, the etymology of the term “angel” in instructive: the 
Hebrew word for angel is mala'a/c, its meaning is analogous to the 
Greek angelos. In both Hebrew and Greek, the term means “the one 
announcing a message”. There are other terms and functions for 
“angel” in the Old Testament, however: “Seraphim”, “Cherub”, and 
“the son o f God”. In Hebrew, Seraph means “flame.” The term is rare: 
we encounter it only in Isaiah 6:2 and 6. From this definition, we can 
derive the meaning of angel to be the designator for the possibility of 
speech, its comprehensibility. In the phenomenological terms, the 
Angel would be the givenness of speaking for a reason.
The second meaning of angel is more common. A wide variety of 
cultural products accept Cherub to be an angel who is a living being. 
The cherubs that Ezekiel saw in his vision had four wings and faces 
like lions, bulls, eagles and human beings. They had human hands, but 
their feet were like hooves. In general, cherubs are described as 
“strange to look at” (Ezekiel 1: 4—14). They too, like those Isaiah saw, 
“shone brightly, like burnished bronze” (Revelation 4: 4-8). The third 
term that is generally thought to refer to angels is found in only a 
handful of places. It is usually —  though not always — translated as 
“the sons of God”. How to understand the term is a topic of great 
controversy, especially in Genesis 6: 1—4, where the sons of God had 
sex with the daughters of men begetting the Nephilim who, although 
deprived of immortality, had prolonged lives; they were considered to 
be wise and powerful heroes of the ancient breed. This kind of an 
angel is an archetypal hero, the embodiment of goodness and the 
defender of faith.
As an imaginary entity, the angel necessarily features a set of 
attributes that stabilize its being for us. In turn, these attributes are 
derived from the corresponding functions. If we reduce the already 
reductive angel typology to a set of most basic features, we will have: 
strange’, god-like', erotic. All these attributes are connected to the 
Angel’s relation to the inhuman world. For the sake of conceptual 
consistency, I will call this world the angel world. The relationship 
between the angel/alien-world and the human/home-world is based on 
the communicative encounter. After all, the Angel’s job is to an­
nounce God’s will. Yet, the ways of announcing the holy words defies 
the human language. The Angel speaks but it speaks the language of 
symbolism that codes out innermost experiences, the ones that can be 
called pre-subjective, or, following the Husserlian terminology,
primordial. The Angel thus joins the paradox of original non-origi­
nality: it speaks but none can understand the language. The Angel’s 
speaking is inaccessible to our comprehension except, as the Christian 
tradition goes, in the mode of utter belief and revelation. If we want to 
understand this mode in the phenomenological terms, we might want 
to solicit help of Giorgio Agamben (2003: 114), who called glos- 
solalia an aporia of an absolute desubjectification and “barbarization” 
of the event of language, in which the speaking subject gives way to 
another subject, a child, angel, or barbarian who speaks “into the air.” 
At the same time, despite the Angel’s inaccessibility, the asym­
metrical relationship between the two co-joint worlds remains co- 
foundational: the Angel needs the encounter with Jacob as much as 
Jacob needs it. At this juncture we can ask a phenomenological 
question, Shall we not try and understand what the encounter with the 
Angel means by examining the how o f  this encounter? In the following 
two sections I suggest that we answer this question by first in­
vestigating an encounter with the alien and then turning to the 
imaginative representations of Jacob and the Angel.
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Encountering the Alien
Phenomenologically speaking, the encounter with the alienworld 
occurs first on the threshold, at the boundaries, or in-between the 
normative and, therefore, familiar experience, and the experience that 
comes as a wave of incomprehension, overpowering us too quickly 
and too deeply to make it possible to distinguish amidst all this 
alienness a specific Alien. In the wake of this experiential conflict, the 
Alien cannot be singled out even in reflecting back. In vain one will 
be identifying the features that could turn the Alien being into an 
object of investigation. The experience of an Alien being is only pos­
sible in and through the experience of alienness that extends beyond a 
particular physical form or a specific, although non-recognizable (at 
first) behavioral pattern. No extrapolation of the alien from the 
alienworld is possible without losing the alien in the homeworld as the 
experiential base. “Limits of a home emerge through the appropriation 
of a home, and the alien is liminally encountered as such by being 
delimited from the home as alien” (Steinbock 1995: 180).
Yet, despite the level of its absorption in a radically different 
culture, the alien is never completely dissolved. It stays in us: “...we, 
as home, are already becoming alien through liminal encounters with­
out having to take ‘foreign qualities’” (Waldenfels 1996: 254). Al­
ways murky, the alien lurks in the shadow, between what is comple­
tely familiar and what is completely unfamiliar. This non-specific 
world of liminal givenness is non-recognizable; however, it is not dark 
either. It glimmers as a beacon, cutting through the space that, out of 
fright, we commonly fill with nothingness, or endow with the power 
of negation. However, this space of the in-between is never fully 
filled. It comes from the darkness of the absolutely alien but never 
reaches the light of the same, remaining at the edge of darkness, 
crepuscule, or twilight. The twilight, as a place of meeting the un­
familiar, has its own order: “We encounter the alien as something that 
can not be said or done within our order. The extraordinary makes its 
appearance as an order existing elsewhere” (Waldenfels 1996: 115).
Although indeterminate as an order, the alienworld can be ex­
perienced in its empirical modalities. We therefore encounter it first as 
those modalities, although in a radically different way that if  we 
would have encountered our home-comrades. According to Depraz 
(2001: 169), “infants, animals, the insane, and aliens are subjects in 
the full sense because they are from the very beginning always already 
intersubjective subjects”. The overreaching concept for the alien types 
is asymmetry: the relationship with the alien is irreversible. The 
inaccessibility to full understanding puts the alien on the side under 
the homeworld not unlike the way the slash sign separates and unites 
the two concepts: home/alien. Since the homeworld holds ontological 
priority over the alien world, it provides the base for the understanding 
of what comes “next”. In turn, this asymmetry results from the process 
of self-differentiation: the self or soul as a home that begins from the 
radical difference. The alien constitutes itself by self-differentiation, 
that is, the alien arises from the process of self-alienation. “Alienness 
then does not proceed from a division but consists in a division” 
(Waldenfels 1990: 21).
Depraz (2001: 172) argues that the intimate nature of the home/ 
alien asymmetry allows for empathetic understanding of the Alien. 
Lived empathy is “grounded in a much more passive and primal 
experience lying in our lived bodies.” Thus, through intercorporeal 
coupling, the alien is connected to the home. The way of coupling is
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different for the four aforementioned types, however. The child with 
his or her pre-formed way of connecting to the world is also pre- 
subjective. According to Depraz (2001: 175), “it is a passive, latent, 
driven, affective and blind intentionality.” In other words, infancy is a 
condition of indeterminacy. It comes from the overwhelming expe­
rience of firstness. It also opens a way into vulnerability. The same 
opening is exacerbated in the case of the animal. It evokes the original 
touch, so to speak of, the experience before it turns into a sedimen­
tation evoked and then confirmed in reflection. In contrast to the child, 
the animal is inter-animal. Reflection is not given to an animal. This 
allows the animal to connect to other animals completely.
The same characteristic prevents an animal from connecting to 
human beings. It is separated from the humanworld completely. This 
might also explain the non-subjective status of the animal. This is 
why, Waldenfels separated the animal from other Alien categories and 
put it “in the shadow”. In Husserl’s words, “the animal is most 
wondrous”. If the child and the animal are characterized by embodied 
passive association, the insane is self-divided. Its temporal inchoate 
being produces “a paradoxical closing-up effect, as a kind of radical 
solipsism” (Waldenfels 1996: 177). This fact brings the insane au 
contraire to both the child and the animal. It is the most imaginative 
case of the Alien. In an empathetic move, we can imagine becoming 
insane; a lot of times, we think we are. Yet, once we become one, we 
can no longer connect to others. This is why the insane alien is the 
most inaccessible. The foreigner is closest to us as his/her alienness is 
communal, historical, communicative. They are, according to Husserl 
(1973: 13), “a generative unity, and thus, a primordial language 
unity/unity of language and language customs.”
At this point, we might want to ask, What consequences does the 
encounter with the alien has fo r  our experience? The answer to this 
question brings us to ethics. If we cannot respond to someone in a manner 
that yields an expected response back, we must resort to a transgression: 
not only we need to transgress our own world, we must transgress the 
world of the Other. The end-result of this ethics would be to let our 
“normativity to be disturbed by the abnormal all the time” (Waldenfels 
1996: 122). Staying at home and hosting the alien would mean to take the 
alien as the alien, appropriate it in the image of the same. In contrast, 
transgression is grounded in responsivity, a tuming-toward. This type of 
resistance is non-violent, non-separatist, non-unifying, and, in that sense,
non-appropriative. It paves a route that reaches the alien by “crossing over 
from within” (Waldenfels 1996: 49).
When we insert an alien original inside our modes of com­
municating with it, we respond for the Alien and not toward. To 
respond to the Alien from within means to recognize the one-sided 
origin of our normative world, and, using this acknowledgement as a 
point of departure, respond to the Alien in-between the comprehen­
sible and the incomprehensible. In performing the response, the 
respondent enters the process of alien-becoming, with all Alien facets 
engaged. The vulnerability of a child, the sound and the fury of the 
madman, the uprightness of the foreigner, and the shadowy figure of 
the animal, all these alien qualities come to stipulate the encounter as a 
whole. Empathetic embodied passivity and subjective asymmetry 
allow for the encounter to take place.
Now, we can return to the analysis of Genesis with a new map and 
direction. The new focus is on the encounter with the angel as the 
alien. Phenomenologically speaking, what the Angel does is in how it 
appears or is made appear. As an Alien type, the Angel is passive, yet 
seductive; vulnerable, yet powerful; incomprehensible, yet exceeding­
ly clear. This internal asymmetry reflects the external one: the Angel 
always hovers over, and it always stands under. Although the Angel is 
not substitutable for a man, coming from the twilight together with 
other alien types allows the Angel to assume a familiar form. As 
something that has no recourse to what has happened, an imaginary 
event of encountering the Angel emerges and develops in the shadow 
of our experience. The shadow gives the event, including its main 
content, and, at the same time, it hides or obscures this very event in 
the texture of what seemingly does not belong to it. This dual 
function, that of concealment and that of disclosure, makes the mode 
of angelic appearance most significant.
This mode of appearance is defined by Barthes as “the third 
meaning”. For Barthes, the third meaning gestates outside of the 
obvious symbolic gesture, in signifiance. Barthes calls this meaning 
obtuse; it is a meaning that prays on uncertainty. Ambiguity is its 
mode of showing: “The characteristic of the third meaning is to blur 
the limit separating expression from disguise, but also to allow that 
oscillation succinct demonstration — an elliptic emphasis, if one can 
put it like that, a complex and extremely artful disposition (for it 
involves a temporality of signification)” (Barthes 1977: 55-56).
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Another way of putting it: the obtuse meaning is the signifier without 
signified. Therefore it is located outside of language. However, by 
showing itself in a particular textual field the third meaning 
enunciates. The work of enunciation becomes particularly strong in 
the case of intersemiotic translation, in other words, when the third 
meaning travels from the original field into another semiotic system, 
such as visual imagery.
In his analysis of filmic and photographic image, Barthes locates 
the third meaning on the periphery of the forwarded imagery, what he 
calls metonymic montage. Eisenstein’s black and white films are 
perfect examples of forwarded content. They announce meaningful 
symbols as they advance one after another like condensed projectiles, 
accumulating into a critical mass of a single conotatum: “greed”, 
“pain”, “now is the time”. In contrast to the obvious symbolics, obtuse 
meaning disperses the metalinguistic (critical) interpretation that 
offers itself for a quick consumption into broken shards of meaning. 
These shards no longer define the whole but arise from it carrying 
their own interpretative weight. With the film that happens as an 
unrolling stream of imagery, one can barely discern their work. Once 
taken out, stopped, however, those stills reveal their independence: a 
barely discemable fly on the face of the tyrant,” a pair of hastily 
repaired glasses on the face of the running woman, these details are in 
fact inaccessible accessibilities.
In the following analyses I attempt to discern the third meaning in 
visual representations of “Genesis 32: 22-32”. Three artistic works 
figure in the analyses: Rembrandt’s “Jacob’s Struggle with the 
Angel,” Sir Jacob Epstein’s “Jacob and the Angel,” and Marc 
Chagall’s “Jacob Wrestling with the Angel.” The selection is not 
haphazard: from a number o f visual interpretations of this passage, the 
selected three “stills” are singled out because they deviate from 
traditional renditions of what has happened at Jabbok. In addition, the 
focus of all three works is The Struggle, the central sequence in 
Barthes’ typology. The question that I pursue here is, How is the 
struggle with the Angel given as the encounter with the alien? In view 
of the phenomenological nature of this question, in my interpretations
I will rely heavily on the description o f both the encounter with the 
artistic work and the encounter as a theme of this work.
5 Other well-known interpretations come from Moreau, Gauguin, and Redon 
(for more, see Singletary, 2004).
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“Jacob’s Struggle with the Angel” by Rembrandt
The Staatsgalerie in Berlin gives the piece (Fig. 1) a prominent 
position. It is hanging in the Hall No. 5 next to two other Rembrandts 
and some other Baroque art. The painting’s placement к  significant in 
at least two respects: first, it is being given as a period piece; second, 
it contrasts with the neighboring full-size pieces. As a fragment, 
Rembrandt’s depiction is a perfect still. It is thus extremely selective 
and economical as to the represented details. A master of psycho­
logical portrait, Rembrandt found his artistic fame in the humanist 
approach to his subjects. The eyes, the face, the hands, all these attri­
butes of human personification were the node of his utmost attention. 
The unflattering realism with which he portrayed his wife Saskia 
testifies to this uncompromising preference. It was so strong at times 
that he would be accused of moral turpitude and proliferation of the 
abominable. His Biblical paintings are especially notable in this 
regard. Few of them are stylized to the point of disguising both the 
contemporariness of the exhibition and the individualization of the 
character. This dual tendency is exhibited in the choice of the 
costumes, lighting, background, and figure arrangement.
In his fragment of the struggle, Rembrandt uses the same realistic 
signature. Rembrandt’s strokes are not fine and miniscule but deep, 
saturated, and broad. His characters reflect the techniques: they are as 
strongly and as broadly outlined. Assisting each other, form and 
content produce a singular image that nonetheless allows multiple 
interpretations. In the painting, we don’t see Jacob’s legs, but he 
appears to be wearing a peasant shirt. A closer examination shows that 
his shirt is in fact a robe, a traditional garb of the housemaster. 
Judging by the way Rembrandt depicts his body, Jacob is very strong. 
His physique exhibits inhuman strain. The direction of Jacob’s force 
creates a contradiction, however. At first, it appears that Jacob is 
straining under the weight of the Angel, but this is only if the Angel 
has any weight. On the contrary, he does not seem to have any mass; 
nor is he struggling. He appears to be suspended, in repose. The Angel 
does not seem to be engaged in combat. He is a subtle and graceful 
creature, so, his hold on Jacob is light, almost effortless. His facial 
expression is that of tenderness and sadness. It appears as if while 
Jacob is struggling with the Angel, the latter is being supported by 
Jacob, who is expected to carry him some place safe.
286 Alexander V. Kozin
Figure 1. “Jacob’s Struggle with the Angel” by Rembrandt.
Yet, it would be a mistake to confuse the Angel’s grace with a lack of 
power. His power, however, is entirely different from Jacob’s powerful 
embrace. While Jacob is being busy with his struggle, looking away, the 
Angel is looking at the Man with adoration. The Angel’s leg that curls 
around the man’s waist is not hurting Jacob, it is caressing him. So are the 
Angel’s hands. The Angel’s touch reveals itself as caress. The power of 
caress comes from Eros. The contrast between the non-struggling erotic 
Angel and Jacob creates an uncanny and marvelous impression, or face. It 
also reformulates the asymmetry in the relationship between the Angel 
and Jacob. What the Angel gives to Jacob is love. Love is not given 
without struggle. The struggle has nothing to do with earning love, 
however its significance is not that far removed from the embodied 
realm, and we discover it in the next work.
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“Jacob and the Angel” by Sir Jacob Epstein
This monumental statue (Fig. 2) stands in the middle of the Gregorian 
Hall on the second floor of the Old Tate Gallery in London. It took Sir 
Jacob two years to carve this man-size sculpture from a block of 
alabaster. When it was moved to Tate, the decision was made to have 
it as a central piece in the connecting rotunda. The statue’s placement 
has an obvious pragmatic side, for it allows for multiple perspectives; 
the statue’s position as a symbol bears a different significance. At the 
site of the museum, the work sits in the center as if  to gather other 
pieces together. It is a node in a system of visual and aesthetic 
relations. A visitor encounters the piece in the mode of dissociation 
while in travel from one hall to another. Even if it may not intend to 
take the traveler by surprise, it does so. It therefore satisfies and 
emphasizes the textual reference. It appears right at the time when one 
is about to break her connection to the aesthetic and sink back into the 
mundane attitude, thus re-experiencing a return to the ordinary. Is it 
when he was crossing the river, carrying with him the narrative of 
hardship that Jacob was surprised by the Angel? And when the Angel 
appeared, did he offer an introduction? The Biblical narrative brings 
the reader straight to the struggle, without previewing it by the scene 
of appearing. We cannot tell from the text where the Angel came 
from. This apparent omission is not an omission, however. Angels do 
not appear. They reveal themselves. We may suggest then that the 
struggle begins at the moment of revelation. Cut off from the moment 
of its initiation, it is reduced to a specific binary configuration: 
Jacob— Angel. This single configuration forms a still. Sir Jacob’s 
artistic creation manifests it. At this point, we might want to examine 
the still, the statue itself.
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Figure 2. “Jacob and the Angel” by Sir Jacob Epstein.
The statue clearly depicts a struggle. As a still, it captures the struggle 
under way in a moment of its fading. The frozen moment discloses 
itself as embrace, and, as in any embrace, the two people hold each 
other, or one can hold the other. In “Jacob and the Angel” the Angel is 
holding Jacob. Not just holding but keeping him from falling down. 
Jacob’s body is limp, lifeless. His right leg is wounded from the 
Angel’s touch. Without the Angel supporting him, he would fall down 
for sure. A giant next to Jacob, the Angel lowers himself to Jacob’s 
height. In doing so, he contorts his powerful body to straighten 
Jacob’s impassive one. In this position the Angel is revealed as 
Zwischen, the in-between, or liminality itself. Standing face-to-face 
with Jacob, the Angel is protected by his wings attached to his back
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like two slabs or two halves of a door. What door, we might ask? 
Could it be a door to Heaven? The Angel has his back, his wings, the 
divine gift, in the way. Could it be so that the Angel was about to open 
the door for Jacob? The wings are the vulnerable spot for the Angel: 
“The Angel dies when you break the Angel’s wings,” wrote Brecht. 
The Angel’s wings as the site of vulnerability re-introduce the theme 
of crossing over as the theme of the opening/ closing. The wings are 
the Angel’s retreat: “let me go, fo r  the day breaketh. ” He comes as 
light; he goes with light. The struggle has ended: Jacob has earned his 
passage by submitting to the vulnerability of the Angel, his face , his 
embrace and his care. While, the Angel is looking straight at Jacob, 
the man is looking up, searching for God. Frozen in the moment of 
Embrace, the artistic still arrives at an interpretative singularity: 
wrestling with the angel was not about resisting; it was rather about 
submitting and falling into the hands of God. The embrace redefines 
the asymmetry of the encounter: Jacob’s crossing is falling, and the 
Angel is there to catch him. At this point, we are entitled to ask, What 
is the Angel doing by caressing Jacob in his powerful embrace?
“Jacob Wrestling with the Angel” by Mark Chagall
Chagall’s painting (Fig. 3) is hanging on the walls of Musee national 
Message Biblique Marc Chagall in Nice next to other paintings by 
Chagall, some of which also depict angels. There we find “the Fallen 
Angel” and “Jacob’s Ladder”. “The Struggle with the Angel” there­
fore comes not as a single piece but comes connected with other 
Biblical paintings through the artist’s style given in variation and 
through a thematic unity. In the context of the museum, it suggests a 
consistent reading that takes the reader outside of the painting itself. 
The colors, the composition, and the history of Chagall’s work 
connect it to both Russian expressionism and French cubism. His 
association with Delaunay and Modigliani becomes transparent once 
the reader of his works is given an opportunity of visiting other halls 
in the museum.
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Figure 3. “Jacob Wrestling with the Angel” by Mark Chagall.
The generative side of Chagall’s personal artistic style coincides with 
his interest in Jewish culture and religion of which he was, self- 
admittedly, a devoted follower. His Jewish heritage translates into 
explicitly religious motifs in graphic arts, designs for opera and ballet, 
ceramics and stained glass windows. In addition, his visual arts exhibit 
the kind of humor and fantasy that have invited critics to suggest that 
he draws deeply on the resources of the unconscious. Indeed, Cha­
gall’s personal and unique imagery is often suffused with exquisitely 
subtle sujets. Yet, all these influences should not be taken for the 
foundation of sense that illuminates his work. As Barthes (1977: 148) 
argues, the modem art defies historiographic or biographical inter­
pretations because “it is made of multiple authors, multiple voices”. 
What singles a specific text out of this multiplicity is the author’s! 
performance. It is with this suggestion in mind that I am going to read 
Chagall’s “Jacob Wrestling with the Angel”.
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As compared to Sir Jacob Epstein’s sculpture whose three-dimen- 
sionality may count for a context of its own, Chagall’s painting comes 
with an imbedded context. Unlike Rembrandt’s still, it preserves the 
main line of the story by re-presenting the key elements of the story: 
the creek, Jacob’s family, and the nocturnal deep density of the 
encounter: “And he rose up that night, and took his two wives, and his 
two women-servants, and his eleven sons, and passed over the fo rd  
Jabbok” In contrast to Rembrandt, whose work he surely knew, 
Chagall staged the battle in such as way as to have it be witnessed by 
the Jacob’s family. He thus interpreted the passage from Genesis in a 
sense different than the intended one: Jacob was alone when he began 
to struggle with the Angel. He was also struggling alone. From his 
perspective, he was alone. But, at the same time, he was being 
witnessed. The subtlety of this discrepancy is emphasized by the 
audience’s position. The other characters are placed in the upper right 
comer of the painting. By making this choice, Chagall detaches them 
from the scene that develops in the lower left side comer: the 
struggling Jacob trying to overpower the Angel. The creek separates 
the wrestlers and the audience. By this montage, Chagall resolves the 
ambiguity discovered by Barthes: Jacob is on the other side of the 
Creek.
With great force and determination, Jacob is trying to push the 
Angel to the edge of the painting, over the creek, away from his 
people. In the meantime, the Angel, somewhat immobile and inert, 
doll-like, is hanging high up in the air, over Jacob. There is a certain 
rigidity about the Angel’s figure, even deadness. He is not resisting 
Jacob; he is simply hanging lifeless. It is not clear from the painting if 
Jacob had lifted the Angel up in the air, or the latter lifted himself. The 
Angel’s wings are on fire, spread widely. Unlike Jacob’s determi­
nation, the Angel’s disposition is indetermination given as weightless­
ness and flight. The Angel exercises this power to point to those 
people who came with Jacob and are now standing on the other side of 
the brook. Pointing is the other side of naming. By pointing, the Angel 
gives Jacob the direction, thus disclosing his own mission: he is there 
to show the way. The moment is transforming in both literal and 
figurative sense. It is a moment of ethical reversal. Hovering over 
Jacob, the Angel is pointing to his people as if  forcing Jacob to turn 
back, to return to the world of his own.
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ln sum, as a result of the sequential analysis conducted by Roland 
Barthes on an episode from the Bible, “Genesis 32: 22-32”, the text 
revealed sequential breaks in the narrative. The resultant strategic 
ambiguity allowed for multiple interpretations to enter the narrative. 
Coming from other semiotic systems, these interpretations enhanced 
and transfigured the original text. Upholding the sequential unity, they 
have nonetheless changed the narrative design toward different meta- 
semantic effects. The coupling of these effects produced a new se­
miotic montage. The effect of Rembrandt’s painting put an emphasis 
on caress. Caress became the point of inflection for the narrative. Sir 
Jacob Epstein broadened the notion of caress in embrace. A sequential 
connection between caress and embrace identified the mode of giving 
the struggle between the Angel and Jacob — as an erotic encounter. 
By positioning the characters in a specific way, separating Jacob from 
the audience, yet connecting them by the directing gesture of the 
Angel, Chagall introduces a new element into the story: the con­
nection between the Angel and his people generated a new way. By 
pointing to the people, the Angel speaks the sign. The sign is given in 
the face  of the Angel. The semioethics of the encounter with the Angle 
is thus predicated on the meta-effects of caress, embrace, and face. In 
order to understand what the encounter means ethically, we need to 
engage yet another dimension, that of semioethics.
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I associate semioethics with the name of Emmanuel Levinas who 
carried out a phenomenology of Eros in his major work, Totality and 
Infinity. Levinas (1969: 254) speaks about “erotic talk [...] interpreted 
as sensation”, that is, the talk that represents the ethical domain. 
Understanding language as an ethical phenomenon means to approach 
the language of Eros in terms of love. For Levinas (1969: 260), love is 
the condition for the possibility of transcendence that “goes beyond 
the face.” In its epiphany, the face of the other reveals the origin of 
exteriority appearing not as an image but as “the nudity of the 
principle” (Levinas 1969: 262). What is given by the nudity of the 
face is not a ritualized agon conducted in the aesthetic realm but the 
face-to-face relationship of love and responsibility grounded in ethics. 
From this formulaic, we might indeed see how the battle with the
loving God who gives itself in the face  of the Angel, the other, would 
override struggle aimed at overcoming with the passive embrace of 
becoming.
The ethics-first approach makes chastity and decency of the face 
“abide at the limit of the obscene yet repelled but already at hand and 
promising” (Levinas 1969: 263). The promise of the other makes Eros 
a social, albeit liminal phenomenon. At the same time, this liminality 
is not what delimits the whole, for then Eros will be at the service of 
the collective pleasure, a totality. Rather, the erotic nudity of the face 
designates “a way, the way of remaining in the no man ’s land between 
being and not-yet being” (Levinas 1969: 259, author’s italics). Hence, 
the Angel’s gift to Jacob: the way he shows is not the way Jacob can 
pursue on his own, but only by being connected to the divine face.
This characterization is essential, for it emphasizes the relation 
between Eros and ambiguity. For Levinas, ambiguity of Eros fuses the 
clandestine and its revelation in “the simultaneity or the equivocation 
of fragility and the weight of non-signifyingness, heavier than the 
weight of the formless real” (Levinas 1969: 257). The both/and of 
equivocation exposes the two sides of Eros: voluptuosity and fecun­
dity. The relationship between the two sides is clearly asymmetrical, 
for the weight of responsibility in fecundity exceeds the fleeting 
enjoyment of voluptuosity. Because of the asymmetrical duality of the 
face-to-face relationship, the erotic, even in flight, and in tenderness, 
and vulnerability, cannot be hidden, only unseen, must remain unseen 
in order to be transcendence, the “what is not yet” (Levinas 1969: 
256). This what is not ye t is the mystery of love, and it can only reveal 
itself as mystery. Deprived of a particular form but tending toward the 
future, this mystery is without mystification: “the what is not yet is 
sensed in the night of the erotic, simultaneously uncovered by Eros 
and refusing Eros” (Levinas 1969: 258-259). In other words, the 
“what is not yet,” the not-yet-sensible movement of erotic fecundity is 
unimaginable without the sensible enjoyment of voluptuosity.
The difference between the two co-joint modes is the difference of 
the self-other relation. While voluptuosity is a return to the self, 
fecundity is the very transcendence of the self. It is in fecundity that 
the face commands beyond refusal; there, it is more serious than 
serious. In apposition to voluptuosity, fecundity has the child for the 
other; it therefore “denotes my future” (Levinas 1969: 268). And not 
just the child; in addition to the offspring, who would stand for the
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past in the future, Levinas talks about paternity and filiality that 
extend my responsibility to a complete stranger, making his possibi­
lities mine. The two modes of givenness are co-foundational: by 
abolishing any expression except for the refusal to express desire, 
voluptuosity clears the way for fecundity, which is already removed 
from the enjoyment of the other, and not just the other but, most 
importantly, from the enjoyment of the self. It is with this sign that 
Jacob, the Patriarch and the father of the Israeli people returns from 
his struggle to his people.
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Переход с ангелом
Эта статья является аналитическим развитием структурного анализа 
отрывка из Ветхого Завета (Книга Бытия 32: 22-32, известного как 
“Борьба с ангелом”), проведенного Роландом Бартом. Исследование 
отрывка в феноменологическом (ксенологическом) ключе как поро­
гового явления, способствовало обнаружению в “Борьбе с ангелом” 
его “третьего смысла”, который проявляет себя на пересечении 
явного и скрытого. Анализ трех визуальных изображений отрывка из 
Книги Бытия 32: 22-32, а именно: “Борьба Иакова с ангелом” 
Рембрандта, “Иаков и ангел” сэра Джейкоба Эпстайна и “Иаков бо­
рется с ангелом” Марка Шагала, — также показывает, что “третьий 
смысл” базируется на основополагающей зависимости названия от 
изображения, указывающего на то, что “Борьба” должна пониматься 
как непосредственная взаимосвязь любви и ответственности, осно­
ванной на этических началах.
Üleminek ingliga
Artikkel on Roland Barthes’i poolt teostatud ühe Vana Testamendi kat­
kendi (Esimene Moosese raamat 32: 22-32, tuntud kui “Võitlus ingliga”) 
strukturaalanalüüsi analüütiliseks arenduseks. Selle katkendi vaatlemine 
piiripealse nähtusena fenomenoloogilises (ksenoloogilises) võtmes aitas 
kaasa “kolmanda tähenduse” avastamisele, mis ilmutab end avatud ja 
varjatu ristumispaigas. Selle katkendi kolme visuaalse representatsiooni 
(Rembrandti “Jaakobi võitlus ingliga”, sir Jacob Epsteini “Jaakob ja 
ingel” ja Marc Chagalli “Jaakob võitleb ingliga”) analüüs näitab samuti, 
et “kolmas tähendus” põhineb nimetuse alustpaneval sõltuvusel kuju­
tisest, mis viitab sellele, et “Võitlust” tuleb siin mõista kui armastuse ja 
vastutuse vahetut seost, mis põhineb eetilistel alustel.
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Spatial semiosis and time1
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Dept, o f Philosophy, Saint-Petersburg State University, 
Mendeleevskaja line 5, St. Petersburg 199034, Russia 
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Abstract. Spatial semiosis differs from temporal one by its structural and 
functional peculiarities. Meaningful relations between units o f spatial texts are 
not ordered along o f temporal axe and do not need time in their form of  
expression. However time remains an important factor for both: being o f  the 
spatial semiosis in the external time and being o f  time in the spatial texts as 
object o f representation. In the contrast to temporal communication, where 
acts receiving o f texts must be synchronized with the acts o f their (repro­
duction, spatial semiosis is built as a diachronic process, dividing in time from 
two separate acts: creating and perceiving. This structural peculiarity allows to 
connect people from different temporal periods and gives to spatial semiosis 
the function o f irreplaceable means for cultural memory. Excluding time from 
the semiotic form o f  their plane o f expression, spatial texts have some rules o f  
presentation in time and semiotic means for representation o f temporal order 
and duration in their plane o f contents. There are different means o f  represen­
tation o f time in the spatial forms: the projection o f temporal structures on the 
spatial ones, concentration o f different moments in one state, etc.
1. The difference between spatial and temporal semiosis
The problem of relations between spatial semiosis and time is a matter 
of principle for semiology of space. The last must be differed from 
spatial sem iograph y,  which describes concrete spatial signs and re­
1 The text is based on the report presented at the 8th Congress o f IASS in Lyon 
(2004). Its short version was published in: Научные чтения —  2004. Санкт- 
Петербург: С П бГ У , 2 5 3 -2 5 9  (2 0 0 5 , in R ussian). A draft o f this paper has 
been published in Amsterdam International Electronic Journal for Cultural 
Narratology (http://cf.hum.uva.nl/narratology/ a05_tchertov.htm).
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veals their meanings. As to semiology of space, it is built on a higher 
level of generalization, and is occupied with such questions as the 
possibility of spatial semiosis itself, its specific character, ways of 
semiotization of space in different spatial codes, etc. The problems 
considered in the report belong just to this semiological level. These 
are the problems of relations between spatial and temporal semiosis, 
peculiarities of existence of spatial semiosis in time and ways of 
representation of time in spatial semiosis.
First of all, it should be mentioned, that distinction of spatial 
semiology as an autonomous branch of semiotics is based on the 
essential difference between temporal semiosis and spatial one, as a 
special form of sign connection. This difference depends to great 
extent on their different ways of existing in time: in spatial semiosis 
temporal relations do not generate meaningful units of text, — in 
contrast to temporal one, were they do. Despite spatial and temporal 
semiosis can often be coordinated with each other in spatial-temporal 
messages, they have different structural and functional possibilities.
Spatial bearers of meanings, which are mainly intended to the 
visual perception, permit arranging relations between meaningful units 
as structures of other types, than chains of signals following each 
other and addressed to listening (see Jakobson 1964). The semiotized 
space can differ in the main from temporal structures by its “semio- 
topological” properties: non-linearity, reversibility, types of symmetry 
and asymmetry, etc. (see Tchertov 2000). Due to variations of these 
properties, syntactic structures in spatial semiosis can be more various 
and complex, than ones limited by temporal axis.
For description of specific structural features of spatial semiosis 
the version of semiology, which traces back to Ferdinand de Saus- 
sure’s linguistic generalizations is ineffective. This version based on 
the declared in his “Cours de linguistique generale” principles of lan­
guage: the principle of non-motivation of signs and the principle of 
linearity of significant units. These principles are not relevant for 
many semiotic systems, which regulate communication by means of 
the visual-spatial channel of connection. In particular, the principle of 
linearity, intended to describe consecutive interchange of signs first of 
all in oral speech, is not relevant for messages, plane of expression of 
which is not reduced to such linear sequence, and where the order of 
units can be reversible. Correspondingly, a theory based on the prin­
ciple of linearity turns out to be not a universal semiology, but a
“chronosemiology” — a theory of temporal semiosis, where meaning­
ful units “dispose nothing but a timeline” and follow each other 
forming a chain (see Saussure 1972: 103).
Describing of systems regulating non-linear and reversible bearers 
of meanings in the spatial semiosis requires another, “non-saussurean” 
semiology — such theory of semiotic means, where at least one of 
two principles of saussurean semiology is not performed. First of all it 
is the principle of linearity of syntactic units, though another one — 
the semantic principle of sign arbitrariness is also irrelevant for many 
of these systems.
Like linguistics became the ground for semiology of Saussure and 
logic — for semiotics of Peirce, investigations of expressive and 
representative means of visual arts, carried out traditionally in aesthe­
tics and visual arts theory, can become a basis for semiology of space. 
It is notable, that the difference between spatial and temporal means of 
representation is discussed in aesthetics from the moment of its 
appearance as an autonomous discipline in the Age of Enlightenment, 
when this problem was raised especially sharp in famous “Laocoon” 
by Lessing. Particularly, a number of Russian art investigators, like 
Bachtin, who has described a “chronotop” in literature, have discussed 
the relations between the time and spatial arts (see, especially 
Favorsky 1988; Florensky 1993; Gabrichevsky 2002; Vipper 1962; 
Volkov 1967; Zhegin 1962). However the problem of relations of spa­
tial means of representation and the time exceeds the limits of 
aesthetics and art theory and touches the grounds of sign theory, first 
of all the divergence of two its branches — spatial and temporal 
semiotics (see Tchertov 2002).
The difference between spatial and temporal bearers of meaning 
can be defined within the framework of the “non-saussurean” semio­
logy as the structural diversity of the texts having different expression 
plane: in the first case it is built as a chain of signs following each 
other, and in the second case — as a configuration of co-existing 
spatial forms and their relations. Such configurations can be con­
sidered as specific spatial texts, where only these spatial forms and 
their relations are meaningful, but no meaning is attached to any 
temporal changes of their material bearers. It is possible to say that a 
spatial text not only exists in a space, but also forms its own space of 
meaningful relations, whereas it does not have own time and exists 
only in external time, where something happens with it, but not within
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it. Temporal texts, on the contrary, have their own, or internal, time 
(but not their own space), formed by relations of temporal following 
between units of their “expression form”. There are also many mixed 
spatial-temporal texts, which have both of these own form types.
It is important, that specific structure of spatial texts touches the 
“form” of expression, rather than its “substance” (using Louis 
Hjelmslev’s terms). That is the point, the difference between “tem­
poral” and “spatial” bearers of meaning is not essential for the 
substance of expression. Both of them participate in the process of 
communication by means of a material mediator, for which both space 
and time are inalienable attributes. Any spatial bearer of meaning 
changes in time as well as any perception and interpretation of spatial 
text as psychological processes has temporal structure. But all 
peculiarities of physical or psychical substance of spatial texts are 
only the ground for special “semiotic form”, established by spatial 
codes, each of that is a system of norms semiotizing the space. On the 
contrary to its bearers, the spatial text is constructed and reconstructed 
only by means of these codes and their semiotic form. Therefore it 
does not have any relations, which are not provided by them. In case 
of temporal semiosis the situation is different: spatial relations here 
are the elements only of substance of expression, but not of its form. 
The last includes, on the contrary, as the meaningful units the 
temporal relations, which in spatial semiosis only exist in the 
“substance of expression”, but do not mean anything as elements of its 
semiotic form. The inevitable physical changes in the substance as a 
rule are not included in the authentic structure of spatial text, and, for 
example, painting restoration just has to take out all physic results of 
this temporal being. So the reasons of separation of spatial semiosis 
are not physical or psychological, but only semiotical: the separation 
of spatial relations from temporal ones in the semiotic systems and 
derived texts, where the form of expression is built only by 
configurations of the spatial relations.
However the time which exceeds the limits of semiotic form of 
expression in spatial texts, remains, on one hand, in its physical and 
psychical substance as an important factor of communicative process. 
On the other hand, the spatial texts get special means representing 
time in their plane of contents. Correspondingly, it is possible to speak 
about being of spatial semiosis in time as well as about being of time 
represented in spatial semiosis.
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2. Spatial semiosis in time
2.1. Peculiarities of temporal being
It is incorrect to think that a specific feature of spatial semiosis is 
existence out of time. As every process it is performed in time, but it 
differs by another way of temporal being. Both functioning of 
communication by spatial bearers of meaning and historical changes 
of conditions of this functioning have own peculiarities in spatial 
semiosis. Moreover relations of these two aspects differ here not as 
deep as in the case of temporal semiosis.
The last exists as a synchronic process of sending and receiving, 
because usage of signs following each other supposes as an obligatory 
condition coexistence of a sender and a recipient of a message in a 
common communicative action (even if this coexistence has virtual 
character, and act of message creation is reproduced by technical 
means). On the contrary, this condition is absent in case of spatial 
semiosis, because it does not need coexistence of participants of 
communication, but cannot do without coexistence of meaningful 
units in the space. Thereby communication occurs here as a 
diachronic process divided in two acts performed in different times: 
creating and “reading” of spatial text.
Separation of these acts in time permits them, first of all, to have 
different duration, because their synchronizing is unnecessary in the 
spatial semiosis. The process of text creating can be very long (for 
example, seven centuries of building of Cologne Cathedral), whereas 
perception of the text can be very short. Vice versa: a meaningful 
spatial form can be quickly created (for example, water-color created 
on a wet paper in technique alia prim a), but perceived and interpreted 
during a long time. However, one can find also a temporal correlation 
between both of these acts: as a rule, more complicated spatial texts 
demands more time for their creating as well as for their perceiving. 
Secondly, a long time period can pass between the acts of creating and 
receiving of a spatial message, and that makes possible not only com­
munication between contemporaries, but also between people, who 
belong to different generations and historical periods. As the spatial 
message can outlive its creators it naturally gets to other contexts and 
to other times. Thereby they can exist not only within the time of 
creation and perception, but also within historical time. The difference
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between synchronity and diachronity themselves is not sharp in spatial 
semiosis, because, on one hand its functioning has a diachronic 
character, and, on the other hand, the preservation of spatial text 
during long time allows to extend this functional connection as far as 
its spatial bearer exists.
So the structural properties of communicative process in spatial 
semiosis make possible some of its specific functions. Due to these 
functions, spatial semiosis is especially favorable or just unique for 
preservation and transmission of information for “long distances” in 
time. Therefore the spatial form of representation is irreplaceable for 
preservation of cultural memory — both personal and collective ones. 
Moreover, historical time itself arises together with the possibility to 
fix events in written form that means — together with the possibility 
of translating of oral speech and all available for its cultural expe­
rience by means of spatial semiosis. Thus, fixation of time in the past 
allows spatial semiosis also to have impact on the future.
The introduction of spatial texts into new historical contexts, where 
they get new senses, is connected not only with the change of com­
municated subjects, but also with historical changing of codes, and 
even of mentality of interpreters. These changes are performed in his­
tory to different extent. Several of them are based on the natural 
grounds, such as psychophysiology of eyesight, which is reproduced 
on genetic level and only modified in a culture. Such are the 
synesthetic codes, which correlate some visual sensations of forms 
and colours with definite feelings of other modalities, as well as the 
perceptual code, regulating transformation of optical data in a per­
ceptual image of volumetric forms. The codes of this type less under­
go cultural influences, than the codes derivative from them, correspon­
dingly, architectonic and perceptographic ones, which have their own 
cultural history. Some other codes are created in culture and change 
more quickly, than natural based ones —  as, particularly, the object- 
functional code regulating categorization of recognizable object forms 
constantly reproduced in culture and connections of these forms with 
their instrumental functions, — or as the social-symbolic code, 
endowing the forms with connotative meanings, thanks to which they 
can indicate the roles of their users in the space of social behaviour 
(see Tchertov 1997).
The uneven development of spatial codes leads to displacement of 
senses and ways of interpretation. This particularly regards to the
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spatial texts with complex semiotic and rhetorical structure, which 
requires for comprehension united application of several codes to­
gether. Some configurations of these codes and their relations in each 
case influence the definite way of “reading” of the pieces as a visual- 
spatial text and conceiving of its senses.
Such complex semiotic structures are typical especially for pieces 
of art, which interpretation depends on usage of changeable set of 
codes. From this point of view all history of spatial arts can be 
considered as the history of using of diverse visual-spatial codes for 
creation and interpretation of art pieces and changing of relations 
between them. So the treatment to the art history as a “history of 
semantic structures” suggested several decades ago (see Wallis 1970) 
can be re-interpreted as the idea of evolution of visual-spatial codes 
developed in history to different extent and modified their relations.
2.2. Presentation of the spatial text in time
The specific relations of spatial texts to time suppose their regulation 
on the level of semiotic form in the systems of corresponding codes. 
The process of text actualization during its perceiving as well as the 
process of text generation requires special rules providing some 
conditions of temporal presentation of spatial texts.
These rules are provided at least in cases of several special codes 
serving for recording of temporal texts in spatial form and their 
reconstructing in the new contexts. These codes have the rules of 
correlation between the expression plane of spatial texts with the 
coded expression plane of texts developing in time. For example, 
phonetic writing gives the ways of projection of the temporal order of 
oral speech into spatial axes, as well as the rules of the reverse 
translation of spatial relations into temporal ones by reading. Its 
expression plane contains spatial rows of significants that denote 
temporal successions of phonemes (for example, by interpretation of 
spatial relations “left-right” as temporal relations “earlier-later”, etc.). 
The represented temporal relations of phonemes belong to the contents 
plane of written text and form its “semantic” meaning, whereas its 
plane of expression contains only spatial relations but not the internal 
time. However, it is also possible to find some “syntactic” or “gram­
matical” meaning of this text, related to the way of its temporal
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presentation, —  because “reading” of the spatial text as a process 
developing in time needs definite order of its actualization and 
limiting of liberty by successive transit from one spatial unit to 
another. The semiotic form of written code sets the direction of these 
transits and thereby gets to the space, semiotized by its means a 
quality of irreversibility, making its structure more similar to the 
structure of oral speech.
The possibility to represent internal temporal relations of oral texts 
through internal spatial relations of written texts due to their structural 
similarity differs phonetic writing from other spatial codes — even 
from some non-phonetic writing, which do not aim to translate tem­
poral sequence of signs into the spatial order. It is true, that culturally 
educated eye can learn to read signs formed up in lines, for instance, 
from left to right or from top to bottom, — as in European writing 
systems. However, such linear reading is a special way of seeing and 
is not the only norm of visual perception. “Natural” eyesight is able to 
synopsis and can take many spatial relations as one whole picture, as a 
simultaneous, but not successive image.
That does not mean that peering into non-written spatial texts has 
no temporal order. The internal programs of its “reading” are not only 
in written texts. For example, the system of architectonic code permits 
perception of spatial relations as a successive process reiterating 
spatial signals, treated as a “rhythmical order” built in time.
However, temporal “opening” of spatial text during its perceiving 
can be subordinated not only to the “principle of projection”, which 
supposes “drawing up” the space in a line, but to be inherent also to 
perception of the two- and three-dimensional spatial text, which can 
not be reduced to a line. Many complex architectural buildings can be 
perceived gradually due to well arrangement, which allows successive 
transit from one rank of parts to another. So, for example a Gothic 
cathedral, which silhouette is perceived from the big distance, “opens” 
for a view all its smaller details as far as they become nearer literally 
“step by step” and big forms go out of viewing field. In a similar way 
temporal ordering can be performed also by perception of many other 
visual-spatial texts (book miniatures, gobelins, ornamented pottery 
and so on), if their perceiving is determined by the artistic using of 
means of architectonic and other visual-spatial codes.
A temporal order of “reading” is supposed also in well-constructed 
depictions, where the lines and tonal contrasts can put a process of
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viewing in time and “guides” the glance of viewer into pictorial space 
in a definite temporal succession (see Florensky 1993: 230-231). So, 
for example, well known scene of “Banishment from the Haven” in 
the relief of Bemdward’s doors of the St. Michaelis Cathedral in 
Hildesheim is arranged as a succession of gestures each of which 
draws attention at first to Adam, then to Eva and at last to the devil; — 
as well as in famous “Sistine Madonna” by Raphael (Dresden Gallery) 
a lot of weakly distinguished angels’ heads are opened only for a sight 
looking into the background after perceiving of the figures clearly 
silhouetted on the foreground.
But in all these cases the temporal structure of “reading” differs 
from the cases of reading by lines, because it neither requires 
irreversibility nor one-dimensionality of the textual space. On the 
contrary, by the “reading” of a picture, as well as of an architectural 
construction, the look is moving in a principally reversibly and non- 
one-dimensional space. The temporal ordering of these spatial texts 
becomes possible, because they, excluding the temporal relations from 
their internal syntactic structures, contain nevertheless the means of 
their presentation in the time of text receiving. As these means are 
regulated by the spatial codes, they are related not only to the being of 
spatial semiosis in the external time, but also to existence of time in 
spatial semiosis.
3. Time in spatial semiosis and 
semiotic means of its representation
3.1. Time represented in semiotized space
Together with the means of presentation of spatial texts in time, 
culture develops the means of representation o f time on the semantic 
level of these texts. The “internal time” in semiotized space is possible 
only as the time represented by spatial means. Such “internal time” is 
contained, for example, in a picture representing some depicted 
events. Their time coincides neither with the external time of physical 
being of its expression “substance”, nor with the psychical time of the 
picture creation or perceiving, nor with the time of expression “form”, 
where it is absent according to the definition of the spatial text. The 
“internal time” of a picture belongs only to its plane of contents and is
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represented together with the depicted space, where some indexes of 
shown action are given.
The temporal semantics of semiotized space includes all three 
aspects accordingly to three temporal modes: the present, the past, and 
the future. However, expression of the present has no temporal 
specifics, and speaking about the representation of time in spatial 
semiosis it is natural first of all to mean the modes of the past and of 
the future.
Spatial forms have specific ability to represent something that 
happened in the past, due to “taking out” its image or its signs from 
the time stream and preserving on its more stable “banks”. Space, as 
an order of relations between the coexistent things, has a relative 
stability in time that permits its structures to imprint the past in 
converted form and to preserve the memory about it. Preserving of the 
past in the space can occur involuntary, as “natural signs”, or indexes, 
of past events —  tracks of diverse processes imprinted in spatial 
forms. By these indexes the cultural history can be naturally laid up 
like geological processes leaving their traces in spatial structures of 
rocks. So, the structure of territory involuntary imprints the ways of 
life of its inhabitants, the structure of roads — the connections 
between settlements, and at least, any print of rolling wheel is an 
obvious evolvement of a temporal process in the space. But imprinting 
of time in the space can be developed also as intentional, in specific 
cultural forms most of which are produced and reproduced 
deliberately. So the function of tools is imprinted in its form, social 
relations between citizens are imprinted in the plan of a city, etc. In 
fact, every spatial artifact preserves traces and indexes of processes, in 
which it has participated whether as a condition, a medium, or a result.
The spatial text can also point to the future. Yet animals can anti­
cipate some future events, using some spatial indexes. Human in­
creases this ability, firstly, interpreting “natural signs” more deep and, 
secondly, creating artificial spatial signs, which program his behavior 
in the future. This programming touches different aspects of the 
activity — from the above mentioned reading of spatial text itself, till 
various spatial moving and actions, directed by forms and spatial 
layout of indexes of movement.
This semantic differentiation has also some pragmatic aspects, and 
they are connected with the corresponding important functions of 
spatial texts. The ability of spatial imprinting of the past in the present
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and thereby of preserving the past for the future allows spatial se­
miosis to perform a function of cultural memory. Another pragmatic 
function of spatial texts touches the other temporal modus — pro­
gramming of the future by establishing of some spatial signals and 
indexes directing body, hand or eye movements.
Both of these functions can be combined and performed by the 
same sector of semiotized space, where equally signs, signals and 
indexes of different time modes function. The semiotic means as natu­
ral as artificial origin form complex semiotic structures, representing 
different aspects of time.
Such combination of different temporal modes in the plane of 
semantics as well as performing different pragmatic functions is 
typical particularly for the architecture. An architectural building can 
contain indexes of the present conditions of its being, for instance, 
revealing of internal constructions by its external shape or repre­
senting some “static” or “dynamic” qualities. Due to expressive means 
of the architectonic code a building can look as solid “staying” on the 
place (as a Greek Temple) or visually “striving” above (as a Gothic 
Cathedral), or “flowing” together with surrounding it fountains (as the 
Dresdner Zwinger).
Architectural buildings also give artificial spatial signs, which 
program behavior of their inhabitants in the future. Each architectural 
building (which is constructed according to a project) appears yet with 
a ready “program” directing future movements and behavior of a 
human in the space arranged by it. Architectural forms have in its 
syntactic structure some spatial units, which act as signals of 
reproduced movements. So steps of a staircase serve as signals of 
definite movements in the future and even as their signs keeping the 
meaning independent on realizing of these movements.
Architecture has also different ways of holding the past. Every 
architectural construction is made artificially and preserves more or 
less clear traces of its creation. Even if rows of bricks point out the 
time and temporal order of their arrangement.
In semantics of architectural buildings one can find diverse cultural 
types of time imprinting through spatial forms — from Egyptian 
pyramids till building forms intentionally reproducing the styles of 
other epochs (“Stylization”, “Historicism”, etc.). These artificial 
means of time representation are combined in architecture with the 
natural traces of physical or historical changes, and sometimes it is
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difficult to differ one from the other (for example, the natural 
deformations and artificially created “Ruins” as signs of the past).
In a similar way three modes of time can be represented by the 
picture, which can serve as a project of the future situation (for 
example, the planned building), as a drawing of a present object, as 
well as an imprinting of the past. A picture can “remember” the 
images of persons or of things carried away by time long ago. As a 
picture has double space — the depicted and the depicting ones, — it 
can contain the means of time representation in both of them — the 
tracks of brush moving in the depicting space as well as some images 
of past events, people or objects represented in the depicted space.
In some cases the time itself in general becomes a subject of 
depiction. This occurs in Vanitas — a special genre of picture, which 
collects different visual-spatial indexes of the transitory and taken by 
time life — old skull, fading flowers, smoked pipe, and other things 
with spatial marks of temporal changes.
The space of picture can represent even relations between time and 
eternity. So the picture by Albrecht Altdorfer “The Battle of 
Alexander Magnus and Dary III” from Munich Alte Pinakothek is 
divided in two parts representing different: the lower part shows a 
mass of fighting people, which forms a stream making literally visible 
a “stream of time” taking out their lives, and the upper part represents 
an immovable board with inscription fixing a result of this battle 
remained eternally.
One can see some historical changes in representation of diverse 
temporal or extra-temporal qualities in different cultures. Unlike 
depictions in Ancient Egypt, which can be elaborated for transit from 
temporal to eternal world, or Medieval icon painting, which was 
intended for uncovering of some eternal for the transient, New 
European painting is directed more on stopping in time of separate 
episodes, which become the shorter, right up to “snapshots” of 
moment in Impressionist’s painting.
3.2. Semiotic means of time representation in space
The means of time representation in semiotized space can differ se- 
miotically. They can be indexes, for example, the tracks of move­
ment — both naturally formed and artificially held indications of the
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past events. They can be signals of movements and actions, which can 
also have both natural and artificial origin (any wall is a spatial signal 
of stopping or turning for the moving subject). They can take the 
semiotic form of conventional signs, as, for example, a tombstone is a 
sign of a last life and memory about it (this sign’s function is clearly 
expressed in Greek ‘sema’ denoting ‘tombstone’ as well as ‘sign’). 
Both index-signal and sign (in narrow sense) means of time represen­
tation are regulated by different spatial codes, each of them has its 
own possibilities. Several of these codes mainly give the means for 
imprinting of the past in the present and its saving for the future. Such 
is for example the code of writing permitting to fix oral speech. Se­
veral other codes contain more signs and signals of the future ac­
tions — as for example, the object-functional code connecting object 
forms with “programs” of their using. The indexes of real or imagi­
nary forces are presented in forms of the architectonic code as if they 
act in the presence.
Different codes can also interact with each other in a common act 
of sense expression. It is possible for example in case of symbols, 
which have complex semiotic structure with two and more levels of 
meaning signified by means of diverse codes. For example “The 
Tower of the Third International” by Wladimir Tatlin was intended to 
serve as a symbol of temporal development of the world, using the 
signs of social-symbolic code connected with relations “upper-lower” 
together with the means of architectonic code for expressing of 
dynamics.
The spatial semiosis uses also such rhetorical forms of time repre­
sentation as metonymy and metaphor. The spatial metonymy repre­
sents a whole period through some parts left o f this time. For example, 
the Doric column or the whole building of the Parthenon can be 
interpreted as a metonymy of “classical antiquity”, as well as lancet 
arch or Gothic cathedral can mean “the Middle Ages”, etc. The spatial 
objects can also represent time by using some metaphors. Such spatial 
metaphors can be found, for example, in different forms of clocks: 
moving of sun shadow, flow of water, pouring out of sound or turning 
of hands in mechanical process become there metaphors, on basis of 
which the time is indicated.
Diverse means of time representation often combine with each 
other. The clock can serve as an example of such a combination of 
different spatial ways of time representation. Indexes of temporal
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order are used here also as signals of some actions for a subject; the 
clock can point out not only the present time, but also the historical 
time of its creation, turning into a sign of time of their origin or even 
into a symbol of some historical period. Some tower clock can contain 
the iconic figures representing following each other periods of human 
life, etc. Construction of clock itself can express some ideas of time 
typical for definite historical periods and can be considered in the 
spirit of Bachtin’s ideas as a specific “chronotop”. The diverse forms 
of ancient clepsydra or of sun clocks point out different ways of time 
comprehension by Egyptian, Greeks or Romans, — as well as the 
spatial form of sound clock expresses the idea of overflowing of the 
future into the past through a short moment of the present, which can 
be found, for example, in Saint Augustine’s meditations about time 
(Augustine 1968: 268-279). In a similar way rotation of wheels in 
mechanical clocks served as a model of temporal order of universe in 
deterministic conceptions of Descartes, Leibniz and other philo­
sophers of XVII-XVIII centuries (see Tchertov 1998).
These examples reveal one more and very important way of time 
representation — formation of its various spatial models, — iconic 
and non-iconic ones —  which have some common features or struc­
tures with time. The spatial models of temporal structures allow 
representing mainly some their quantitative features: an order of 
discrete units or duration of a continual period. Both these cases need 
different means of representation.
Representation of the temporal order is possible, first of all, 
through its submitting by spatial relations. This representation is per­
formed, as a rule, by usage of the same principle of its projection into 
the spatial structures, which take place in the above described written 
code. Such projection occurs, for example, in a face of watch, where 
the temporal order is represented by spatial relations of circularly 
arranged indexes differing from each other only with the spatial order. 
The projection can be performed by different syntactic constructions: 
the meaningful orders can be separated and built as lineal sign 
successions arranged along the spatial axe — as a rule, vertical or 
horizontal one; the spatial order can be cyclical (as in dial) or tabular 
(as in calendar). The semiotized space has in such cases not only a 
fixed dimensionality, but also as a rule a fixed direction; therefore it is 
“semantically anisotropic”, because changing of the direction 
influences the sense.
The principle o f  projection  is also used for representation of the 
temporal order by means of spatial relations in other cases. It can be 
found, for instance, in the motive of procession often met in the art of 
Ancient East (Egypt, Assyria, Persia, etc.) — rows of figures arranged 
one after another and presented in different moments of time. The 
principle of projection is also appeared in the rows of pictures 
representing different events of a story separating them in singled 
pictures. Coordination of temporal and spatial successions is typical 
for arrangement of narrative pictorial series intended to be drown in a 
line — from the relief on the column of Trahan and rows of Bible 
scenes (as, for example, in mosaics of Saint Apollinare Nuovo in 
Ravenna) till contemporary comic strips. The same projection of the 
time succession in the spatial order can take place also within the 
frames of one picture representing some processes due to stratifying 
them into a row of moments. In Medieval icon painting and even in 
Renaissance pictures there was a usual way of depicting of several 
story episodes performed in diverse moments of time as scenes, which 
are arranged in different fragments of one space —  as, for example, in 
“Seven joys of Maria” by Memling (Munich, Alte Pinakothek) or in 
painting series “The story of Saint Ursula” by Carpaccio (Venice, 
Gallery of Academia). Dissociated moments of time can be smaller 
and consist of single stages of movement, on which the parts of 
moving figures are decomposed — as it was made in Futurists 
paintings, where this “cinematographic” way of depiction became 
very popular expressive mean. It is essential, that time representation 
gets especially important for spatial arts of XX century. N. Pevsner 
and A. Gabo in their “Realistic manifest” (1920) theoretically pro­
claimed introduction of time in spatial arts as their actual task and 
practically fulfilled it having created own non-figurative spatial 
constructions with multiple elements as a spatial equivalent of the 
temporal order (see, for example, Thomas 1986: 142).
It is also possible to represent duration of processes by means of 
spatial semiosis. For such representation other grammatical forms are 
necessary, than for projection of temporal order in spatial rows. The 
duration can be represented —  particularly in pictorial series — 
through the distance between depicted scenes — as, for example, in the 
miniatures of some ancient Russian manuscripts (see Lihachev 1979: 
3l). It can be represented also by concentration of different events or 
states in one picture or even in one figure. An example of such
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concentration is well known —  a “flying gallop” of horses, depicted 
by Gericault as well as by many other artists and discussed by many 
art explorers starting from Rodin (see, for example, Volkov 1977: 
134-139).
Projection of a temporal succession in the spatial order represents 
the time as a homogenous multitude of moments — as if any moment 
is equal to other one and all their difference is reduced only to places 
order. However, the spatial means can represent not only general and 
unified course of time and its quantitative structures, but also its 
qualitatively differed periods — such as seasons of the year, times of 
the day, etc. (as, for example, famous sculptures of Medici tomb by 
Michelangelo). Spatial bearers also preserve the memory about the 
individual being of concrete persons and unique moments of their life: 
their birth, death and other significant events.
This memorial function performs, for example, tombstones and 
any other monuments dedicated to some heroes or outstanding events. 
However, it is natural, that imprinting of something or somebody 
individual takes a form of their iconic models, which can, unlike 
general signs, reproduce particular features of things or of people. 
This form includes all kinds of depictions, each of them “stops” a 
depicted and saves its image from disappearance, due to the quality of 
space to hold the forms of things left in the past (cf. Peirce 1960: 360, 
about connection of icon signs with past experience). In the same 
time, there are depictions specially intended to this saving. Such are, 
for example, death-masks, which make an attempt to imprint last face 
in more constant substance, and which do it in a different way in 
diverse cultures: preserving something general and essential in An­
cient Egypt or, in opposite, keeping some individual features in An­
cient Rome. Such are also the memorial portraits of later ages perfor­
med in sculpture, painting or engraving and representing some persons 
together with attributes of their time. The preservation of particular 
instants and conditions is performed especially in photograph, which 
literally “stops” a moment and “takes” its fleeting image from tem­
poral stream for saving in the more stabile spatial form.
The developed cultures besides “primary” spatial forms of time 
representation like writing or art pieces have also “secondary” ways of 
artificial imprinting of temporal changes. Their specific feature is 
ordering of spatial bearers, which already perform the function of 
cultural memory. Among these “secondary” aggregations one can find
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some involuntary appearing formations as, for example, sponta­
neously formed environment of towns, which contains the marks of 
diverse events of their centuries-old history. However the cultural 
memory can be concentrated intentionally in some “reservoirs” of 
spatial bearers of information, in collections of spatial texts. Various 
types of these collections can take, in particular, a form of a 
cemetery — an aggregation of tombstones as signs of last lives, of a 
library —  a depository of written texts as accumulators of all human 
experience, or of a museum (pinakothek, gliptothek, etc.), as a 
collection of art pieces and other bearers of cultural memory. Each of 
them transforms in its own way some temporal traces in semiotized 
space. For example, museum can be treated as a form of transfor­
mation of historical time in heterogeneous cultural space, where the 
spatial relations between art pieces and historical documents of 
different ages become a form representing their temporal relations. A 
new type of such “hyperspace” is formed by Internet as an infor­
mation milieu, which gives perhaps already a “ternary” system of time 
representation and of cultural memory.
Concentration of the collective memory in diverse forms of the 
spatial semiosis makes possible the qualitative transformation of 
culture. The space of its changing is accelerated by appearance of the 
new technical means of the spatial semiosis —  from book-printing to 
the Internet, — each of them gives new possibilities for semiotized 
space to keep of the past in the cultural memory, as well as to program 
the future.
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Пространственный семиозис и время
Пространственный семиозис отличается от временного своими 
структурными и функциональными особенностями. Значимые от­
ношения между единицами пространственных текстов не строятся 
по временной оси и не образуют внутреннее время в своей форме 
выражения. Однако временной фактор остается существенным для 
пространственного семиозиса, который, с одной стороны, находит 
свои особые способы существования во времени, а, во-вторых — 
способы репрезентировать время в пространственных структурах. В 
отличие от временной коммуникации, где акты приема сообщения 
должны быть синхронизированы с актами их создания или воссозда­
ния, пространственный семиозис строится как диахронный процесс,
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в котором акты создания и восприятия значимых пространственных 
структур разведены во времени. Эти структурные особенности 
позволяют связывать людей разных исторических периодов и сказы­
ваются на функциях пространственного семиозиса, делая его незаме­
нимым средством культурной памяти. Исключая время из семио­
тической формы своего плана выражения, пространственные тексты 
имеют определенные правила своей презентации во времени и 
семиотические средства для репрезентации временного порядка и 
длительности в своем плане содержания. В пространственном семио- 
зисе развиваются различные средства репрезентации времени с по­
мощью пространственных форм: проекция временных порядков на 
пространственные структуры, концентрация различных моментов в 
одном состоянии и др.
Ruumiline semioos ja aeg
Ruumiline semioos erineb ajalisest oma struktuursetelt ja funktsionaal­
setel eripäradelt. Ruumiliste tekstide ühikute vahelised tähenduslikud 
seosed ei ehitu ajateljel ja ei moodusta sisemist aega oma väljendus­
vormis. Kuid ajafaktor on oluline ka ruumilise semioosi jaoks, mis, ühelt 
poolt, leiab oma erilised olemisvormid ajas ja teisalt — aja represen­
teerimise viisid ruumilistes struktuurides. Erinevalt ajalisest kommunikat­
sioonist, kus teate vastuvõtu aktid peavad olema sünkroniseeritud nende 
loomise või taasloomise aktidega, ehitub ruumiline semioos kui diakroo­
niline protsess, milles tähenduslike ruumiliste struktuuride loomise ja 
vastuvõtu aktid on ajas lahku viidud. Need struktuursed iseärasused või­
maldavad seostada erinevate ajalooliste perioodide esindajaid ja mõju­
tavad ruumilise semioosi funktsioone, tehes sellest kultuurimälu asenda­
matu vahendi. Eemaldades aja oma väljendusplaani semiootilisest vor­
mist, omavad ruumilised tekstid kindlaid reegleid ajalise järgnevuse ja 
kestvuse representeerimiseks oma sisuplaanis. Ruumilises semioosis 
arenevad erinevad aja representeerimise vahendid ruumiliste vormide 
abil: ajaliste järgnevuste projitseerimine ruumilistele struktuuridele, erine­
vate momentide kontsentratsioon ühes seisundis jmt.
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Abstract. This paper examines the discourse o f  war from a semiotic point o f  
view and suggests some ideas for the development o f  practices o f resistance to 
it. The discourse o f war can be considered symptomatic in respect to under­
lying discourses o f totality such as globalisation. By aiming at explanatory 
simplification, this kind o f discourse takes the paradoxical form o f an exhaus­
tive paradigm which always engenders a residuum to be eliminated. Semiotics 
can develop practices o f resistance to the discourse o f  war by operating on the 
syntagmatic chains generated by its mediatic agencies. These practices are 
based on the postmodernist critique o f  totalising discourses. A process in 
which details are disconnected from the mediatic chains where they vanish 
might trigger the opening o f a space o f community that makes the residuum o f  
war discourse presentable through metaphorical substitutions. Semiotic 
practices o f  resistance to the discourse o f war presuppose a shift in theory 
from the paradigm of globality to that o f partiality. Partiality must be under­
stood both from a political and an epistemological point o f  view and it could 
therefore represent an important element in the development o f a semioethics.
Some striking similarities are, in my opinion, evident in the debate of 
recent years about the situation in the humanities and social sciences 
in general (and semiotics in particular) on the one hand and the 
discussion about globalisation on the other. These similarities are 
evidently due to the critical problematisation of the “modernist pro­
ject” (Pettman 2004: 13), within which the kind of rationality consti­
tuting the ideological basis of Western knowledge has been respon­
sible for the kind of World Order represented by globalisation and 
finds in it its own accomplishment.
318 Daniele M onticelli
In the case of the social sciences and humanities the main focus of 
the discussion has been on the contraposition between an ideal of 
unity and one of multiplicity (hence the various distinctions between 
‘science’ and ‘studies’, ‘unified method’ and ‘plurality of approaches’ 
or ‘theory’ and ‘practices’). The almost universal claim about the 
vanishing boundaries between individual disciplines and the inter­
disciplinarity of the humanities hides the attempts of different 
methods of research to gain a hegemonic position, something parti­
cularly evident in the recurring inclination of semioticians to present 
themselves as the new methodologists of the humanities and social 
sciences. In the discussion about globalisation, the terms of the 
problem seem to be quite similar. Much in focus is the distinction 
between the principles of universalisation/assimilation on the one 
hand, and those of differentiation on the other. The question of 
hegemony also has a strategic role here, and it has been sometimes 
asked to what extent alternative forms of existence will be able to 
continue in the age of the pensee unique or “global monoculture” 
(Anderson 2004: 2). War is the extreme moment, when the polemical 
aspects deeply inscribed in the logic of globalisation become over­
riding.
In this paper I will consider what can be called the ‘discourse of 
war’ and show its symptomatic status in relation to the underlying 
discourses of totality (such as globalisation). I will then try to put 
forward some proposals for the development of semiotic practices 
grounded on partiality, which could be opposed to the discourse of 
war. In doing so, I will take sides in the debate mentioned above, 
arguing that a semiotic theory should be thought of as a set of 
practices which can function as a generator of resistance to totalising 
discourses. This is what a ‘semioethics’ should look like, rather than 
like a ‘science’ with a unified method.
Globalisation and semiotics
At the end of the 1980s, when the totalitarian regimes of Eastern 
Europe started to collapse, the feeling that a new era of peace and 
freedom was about to begin was widespread. The fears of annihilation 
which were experienced during the Cold War disappeared. These fears 
had had a material basis insofar as they were related to different
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degrees of embodiment: the physical division of the body of humanity 
into two (East and West separated by the Iron Curtain); the depor­
tation and imprisonment of individuals as an instrument of the dis­
memberment of national and social bodies (particularly in the Soviet 
Union), and the dissolution of individual bodies (as a consequence of 
a possible nuclear war).
The end of the Cold War coincided with an impressive accele­
ration of so-called globalisation, which in Western societies took the 
form of ‘informatization’, a progressive dematerialisation or disem­
bodiment of everyday-life with an increasing amount of human 
interaction taking place through exchanges of information within a 
virtual environment.1 The protagonist of this process is the new 
media: what represents globalisation better than the World Wide 
Web? These changes appeared very promising for semiotics. In fact, 
the dematerialisation of reality can also be seen as a progressive 
semiotisation of our world. Globalisation and its new media have 
enormously enlarged the portion of reality which is graspable by the 
methods of semiotics. The web, with its nodes and inter-related 
threads, is exactly the kind of structure semioticians have been 
accustomed to dealing with from the very beginning of their discipline 
(a classical Saussurean structure and a web can be seen as isomorphic 
construction). In these conditions the dream of a global semiotics, 
which would be the most natural theoretical way to describe our new 
world in exactly the terms of a “semiotic web”, seemed to be justified. 
Global semiotics can be seen from this point o f view as an attempt to 
extend a method originally thought of and developed to deal with 
human (social/cultural) artefacts as systems of signs, to cover all the 
phenomena of the biological world: “the activity of signs, or ‘se­
miosis’, extends in principle to the whole o f  being as ‘knowable’” 
(Deely 2005: 7; see also Sebeok 2001: 10: “The criterial mark of all 
life is semiosis”). The condition of possibility for the development of 
a global semiotics could therefore be found in one of the (realised or
Globalisation brought in this sense to full realisation what Guy Debord 
defined as “the spectacle”. As Debord explains, the spectacle must not be thought 
of as a simple set o f images, but as a social relation between persons (Debord 
1995: 16). I will return later to the consequences o f this fact.
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dreamed of) aspects of globalisation: the culturalisation/humanisation 
of nature as a reduction of its alterity.2
At the foundations of the dream of globalisation thus lies an ideal 
of intelligibility or transparency, just as if the sources of opacity could 
once and for all be removed, connections substituting for divisions, 
previous alterity becoming penetrable and therefore knowable through 
already existing means. The information society naturally finds its 
Other in the Third World; the undeletable materiality of hunger and 
disease is the challenge to globalisation. But if in the past the 
(barbarian) Other was seen with terror, as a constant threat of chaos to 
the order of civilization, at the beginning of the 1990s globalisation 
seemed to be the power which would make that which was still 
something else finally ‘our own’. The expansion of the Western 
system to the former East of the Communist Bloc had already 
successfully shown the power of market values; if this happened in a 
case in which the other side had a strong form of its own, why should 
it not happen in the case of the Third World, a space that we 
Westerners are used to imagining as having no systemic form at all? 
The increasing transparency granted by globalisation was thought to 
mean that the world would become increasingly readable for us 
Westerners, as our capacity to interpret reality thousands of miles 
away from home with the aid of our cultural codes. The dream of 
globalisation can be described in semiotic terms as a dream of 
assimilation without contamination of the original system, like the 
imposition of a form on an amorphous matter. Assimilation in fact 
presupposes a preliminary disarticulation of the pre-existent forms: the 
charge o f symbolic violence through which the “external culture”
2 I am not saying that global semiotics agrees with these aspects o f globali­
sation. On the contrary, it can be understood as a polemical reaction to them. It 
simply seems to me that the “delinguistization” and consequent “biologization” 
(Sebeok 2001: xxi) or “animalization” (Deely 2005) o f  man suggested by global 
semiotics presupposes in some sense a preliminary ‘culturalisation’ or ‘huma­
nisation’ o f the biological by theory. The question is that o f  whether Saussure was 
too logocentric or whether, on the contrary, he was not yet able to imagine the 
extraordinary power o f language (systems o f signs) in the society o f  the spectacle 
to substitute itself for reality, creating its own separated world and the subjects 
inhabiting it as essentially linguistic beings. I think that a theoretical attempt to fill 
the gap between culture and nature cannot ignore these points.
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destroys the “internal cultures” (Tarasti 2005) becomes here imme­
diately evident.3
The illusions promoted by globalisation were brought to a halt by 
an unexpected fact: the growing centrality of war in our new world. 
Examples of resistance to the global order provoked a return to the 
violence of colonization, a return to expansion through annihilation of 
the Other. To think of war as a momentary difficulty in the peaceful 
process of globalisation is to miss the point. War is the symptom 
which reveals the essence of globalisation as violence and at the same 
time its purest, supreme means. I think that semioticians cannot ignore 
this fact any more, but this paper will not be an attempt to develop a 
new component of the global web of semiotics, a semiotics o f war 
which could be add to the semiotics of life, culture, passions and so 
on. Such an attempt would result in a ‘discourse about’ with its own 
method and that is exactly what I do not want to do. Rather, the aim of 
this paper is to show how semiotics could go about developing a 
critical attitude towards war, and the kind of practices which would 
follow from this. The object of these practices would not be war in 
itself but the discourse of war and its mediatic agencies, in the spirit of 
what Umberto Eco has described as semiological guerrilla warfare 
(Eco 1986). That is, instead of taking language as a merely partial 
aspect of the global semiotic web of the ‘semiotic animal’, I will try to 
bring partiality into language taken as the global semiotic web itself.4
3 In the terms o f  globalisation we could think in a provocative way about the 
disarticulation and dissolution o f the Soviet Union and the consequent formation 
of national states with weak economies as the creation o f forms which are easily 
penetrable by international capital and other assimilating forces. The violence o f  
the process is evident in the consequent marginalization o f a significant part o f  the 
population. This means that the nation and nationalism can not always be 
considered as a hindrance to globalisation. The national state can be seen in this 
perspective as “the form whose homogenizing drive connects the apparent 
particularity o f national identities to the greater homogeneity o f universal history” 
(Lloyd 1997: 182).
4 I do not claim that this is the ‘right way out’, simply that it fits well with the 
kind o f critical practice I am going to develop in what follows.
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The paradoxical character of wartime
I will take as a starting point three different theoretical ways to 
approach war, covering a stretch of time from the First World War 
until the first Gulf War of 1991. The somewhat contradictory ideas 
contained in the texts to be examined will help me to draw the 
reader’s attention to the different components of what will be defined 
as the discourse of war, as well as to the changes triggered in it by the 
development of its agencies, the media.
In an article written in 1915, Sigmund Freud described war as a 
“whirlwind” [Wirbel] in which participants are confused by the 
significance of the impressions that overwhelm them (Freud 1974: 
35). He writes of “wartime” as a complex process, a peculiar time, 
when violence knows no limit and overwhelms with blind rage any­
thing that stands in its way, as though there were to be no future and 
no peace afterward (Freud 1974: 38). In the terms used here above, 
what the whirlwind of wartime destroys is the intelligibility and 
transparency of the world we live in. We lose the necessary ‘distance’ 
from the transformations that are taking place and remain in the dark. 
Freud defines this psychological condition as the end of belief in the 
power of human acculturation, a “disenchantment” [Enttäusschung] to 
which individuals react by trying to direct outward the disorienting 
forces menacing their stability. If wartime represents a danger to 
individuals because it tears them out of their “place”, it simulta­
neously mobilises those very same disintegrating forces against an 
Other, which is labelled as the enemy (Weber 1997: 94).
Similarly to Freud, Emmanuel Levinas sees in war the establish­
ment of an order from which no one can remain at a distance. War 
reduces individuals to bearers of impersonal powers, which direct 
them (Levinas 1996: 6). Levinas, therefore, links war to that kind of 
totality which characterizes Western thought: the goal of both is the 
reduction of the Other to the Same. Totality coincides with the ex­
haustion o f all exteriority, the closure of the system, recalling the lack 
of future of Freud but also the ideas of such theoreticians of the global 
world as Francis Fukuyama about the “end o f history”. War serves 
totality in two ways: firstly by making individuals bearers of an 
impersonal universality, and secondly by actively leading them to 
neutralise the Other which would otherwise remain exterior to the 
totality. That is why, according to Levinas, peace always has an
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eschatological nature and the Other is linked with infinity: both bear 
the signs of the exteriority, the open, the not-still as opposed to totality 
(Levinas 1996: 8-9).5
The third text I will briefly consider is the much-discussed essay 
by Jean Baudrillard about the Gulf War. What Baudrillard insists upon 
is the dematerialization and the virtuality of war in our time. This is 
accomplished by the media where the events vanish in information 
itself, stripping war of its passions and violence and re-clothing it with 
“all the artifices of electronics as with a second skin” (Baudrillard 
1995: 64). The disorienting effect of war (the Freudian whirlwind) 
does not disappear: it is now triggered by the media which, by 
liquidating the event in an infinite series of repetitions, speculations, 
interpretations, transforms the spectators into “corpses in the charnel 
house of new signs” (Baudrillard 1995: 76). War, therefore, functions 
in Baudrillard as a symptomatic device; it reveals that the dema- 
terialising power of the media engenders a new, radical opacity in 
respect to the events which are deleted by discourse. This has become 
possible in contemporary society, where the spectacle, alienating 
language, constitutes it as the separated world in which we live 
(Agamben 2000: 81). The media does not bring war nearer to us, into 
our houses, as some say. We do not really know more about war than 
Freud’s contemporaries did. Anyway, it would be false to think that 
the mediatic unreality of war implies its lack o f real effects. The 
mobilizing power of war, as stated by Freud and Levinas, remains 
unquestionably in place in the age of the spectacle too. Media sources 
has simply become the new “storm troopers” (Agamben 2000: 94) of 
the discourse of war and, at the same time, the media has become the 
battlefield where it is really decided who shall win (Vietnam was an 
earlier example of this shift. In the case of Iraq it would be very 
difficult to decide who won the war, if the media had not told us that 
the US did.)
5 In his comment on Levinas’ book, Derrida diverges from the author o f  
Totality and Infinity in that he situates the Other within language and history, 
where it can never be thought o f  as a ‘positive infinity’, but always as maintaining 
within itself the negativity o f the indefinite. This is a very important point for my 
argument, because Derrida links in-finity and partiality to finitude and positions 
them all straight into language: “The other cannot be what it is, infinitely other, 
except in finitude and mortality (mine and its). It is such as soon as it comes into 
language” (Derrida 2004: 143). I will return to this later.
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The synthetic exposition of Freud’s, Levinas’ and Baudrillard’s 
ideas about war has brought to light a kind of paradox in the logic of 
wartime, whose consequences will be of great importance in what 
follows. ‘Wartime’ brings with it an overwhelming lack of transpa­
rency and intelligibility in people’s relationship with the events which 
are taking place. The impossibility of remaining at a distance is 
established by the tyranny of a present which ends future and past in 
the ‘real time’ of the media.6 But, simultaneously, wartime triggers 
also a shortcut to that sort of simplifying intelligibility which is 
characteristic of all discourses of totality. The tyrannical present of 
wartime transforms itself into presence , the imposition of a given 
discourse as a closed and self-evident totality, the only possible way to 
look at the events. Freud describes the effects of this imposition on the 
“best minds” as a “logical blindness” [Verblendung] which is a se­
condary phenomenon following an “emotional excitation” [Gefühl­
serregungj (Freud 1974: 47). It is through this blindness that the 
mobilising potentiality of war becomes a reality.
It is precisely in this paradox (lack of intelligibility together with a 
shortcut to simplifying universalisations) that the symptomaticity of 
war in relation to globalisation begins to appear. Seeing things by 
means of this paradox, beyond the ideal of globalisation as a growing 
cosmopolitan knowledge, the asymmetrical ignorance “that stands as 
an indictment of the crippling and disastrous inequalities of the world 
system” (Hitchcock 2000: 4) will emerge.8 Let us consider, to briefly 
exemplify this, the phenomena which we usually call ‘natural 
disasters’ when they take place in the globalised world — this might
6 “War implodes in real time, history implodes in real time, all communication 
and all signification implode in real time” (Baudrillard 1995: 49).
See Derrida (2004: 1-35).
8 It is from this perspective that Tarasti proposes precisely the coming to an end 
o f both the future and the past which was discussed above, as fundamental to 
globalization. For individuals, this means uncertainty and an impossibility either 
to make long term plans or to resort to history in the search for explanatory 
criteria (Tarasti 2005). William E. Connolly develops the same ideas at the level 
o f the State: “global contingencies” are, in his view, “possibilities and potential 
emergencies that might be resistant to control”. Global contingencies engender a 
gap between the power o f  the most powerful states and the power they would 
require for self-government and self-determination. The drive to close this gap 
causes, in Connolly’s view, a rise o f  disciplinary pressure in the domestic sphere 
and represents a serious danger to global survival (Connolly 2002: 24-25).
also give a further explanation of the doubts expressed above about 
global semiotics. In both the cases of the South-east Asian Tsunami 
and Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans what strikes our imagination as 
something unthinkable (a paradox) is the coexistence of a perfectly 
transparent knowledge (sanctioned by science) of the event with the 
absolute opacity of what is taking place. It is enough to look at the 
victims of the two disasters to see how the paradox finds its expla­
nations in the ‘asymmetrical ignorance’ and the ‘disastrous inequa­
lities’ characteristic of the global world mentioned above. The recur­
rent use of bellicose metaphors in the description of natural disasters 
also manifests the symptomatic quality of wartime in our representa­
tion of such phenomena.
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The discourse of war
I am now ready to proceed with a semiotic analysis of the discourse of 
war as it manifests itself in our times. In so doing, I will sum up the 
elements presented so far, and add some new perspectives. In essence, 
it is possible to explain the paradox referred to earlier by postulating a 
functional detachment between the paradigmatic and the syntagmatic 
levels of the discourse of war. It is here that a space opens for semiotic 
practices of resistance to this discourse.
At the paradigmatic level it is particularly evident that the dis­
course of war is based on what Levinas called totality, the thing that 
we often hear of and recognize today as ‘fundamentalism’. In fact, the 
paradigmatic oppositions of the war discourse are all grounded in a 
fundamental and irreducible difference, that between we and they 
strengthened by the principle ‘anyone who is not with us is against 
us’, making the paradigm an exhaustive classification in which every­
thing is comprehended without any exteriority.9 But the disposition of 
the two terms of this opposition on the same level is only apparent. 
Actually we encounter here what Sidra Dekoven Ezrahi has called an 
apocalyptic logic based on chosenness. In this kind of totalising dis­
course, Ezrahi writes, “we don’t see in them a reflection of our
9 The inscription o f the tertium non datur principle in the discourse o f war was, 
for instance, a very important point in George W. Bush’s speeches after the 
September 11 attacks.
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humanity” because “there is really no room in the mirror for more 
than one reflection” (Ezrahi 2002: 66; my emphasis —  D. M.). This 
removal of humanity is a process in which the identity of the enemy is 
disarticulated, and the enemy is excluded from all possible (social, 
juridico-political, cultural) attributions. Paradoxically, the exhaustive 
classification mentioned above therefore generates, by its very 
functioning, a residuum. This kind of residuum is very similar to the 
one generated by what in political and legal theory is known as a 
“state of emergency” and Giorgio Agamben re-defined in a broader 
philosophical perspective as a “state of exception” (Agamben: 2005). 
A state of exception is a state of suspension of the law, in which the 
individuals who are subjected to it suffer a deprivation of their 
juridico-political status and are essentially reduced to what Giorgio 
Agamben calls “bare life”. In the state of exception power applies 
without mediation directly to bare life as a sovereign right over life 
and death (Agamben 1998: 81-86; 2000: 40). As Freud demonstrates, 
war is the symptomatic moment, when the citizen realizes what should 
have already been clear in peace time: that the State monopolises the 
use of violence and every possible injustice (Freud 1974: 39). It is 
thus possible to describe the process which is made clear by the 
paradigm of war discourse in terms of the process of “dislocating 
localization” (Agamben 2000: 43) at work in the state of exception; 
through it the localisation of ‘us’ as an exhaustive totality (for instance 
‘humanity’) is based on the differentiation of a ‘they’ and its 
dislocation as a residuum (bare life). Karl Schmitt describes this 
procedure as follows:
Humanity as such as a whole has no enemies. Everyone belongs to humanity 
[...]. ‘Humanity’ thus becomes an asymmetrical counter-concept. If he [the 
person who speaks in the name o f  humanity] discriminates within humanity 
and thereby denies the quality o f  being human to a disturber or destroyer, then 
the negatively valued person becomes an unperson, and his life is no longer of 
the highest value: it becomes worthless and must be destroyed. Concepts such 
as ‘human being’ thus contain the possibility o f the deepest inequality and 
become thereby ‘asymmetrical’. (Schmitt 1987: 88)10
We therefore face a paradigm which generates diversity only to 
disarticulate or dislocate it, by excluding it from any possible defini­
For a discussion about the construction o f  humanity/inhumanity in relation to 
war and terrorism see Butler 2004: 89-91.
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tional status; the above-mentioned paradox disappears when we think 
at the constitution of the enemy into a residuum as the legitimising 
precondition for its annihilation which restores the self-sufficiency of 
the totality. Note that the inequality and asymmetricality mentioned by 
Schmitt in this case are actually of the same kind as those described 
above as characteristic of globalisation.
There are some terms which bring this kind of totalising activity to 
an extremity, and they seem to function within the paradigm of war 
discourse in an unrelational way, as if they had an extra-systemic 
value. In the Western discourse of war, such terms include for 
instance ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’. When asked, George W. Bush 
frequently gives quite a deceptive definition of them, for example by 
saying that Americans had the opportunity to vote him out of office, 
but they did not use it (and that this is democracy) or that the State 
must serve citizens, not vice-versa (and that this is freedom).11 But 
‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’ acquire a somewhat magical value in the 
discourse of war, where they figure as universals not subject to 
(syntagmatic) definition or (paradigmatic) relativisation: they own 
“the redemptive unity of the Idea” in respect of the abjection of war 
(Kristeva 1982: 145). This unity takes precisely the form of the 
‘dislocating localization’ encountered before: ‘ We all want freedom 
and democracy, but they don’t.’
It is possible to summarize the different aspects of the paradigm of 
the discourse of war using Levinas’s observations about the two ways 
in which Western thought faces the relation between the Same and the 
Other: supremacy of the Same (apocalyptical oppositions) or reduc­
tion of the relation to an impersonal universal order (unity o f the idea), 
where being together means being side by side all looking at the idea 
rather then at each other. The new concept of residuum defined here 
will become important in what follows.
On the syntagmatic level of war discourse we encounter the 
mediatic chains described by Baudrillard. Here the totalising process 
manifests itself as an absolute predominance of the whole over its 
constituent parts. It has been noted in relation to poetry that an abuse 
of syntagmatic procedures like alliteration can provoke strong inter­
ferences in the processing of meaning with a consequent loss of sense 
(Silverman 1983: 106). In the same way, repetition is the process
" See for instance the interview released by Bush to the Estonian newspaper 
Postimees (Postimees, 07.05.2005).
328 Daniele Monticelli
which establishes that, in media coverage of war, the real and singular 
event is always and already left behind. The relation between the 
syntagmatic and the paradigmatic moment of war discourse appears 
clearly in the words Baudrillard uses to describe what Debord and 
Agamben call the “society of the spectacle”:
the age o f simulation thus begins with a liquidation o f all referential —  
worse: by their artificial resurrection in systems o f signs, which are a more 
ductile material than meaning, in that they lend themselves to all systems of 
equivalence, all binary oppositions and all combinatory algebra. (Baudrillard 
1988: 167)
If the event vanishes within the repetitive syntagmatics of war dis­
course, the paradigmatic order offers a shortcut to the kind of expla­
natory transparency described above for the case of globalisation. In a 
sense the paradigm does not provide us with the competence needed 
for the interpretation of the mediatic syntagms. Instead, it exonerates 
us from the need to interpret them, because their compositional logic 
(relations of meaning between the parts and the whole) remains 
opaque from the very beginning. That is why I speak of a detachment 
between the syntagmatic and the paradigmatic levels of the discourse 
of war. It is possible to think about this detachment as a double 
erasure, with the generation of a residuum, as shown in Fig. 1.
RESIDUUM 
(bare life)
Figure 1. Double erasure and residuum.
The residuum produced by the shortcut as a consequence of the use of 
asymmetrically universalising concepts is precisely the point at which 
the discourse of war becomes symptomatic to all the discourses of 
totality, such as globalization. Practices o f resistance to the discourse
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of war can be developed starting from its realized, that is syntagmatic, 
form; if the paradigm is a totalising system of classification, the 
syntagm always presupposes speech (Silverman 1983: 104) and, as 
Saussure long ago observed, it is only through speech that we can 
trigger changes in language.
The whole and the parts
The mediatic environment represents, in the society of the spectacle, 
our always-already given and it will therefore be the starting point for 
the semiotic practices of resistance described in what follows. First of 
all, the image of the media as a web must be substituted with an image 
better fitted to the observations made so far. It is the Italian writer 
Italo Calvino who offers a suitable image when, in his novel Priscilla- 
Death, he compares our mediatic environment or, as he writes, 
“everything that is language in the broad sense”, to a cover (<calotta is 
the Italian world, meaning a hemi-spherical and hard kind of cover 
rendered as cap by the English translator):
As soon as we are out o f the primordial matter, we are bound in a connective 
tissue that fills the hiatus between our discontinuities, between our deaths and 
births, a collection o f signs, articulated sounds, ideograms, morphemes, 
numbers, punched cards, magnetic tapes, tattoos, a system o f  communication 
that includes social relations, kinship, institutions, merchandise, advertising 
posters, napalm bombs, namely everything that is language, in the broad 
sense. [ ...]  Like a duplicate o f  the Earth’s crust, the cap [calotta] is hardening 
over our heads. (Calvino 1969: 91)12
12 Note that, in his attempt to show the extension o f  the category o f  sign, Sebeok 
quotes a passage from Peirce, suggesting examples that are reasonably analogous 
(given the difference in time) to Calvino’s: “Signs in general [are] a class which 
includes pictures, symptoms, words, sentences, books, libraries, signals, orders o f  
command, microscopes, legislative representatives, musical concerts, [and] per­
formances o f  these, in short, whatever is adapted to making mental impressions 
virtually emanating from something external to itse lf’ (Peirce, MS 634, 16-17  
[September 1909], quoted in Sebeok 2001: 8-9). A relevant difference seems to 
lie in the fact that Calvino speaks o f a covering, and therefore o f  a duplication, 
while in Peirce’s terms the universe is “perfused” with signs, which are therefore 
represented as much more “inherent” to it (hence global semiotics). That is why, 
in my opinion, Calvino’s image (quite similarly to Debord 1995: 21) works better 
than Peirce’s in describing the society o f the spectacle.
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The filling of empty spaces (hiatuses) caused by the cover does not 
mean, in Calvino’s terms, the elimination of all barriers to commu­
nication, on the contrary it makes communication nonsensical and 
impossible, becoming an “hostile envelope”, a “prison”; what we 
thought of as a “network” of connections (the media) turns out to be 
an instrument of isolation (Weber 1997: 100-101). The symptomatic 
nature of war in relation to the nature of the media, which we can re­
state in everyday terms as the ‘complete coverage’ of war by the 
media, could become a site on which semiotic practices might seek for 
a spot to “break the cap” trying “to prevent its perpetual self­
repetition”, as Calvino puts it (Calvino 1969: 92). It seems to me that 
this cannot be done along the critical lines proposed by Baudrillard, 
because the situation has changed since 1991. If at that time the 
problem of the reduction and absorption of the singular into the 
universality of the New World Order seemed to be soluble for the 
West with the cleanliness of a spectacular operation (Baudrillard 
1995: 86), we are now witnessing, with terrorism, the return of the 
fears of annihilation characteristic of the Cold War: the body of 
humankind divided into two (Islam and the West), the individual body 
exposed to dismemberment (for example in the beheadings of 
hostages or the falling bodies of the Twin Towers) and the social body 
constantly threatened by a possibly mortal virus (immigrants as 
potential terrorists).The discourse of war uses the vulnerability arising 
from these fears of constant menaces to our life to promote war as the 
symbolic space where we can continue to imagine ourselves as 
invulnerable; it does so through the process of dislocating localization 
described above, a mechanism which more and more transforms the 
state of exception into the rule of our societies: we can be ‘sure’ only 
if everyone, potentially, might be deprived of his or her juridico- 
political status and reduced to a residuum, bare life without any rights 
subjected to a power able to decide on his or her life and death: 
“power no longer has today any form of legitimization other than 
emergency [...] power everywhere and continuously refers and 
appeals to emergency as well as laboring secretly to produce it” 
(Agamben 2000: 6; see also Agamben 1998: 114—115, Connolly 2002: 
24; Butler 2004: 50-100).13
13 __
Thus, in Agamben’s view, the Third World, enemies o f  war, and the ‘enemy 
combatants at the prison in Guantanamo Bay are instances o f  bare life on the 
global level just as much as migrants, aliens without citizenship and the
From globality to partiality  331
In search of practices of resistance to the discourse of war, it is 
useful to revert to the strategies of reaction to totality elaborated 
within the frame of postmodernist thought.14 Difference, dissemina­
tion, heterogeneity, molecularity, discontinuity (Jameson 1983: 53, 
58), multiplicity and plurality (Haber 1994: 7, 18), segmentation 
(Silverman 1984: 246-250) are some of the concepts that post­
modernist thinkers have used as critical instruments against totalising 
forms of discourse. What postmodernist critique tries to do is to 
identify those places in discourse where subjects and worlds seem to 
“resist recuperation within the oneness of the world” (Hitchcock 2000: 
16). I want to introduce here this strategy of resistance to totality in a 
quite unusual way: by returning, that is, to some of Calvino’s ideas 
about literature instead of quoting some well-known postmodernist 
theoretician.
In his Six memos fo r  the next Millennium, Calvino writes about 
Lucrezio’s De rerum natura as the first “work of poetry in which 
knowledge of the world tends to dissolve the solidity of the world, 
leading to a perception of all that is infinitely minute, light and 
mobile” (Calvino 1996: 8). This is why, first of all, Lucretian atomism 
gives rise to a “poetry of the invisible”, a poetry “of infinite unex­
pected possibilities”. Secondly, the Lucretian pulverization of reality 
is a means of avoiding the oppression of matter, dissolving the solidity 
of the world, and establishing “an essential parity between everything
inhabitants o f the outskirts o f great post-industrial cities (think o f the Parisian 
banlieue\) are within the national state. Anderson uses the concept o f ‘fifth world’ 
to describe “displaced persons and peoples” such as refugees or the homeless 
(Anderson 2004: 300-302). In terms quite similar to Agamben, Connolly 
describes what he calls the external Other (foreign enemies and terrorists) and the 
internal other (low-level criminals, drug users, the disloyals, racial minorities, and 
the underclass) as both functional to the “theatricality o f power” which construct 
them as “a dispensable subject o f political representation and an indispensable 
object of political disposability” (Connolly 2002: 208).
14 I think therefore that semiotics can and should usefully employ some o f  the 
ideas generated by the postmodernist tradition instead o f  proclaiming itself “/Ae 
postmodern revolution in philosophy” (Deely 2005: 10; my emphasis —  D. M.) or 
opposing its own solid “pre-socratic” origins to the “ephemeral Parisian fads” o f  
twentieth-century thought (Sebeok 2001: 6). The ‘postmodernist turn’ in semiotics 
means giving up the idea o f semiotics as a unified and unifying method and 
instead doing semiotics in a situation where it already appears to be: a set of 
different theoretical practices which employ some common concepts, defining 
them in very different ways.
that exists, as opposed to any sort of hierarchy of powers or values 
(Calvino 1996: 9). What is important in the Lucretian method is the 
recovered independence of the parts in respect to the whole to which 
they belonged. If Lucretrius was dealing with matter, we could apply 
the same process to the mediatic environment, particularly now, when 
Calvino’s words have been used to define it as a cover, something as 
hard and oppressive as matter was for Lucretius.
The semiotic procedure which I would like to propose would apply 
the Lucretian method to the mediatic environment, disentangling 
small details from the uninterrupted flow of information which makes 
them invisible, assigning them a place only within the chains of 
interpretations, speculations, and argumentations. This disentangle­
ment implies a reversal of the direction of semiotic practices: if se­
miotics traditionally tends to establish connections, we should instead 
try to favour the emergence of disconnections.15 Highlighting the 
detail, paying attention to it, we make room for its emergence and help 
it resist: “it is we alone who determine whether the world will appear 
and so be, or languish in the darkness of non-being” (Silverman 2000: 
7). If at the beginning of the history of cinematography Walter 
Benjamin called the new technique shocking, because of the temporal 
impossibility of the spectator arresting a single scene and developing 
an independent train of thought about it (Benjamin 1973: 231-232), in 
our time, on the contrary, it is exactly the idea of stopping the con­
tinuous flow of images and words that has become shocking. Think of 
the fundamental role which photos, not videos, have played in the 
development of a critical conscience against war from Vietnam to 
Iraq.
The semiotic procedure here proposed relates, in my opinion, to 
Ben veniste’s ideas about the difference between the semantic and the 
semiotic, the first being based on understanding, the second on
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15 We find a similar procedure in Barthes, where segmentation (“cutting up”, 
“breaking”, “interruption”) is used to disrupt the syntagmatic order o f the text and 
to challenge the ideological systematization imposed by a given code (Barthes 
2000: 13-16). Agamben uses the term ‘interruption’ to characterize the process 
through which “the factum o f  language comes to light for an instant” (Agamben 
2000: 70). Furthermore, Levinas speaks o f  the need to “break” the discourse, 
which vanishes otherwise into the All (Levinas 2002). Lacan seems to synthesize 
Calvino’s intentions in the best way, when he writes: “this cut in the signifying 
chain alone verifies the structure o f the subject as discontinuity in the real” (Lacan 
2001:331; my emphasis —  D. M.).
recognition. The only difference is that if Benveniste claims that “la 
seule question qu’un signe suscite pour etre reconnu est celle de son 
existence” (Benveniste 1974: 64), in what I am trying to do this 
statement could be inverted as follows: “the detail is called into 
existence as a sign only if it is recognized”. Recognition has, therefore, 
the form of a shock, a short circuit in the system which disentangles the 
detail from the syntagmatic chain, where it figured as an insignificant 
part. The question is now “which kind of recognition?”, because, as 
shown above, the discourse of war has its own paradigm and inside this 
paradigm recognition is achieved on the basis of the all-important 
opposition between we and they. The kind of recognition I am thinking 
about should be able to disrupt exactly this paradigm. As a basis for this 
idea of recognition, Kaja Silverman’s description of different kinds of 
resemblance (Silverman 1983: 87-125) might be useful. Drawing on 
Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis, Silverman argues that we can 
distinguish between three kinds of resemblance, those related respecti­
vely to paradigm, condensation and metaphor. Differences and 
distinctions are fundamental to the paradigm which is organized on a 
relational logic and based on binary oppositions, where “the parts have 
value by virtue of their place in the whole” (Saussure 1966: 128, quoted 
in Silverman 1983: 105). The paradigm is the place of the we/they and 
all the other related oppositions of the discourse of war, as shown 
above. Condensation refers to what Freud calls ‘primary processes’ 
(like dreams) and collapses distinctions between different elements to 
achieve absolute identification. In condensation, “each manifest signi- 
fier refers to a group of latent signifieds”, highly economically; “under 
its [condensation] influence the part stands for the whole, a single figure 
represents a diverse group” (Silverman 1983: 91). The mechanism of 
condensation appears to be at work in the above mentioned “redemptive 
unity of the Idea” with its charge of symbolic violence. Is it not as if in 
some kind of dreamlike conditioning that ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’ 
impose themselves as self-evident universals? Metaphor lies in 
between: it is neither complete identity, nor irreducible difference, “it 
permits profound affinities and adjacencies to be discovered without 
differences being lost” (Silverman 1983: 109). If paradigm and con­
densation are grounded on presence and exhaustive closure (all is here 
now and there is nothing more), in metaphor it is the ‘principle of 
absence’ that becomes central. It is precisely because of the unelimin- 
able partiality of the metaphor (a metaphor is a substitution legitimated
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only in some respect) that the hidden term is never exhausted in the 
substitution, never totally present. That is why it would be more precise 
to consider the ground of a metaphor not as a sign, but as a trace, where 
something is “present not as a total presence” (Derrida 2004: 119, 135; 
see also Derrida 1997: 44—73). The disentangled detail can become the 
ground for this kind of metaphorical recognition linking the Self and the 
Other, where the Other is absent but evoked by the detail functioning as 
its trace. As in Lacan and Levinas, absence triggers desire and desire 
puts into motion a series of further recognitions.16
Opening the space of community: 
partiality, in-finity and finitude
It is now possible to change Figure 1, as shown in Figure 2.
e v M t  — ►
Figure 2. Disentanglement of the detail and space of community.
16 Basing the kind o f disconnections I am discussing here on recognition and 
resemblance, I take the risk o f once more emphasising similarity at the expense of  
difference. Anyway, as Honi F. Haber has shown, the universalisation of  
difference, like the universalisation o f totality, prevents the elaboration o f every 
possible strategy o f  resistance. The latter become possible only insofar as 
“sometimes we recognize parts o f ourselves in the stories o f others” (Haber 1994: 
43; see also Whitebrook 2001: 150-151 and Connolly 2002: ix-xxxi). Anyway, 
unlike the last two authors, I will not use the concept o f ‘identity’ to describe the 
kind o f resemblance I am speaking about, for reasons that will be explained 
below.
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The disconnection of the detail from the mediatic chain opens a space 
o f ‘community’, where the Other generated and dislocated by the 
paradigm of war discourse as a residuum (bare life) can be expe­
rienced by us. Opening up this space means resisting the alienation of 
language as our power to communicate in the world of the media, the 
cover which fills all the empty spaces between our discontinuities only 
to make communication impossible and the place where “human 
beings are kept separate by what unites them” (Agamben 2000: 84). 
To open up the space of community therefore means bringing 
“language itself to language” (Agamben 1993: 82). The space of com­
munity is the space of the re-instituted power of language, the space of 
total possibility that Derrida, following Heidegger, identifies with 
Being, not as a given predicate but as “what authorizes all predicates” 
and “far from closing difference, on the contrary liberates it” (Derrida 
2004: 175, 406). In comparison with the fullness of being (uni­
versality) represented by the paradigm of war and the non-being of the 
residuum as bare life (exception), we can define the space of com­
munity opened by the disconnection of the detail as the space of the 
possibility to not not-be (Agamben 1993: 31). The kind of community 
here imagined has nothing to do with identity (which grounded the 
paradigmatic opposition between we and they); on the contrary, the 
space of community should be thought as a space of pure commu- 
nicability, pure mediality, where instead of identity a principle of 
unconditioned substitutability (Agamben 1993: 24-25) is in force. If 
the rhetoric of identity was the premise for the universal repre- 
sentability and the self-identification of individuals inside the 
paradigm of the discourse of war, anti-identitarian substitutability will 
be the way to present within the space of community what that 
paradigm dislocated as something unpresentable (residuum, bare life) 
to be destroyed. In his theory of the text, Barthes defined this kind of 
unconditioned substitutability as an “unbridled (pandemic) circulation 
of signs”, which “abolishes the power of legal substitution” exhausti­
vely regulated by the paradigmatic oppositions (Barthes 2000: 215- 
216).
It is interesting to note the way that the opening of the space of 
community triggered by the disentangled detail becomes parado­
xically possible, in spite of Baudrillard’s pessimism, exactly because 
of the separation of language in an autonomous sphere accomplished 
by the media in the society of the spectacle. This is the positive aspect
of what Benjamin earlier defined as the “loss of aura” of the work of 
art due to its mechanical reproducibility (Benjamin 1968: 215). The 
society of the spectacle, more generally, can be defined as the 
“devastating experimentum linguae that disarticulates and empties, all 
over the planet, traditions and beliefs, ideologies and religions, iden­
tities and communities” (Agamben 2000: 85); this experiment makes 
it possible for us to fully experience our linguistic being. Derrida 
stresses how Levinas too never condemned technology, on the 
contrary he saw in it the possibility of letting the human face shine in 
its nudity as opposed to the violence of the traditional “taking root”, or 
“implantation in the Site” (Derrida 2004: 400, 409). Thus the simpli­
fying transparency o f the paradigm of war discourse and the relative 
practices of identification obtained through double erasure and 
shortcut (fig. 1) need not be the only possible results of the 
constitution of language as an autonomous sphere within the society 
of the spectacle. The latter contains a positive possibility too precisely 
in its very much criticized ‘devoiding power’. This possibility starts to 
emerge when the pulverization of the mediatic chain into details opens 
up a space o f community, where the paradigm is disrupted and its 
residuum made presentable in a trace, the ground for a metaphorical 
link between we and others where the range of possible substitutions 
knows no pre-established conditions.
Returning to the recognition which enable the disentanglement of 
the detail, it is possible to describe it now, in Levinas’s terms, as the 
answer to an interpellation which Derrida reformulates as an ethics of 
“letting be” (Derrida 2004: 172, 179). “To let be” presupposes what 
has been described as the opening up of a space of community, the 
reinstating of the linguistic power as a possibility to not not-be. The 
point of departure of that interpellation (the Other) is thought by 
Levinas to be exterior to the totalising discourse it helps to 
deconstruct. That is why the details which trigger our rejection of the 
discourse of war are usually not scenes of war (such as images of the 
wounded, or of dead people); those make violence into a spectacle to 
which we are accustomed to a high degree (Baudrillard 1995; Weber 
1997: 96-105). However, there are other images and words (children, 
details of everyday life or scenes of joy, faces, words of affection and 
so on), which entangled as they are in the mediatic chains of the 
discourse of war lose their ability to make sense, but if they are 
recognized and disentangled they point to their (that is my and the
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Other’s) exteriority to that discourse. In recognition we become 
vulnerable to the Other, losing the invulnerability that the totality of 
war discourse granted us, but overcoming our vulnerability to the 
confusing effects caused by the mediatic chains of war discourse. The 
disenchantment described by Freud as a consequence of wartime is 
not denied and reversed against the Other any more, but affirmed as 
the condition where the Self and the Other may meet. As Agamben 
puts it, only in a world “in which the citizen has been able to 
recognize the refugee that he or she is”, it will be possible to think at 
the “political survival of humankind” (Agamben 2000: 26), the 
opening of a space of community. Only if we recognize ourselves in 
the ones who may not be, does it become possible to let be, to 
cultivate the possibility to not not-be. It is at this point that the 
partiality of details encounters the in-finity (see footnote 5) of the 
Other and our (and the Other’s) finitude (mortality), whose acknow­
ledgment has often been understood as the premise for all possible 
critique of war and violence (e.g., Freud 1974: 49-60; Weber 1997; 
Connolly 2002: 164—171; Silverman 2003).17
It should now be clear how the semiotic practice of disconnection 
suggested here may represent a strategy of resistance to the discourse 
of war as characterized above. From the paradigmatic point of view 
the details, with their lightness and lack of hierarchy, become a 
contrast to the unbalanced oppositions of the discourse of war. Like 
the “parity between everything that exists” obtained through the 
Lucretian pulverisation of reality, the pulverisation of the mediatic 
cover into details provokes a similar parity between we and they, 
questioning apocalyptic chosenness and making “empathy” possible 
(Ezrahi 2002: 66). From the syntagmatic point of view, disconnection 
represents the necessary precondition for developing our own dis­
course, it gives us access to the right to speak.18 Recognition is in fact 
always experienced by me, it is my point of contact with the Other, 
my metaphor for the Other, my way of being for the Other: “Creatures 
and things invite us to answer to their appeal in a manner which,
17 “This identification with humanity through the experience of difference and 
finitude may achieve its most influential presence in life, though, if death is taken 
as a theme of reflection and treated as one of the tests around which life is 
organized” (Connolly 2002: 167).
18 Agamben writes in this sense about the “event of language” as “free use of the 
14 common” (Agamben 2000: 117-118).
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although fully responsive to their formal coordinates, is absolutely 
particular to ourselves” (Silverman 2000: 22). Peace, writes Levinas, 
is always my peace and it manifests itself as an attitude towards 
speaking (Levinas 1996: 8, 342).
About semiotics
In conclusion I would like to sum up how war taken as a symptom 
helps us to reconsider the method of semiotics. I return therefore to 
the title of this paper to claim that we should bring about in semiotics’ 
practices a shift from the paradigm of globality (totality) to that of 
partiality. This shift goes, in my opinion, in the same direction as 
some of the proposals made by the late Michel Foucault for a new 
intellectual ethics.
The first meaning of partiality which I suggest is a rather political 
one. Commitment could be a fundamental premise of our activity as 
semioticians and commitment means taking a position within the field 
we are studying. This is why it is more useful to discuss the place of 
semiotics’ practices in the social field than the status of semiotics as a 
science. What we should renounce is the pretence of imagining our­
selves to be positioned somewhere outside that which we are 
observing, the pretence of objectivity or, better to say, that of objecti­
fication, which is the premise of all totalising discourses. Foucault 
described what he presented as a necessary change in the role of the 
intellectuals as a shift from the universal (the position of “owner of the 
truth”, maitre) to the local, where intellectuals can see themselves as 
positioned and conditioned within their own field, the field of know­
ledge, truth, consciousness, discourse. This perspectival (partial) point 
of view represents an indispensable premise for becoming engaged in 
the struggle against the forms of totalising power characteristic of our 
own field (Foucault 1977: 20, 109). Theory should therefore not be 
seen as the translation of a practice, but as a practice itself, not 
totalising, but local, regional. It is only from this point of departure 
that it becomes possible to construct transverse links between different 
theoretical practices and struggles as a premise for a committed 
interdisciplinarity.
The epistemological meaning of partiality derives immediately 
from the political one. The decision to look at our mediatic environ­
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ment as a cover rather than as a web solicits from the semiotician an 
analytic rather than a synthetic approach, an approach able to discover 
the part in the whole, the particular in the global, the different in the 
same. The result need not be a straightforwardly deconstructive kind 
of semiotics. On the contrary, I am trying to answer the Foucault’s 
request for a criticism which would multiply “signs of existence”, 
having as a fundamental means curiosity because “it evokes the care 
one takes of what exists and what might exist; a sharpened sense of 
reality, but one that is never immobilized before it [...] a lack of 
respect for the traditional hierarchies of what is important and funda­
mental” (Foucault 1997: 325). The segmenting, disconnecting mo­
ment of the semiotic practice suggested here can become the premise 
for another kind of speech, where the parts do not vanish into the 
whole and the exteriority of the Other is never finally resumed into the 
totality of the Same. Lucretius’s atomism and Levinas’s philosophy 
both have in-finity as their epistemological basis and so should 
semiotics.
References
Agamben, Giorgio 1993. The Coming Community. (Hardt, M., trans.) 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
— 1998. Homo sacer. Sovereign Power and Bare Life. (Heller-Roazen, D., 
trans.) Stanford: Stanford University Press.
— 2000. Means without Ends: Notes on Politics. (Binetti, V.; Cesarino, C., 
trans.) Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
— 2005. State o f Exception. (Attell, K., trans.) Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press.
Anderson, Myrdene (ed.) 2004. Cultural Shaping o f Violence — Victimization, 
Escalation, Response. West Lafayette: Purdue University Press.
Barthes, Roland 2000. S/Z. (Miller, R., trans.) Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 
Baudrillard, Jean 1995. The Gulf War did Not Take Place. (Patton, P., trans.) 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
— 1988. Selected Writings. (Poster, M., ed.) Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Benjamin, Walter 1968. Illuminations. (Zohn, H., trans.) New York: Shocken
Books.
Benveniste, Emile 1974. Problemes de linguistique generale. Volume 2. Paris: 
Gallimard.
Butler, Judith 2004. Precarious Life: The Powers o f Mourning and Violence. 
London: Verso.
340 Daniele Monticelli
Calvino, Italo 1969. T-zero. (Weaver, W., trans.) San Diego: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich.
— 1996. Six Memos fo r the Next Millenium. (Creagh, R., trans.) London: 
Vintage.
Connolly, William E. 2002. Identity/difference: Democratic Negotiations of 
Political Paradox. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Debord, Guy 1995. The Society o f  the Spectacle. (Nicholson-Smith, D., trans.) 
New York: Zone.
Deely, John 2005. Defining the Semiotic Animal: A Postmodern Definition of 
"Human Being” to Supersede the Modern Definition as “Res Cogitans”. 
Sofia: Tip-Top Press.
Derrida, Jacques 1997. O f Grammatology. (Spivak, G. C., trans.) Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press.
—  2004. Writing and Difference. (Bass, A., trans.) London: Routledge.
Eco, Umberto 1986. Toward a semiological guerrilla warfare. In: Eco, Umberto, 
Travels in Hyperreality. (Weaver, W., trans.) New York: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, 135-144.
Ezrahi, Sidra Dekoven 2002. The future of the Holocaust: storytelling, oppression, 
and identity—  see under: “apocalypse” . Judaism 51(1): 61-70.
Foucault, Michel 1977. Microfisica delpotere. Torino: Giulio Einaudi Editore.
—  1997. Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth: Essential works o f Foucault 1954-1984. 
Vol. 1. (Rabinow, P., ed.) New York: The New Press.
Freud, Sigmund 1974. Zeitgemässes über Krieg und Tod. In: Studienausgabe, 
Band 9: Fragen der Gesellschaft. Ursprünge der Religion. Frakfurt am Main: 
S. Fischer Verlag, 33-60.
Haber, Honi F. 1994. Beyond Postmodern Politics: Lyotard, Rorty, Foucault. 
New York: Routledge.
Hitchcock, Peter 2000. Globalization and Bakhtin. In: Brandist, Craig; Tihanov, 
Galin (eds.), Materializing Bakhtin: The Bakhtin Circle and Social Theory. 
London: Macmillan.
Jameson, Fredrick 1981. The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially 
Symbolic Act. London: Routledge.
Kristeva, Julia 1982. Powers o f  Horror: An Essay on Abjection. (Roudiez, L., 
trans.) New York: Columbia University Press.
Lacan, Jacques 2001. Ecrits: A Selection. (Sheridan, A., trans.) London: Rout­
ledge.
Levinas, Emmanuel 1996. Totalite et infini: Essai sur I 'exteriorite. Paris: Kluwer 
Academic.
Lloyd, David 1997. Nationalism against the state. In: Lowe, Lisa; Lloyd, David 
(eds.) The Politics o f  Culture in the Shadow o f  Capital. Durham: Duke 
University Press, 173-197.
Pettman, Ralph 2004. Reason, Culture, Religion: The Metaphysics o f  World 
Politics. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Saussure, Ferdinand de 1966. Course in General Linguistics. (Baskin, W trans ) 
New York: McGraw-Hill.
Schmitt, Carl 1987. The legal world revolution. Telos 72: 73-89.
From globality to partiality 341
Sebeok, Thomas A. 2001. Global Semiotics. Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press.
Silverman, Kaja 1983. The Subject o f  Semiotics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
— 2000. World Spectators. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
— 2003. All things shining. In: Eng, David L.; Kazanjian, David (eds.), Loss: 
The Politics o f  Mourning. Berkeley: University of California Press, 323-342.
Tarasti, Eero 2005. Semiotics o f resistance: Being, memory, history — the 
counter-current o f signs (lecture at the Summer School of Semiotics and 
Structural Studies in Imatra, Finland).
Weber, Samuel 1997. Wartime. In: Vries, Hent de; Weber, Samuel (eds.), Vio­
lence, Identity and Self-determination. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
80-105.
Whitebrook, Maureen 2001. Identity, Narrative and Politics. London: Routledge.
От глобальности к парциальности: семиотические стратегии 
сопротивления дискурсу войны
Дискурс войны можно рассматривать как симптоматический по от­
ношению к основным дискурсам тотальности (напр, глобализации). 
Стремясь к упрощению, такие дискурсы принимают вид исчерпы­
вающей парадигмы, но в ходе этого они всегда создают нерепрезен- 
тируемый и подлежащий уничтожению остаток. Семиотика может 
развивать практики сопротивления дискурсу войны, оперируя его 
синтагматическими цепочками, образуемыми их медиаторами. Такие 
практики сопротивления основываются на постмодернистской кри­
тике тотализирующих дискурсов. Если мелкие детали теряют в 
синтагматических цепочках дискурса войны свою ценность, то их 
различение и выделение может открыть “пространство общности”, в 
котором остаток дискурса войны стал бы репрезентируемым с 
помощью метафорических замещений. Семиотические практики 
сопротивления дискурсу войны предполагают теоретический сдвиг 
от парадигмы глобальности к парадигме парциальности. Парциаль- 
ность следует рассмаривать как с политической, так и с эпистемо­
логической точки зрения, тем самым она может явиться существен­
ной предпосылкой разработки “семиоэтики”.
G lobaalsuselt partsiaalsusele:
Sem iootilised  vastupanupraktikad  sõja d iskursusele
Sõja diskursust võib käsitleda kui totaalsuse diskursuste — nt globali- 
seerumise — sümptomaatilist väljundit. Lihtsustava seletamise eesmärki­
del võtavad sellised diskursused ammendava paradigma kuju, aga seda 
tehes loovad need alati ka esitamatut ja hävitamisele määratud jääki. 
Semiootika võib arendada vastupanupraktikaid sõjadiskursusele, pöörates 
tähelepanu selle süntagmaatilistele ahelatele meedias. Sellised vastupanu­
praktikad põhinevad totaliseerivate diskursuste postmodernistlikul kriiti­
kal. Kui väikesed detailid kaotavad sõja diskursuse süntagmaatilistes 
ahelates oma väärtuse, siis nende eristamine ning esile tõstmine võiks 
avada “ühisruumi”, milles sõja diskursuse jääk muutuks esitatavaks meta­
foorsete asendamiste abil. Semiootilised vastupanupraktikad sõja diskur­
susele eeldavad teoreetilist nihet globaalsuse paradigmalt partsiaalsuse 
paradigmale. Seda nihet tuleb mõista nii poliitiliselt — partsiaalsus kui 
enese positsioneerimine, kui ka epistemoloogiliselt — partsiaalsus põhi­
neb paljususel ja erinevusel. Poliitiline ja epistemoloogiline partsiaalsus 
on oluliseks eelduseks “semioeetika” väljatöötamisel.
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Abstract. Oleg B. Zaslavskii. The little in a non-Euclidean world: On the 
artistic space in Tom Stoppard's film and play “Rosencrantz and 
Guildenstern are dead”. It is shown that quite different aspects of Tom 
Stoppard’s work — spatial organization, relationship between reality and the 
conditional character of events, causality and narrative links, the problems of 
choice and personality —  are united by the spatial one-sided model like the 
Möbius strip or Klein bottle. The artistic space turns out to be not orientable, 
the time being cyclic. This enables us to explain the mutual exchange of 
names between Rosencrantz and Guildenstern and a number of other 
paradoxical features in the plot and composition. The model like the Möbius 
strip embodies the absence of a free choice: there is no other side in the world 
and there is no chance to escape from the fate indicated in the title of Tom 
Stoppard’s work. The relevance of topology, e.g. the property of a global 
nature, is connected with the fact that a bearer of danger is the world as a 
whole. Apart from this, it points to the fact that such a structure of the world is 
essentially “non-Euclidean” and cannot be understood on the basis of 
observations from every-day life or “obvious” experiments like those carried 
out by Rosencrantz.
Введение
В настоящее время драматургия Стоппарда является объектом 
изучения с самых разных точек зрения, и о ней имеется обширная 
литература (примерами могут служить недавние монографии
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Fleming 2001, Bloom 2003). Между тем, есть важный аспект, 
который до сих пор был лишь бегло затронут в исследованиях. 
Речь идет о пересечении художественного мира Стоппарда с ми­
ром науки, главным образом математики и физики. Например, в 
“Аркадии” содержится в свернутом виде обсуждение идей, 
связанных с фракталами, хаосом и вторым началом термодина­
мики (Jackson 1995; Peterson 2002). В произведении “Professional 
foul” значимы понятия теории катастроф (Cobley 1984). В пьесе 
“Hapgood” имеются интересные соответствия между свойствами 
сюжета и такими особенностями квантовой механики как влия­
ние измерения на результат эксперимента, невозможность точной 
локализации объекта, квантовые скачки и т.д. (Brouwer 1994: Sec. 
VI). В данном отношении пьесе “Розенкранц и Гильденстерн 
мертвы” повезло меньше. Обычно рассмотрение роли математики 
ограничивается здесь обсуждением диалога двух героев о теории 
вероятности. Характерно, что на сайте “Mathematical Fiction”, 
специально посвященном отражению математики в художествен­
ной литературе и театре, эта пьеса включена в список лишь под 
нажимом читателей.1 В одноименном фильме Стоппарда сциен­
тистский аспект усилен тем, что Розенкранц по ходу действия 
неоднократно ставит физические опыты. Между тем, роль на­
учных идей в художественном произведении отнюдь не исчерпы­
вается их явным обсуждением непосредственно в тексте или 
демонстрацией опытов. Наибольший интерес здесь представляет 
случай, когда соответствующие абстрактные конструкты (кото­
рые могут быть вообще не эксплицированы в тексте) организуют 
саму художественную структуру произведения. Именно такому 
явлению и посвящена данная работа.
1 “This brilliant, weird play, retelling the story of Shakespeare’s Hamlet from 
the point of view of two “throw away” characters, unfortunately has very little 
mathematics in it. However, every few days I get an e-mail message from some­
one suggesting that I add it to the list, so I will” (http://www.math.cofc.edu/ 
faculty /kasman/MATHFICT/mfview.php?callnumber=mfl 29).
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Безальтернативное пространство
Речь пойдет об одной, но ключевой особенности языка про­
странственных отношений в произведении Т. Стоппарда “Ро- 
зенкранц и Гильденстерн мертвы”. Она является общей для обоих 
художественных произведений — пьесы и фильма,2 но поскольку 
в фильме как тексте иконической природы она проявляет себя 
более наглядно, мы в основном (делая необходимые оговорки) 
сосредоточимся на фильме.
В представленном там мире с самого начала действует стран­
ность: подброшенная монета неизменно падает одной и той же 
стороной. При этом выпадает “орел” — по-английски “heads”, так 
что Г ильденстерн говорит даже о “double-headed coins” —  это до­
вольно очевидным образом намекает на мотив казни (в фильме — 
повешения), причем две головы орла соответствуют двум голо­
вам незадачливых героев (этот момент пропадает при переводе с 
английского на русский). Не в силах понять, почему же монета 
падает лишь одной стороной, Г ильденстерн однако воспринимает 
это как намек на нечто угрожающее. В фильме он спрашивает 
Розенкранца, не испытывает ли тот страх (“No fear?”); в пьесе он 
говорит: “И это все? И никакого страха? [...] Да, страха! Такая, 
знаешь, щелка, сквозь которую мозги заливает светом!” (Здесь и 
далее мы используем перевод И. Бродского —  Стоппард 2000.) 
Судя по трагическому финалу, интуиция не обманула героя в 
том, что касается “страха”. Это заставляет с особенным внима­
нием отнестись и к его словам о том неясном и пугающем, что 
стоит за опытами с монетой: как мы сейчас увидим, в этих опы­
тах действительно проступает фундаментальная характеристика 
мира произведения в целом. Она связана с нейтрализацией 
противоположностей и дискредитацией выбора.
Это, прежде всего, относится к проблеме индивидуальности. 
По ходу дела время от времени оказывается невозможно раз­
обрать, кто из героев есть кто — причем их имена путают как 
другие действующие лица, так и они сами, так что различие 
между Розенкранцем и Гильденстерном ставится под сомнение. 
Приведем сначала пример первого рода. “Гамлет. Мои милейшие 
друзья! Как поживаешь, Гильденстерн? (Идет к авансцене с
2 Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are Dead. Режиссер Том Стоппард, 
сценарий Тома Стоппарда. Metro Goldwyn Mayer, 1990.
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рукой, протянутой к Розенкранцу, Гилъденстерн кланяется. 
Гамлет поправляет себя.) Ах, Розенкранц!” В дальнейшем Гамлет 
повторяет эту ошибку (начало 2-го действия): “Гамлет (к Розен­
кранцу). Слушайте, Гильденстерн, и ты (к Гильденстерну), Розен­
кранц”. Пример второго рода: “Розенкранц. Мое имя Гиль­
денстерн, а это —  Розенкранц. Гильденстерн делает ему заме­
чание. (Без смущения.) Виноват, его имя Гильденстерн, а Розен­
кранц —  это я”.3 В ходе игры в вопросы и ответы (перед первой 
встречей с Гамлетом) герои, пытаясь подготовиться к этой встре­
че, лишь воспроизводят указанную путаницу. Гильденстерн обра­
щается к Розенкранцу: “Гильденстерн!”, и тот откликается. В 
свою очередь, Розенкранц, сбитый с толку предшествующей 
репликой Гильденстерна, обращается к нему: “Мой милый Розен­
кранц!”. Характерен вопрос в ходе этой игры: “А я в таком случае 
должен стать тобой?”.
По всему произведению рассыпаны намеки на то, что неот­
чуждаемые признаки человека потеряли свою устойчивость и 
способны к превращениям и взаимным перераспределениям меж­
ду разными людьми, так что в этом мире понятие личности 
теряет однозначность. Так, в пьесе во время нападения пиратов 
Розенкранц, Гильденстерн и Актер спасаются, прыгая в бочки. 
Однако потом Розенкранц и Гильденстерн вылезают из бочки 
Актера, Актер —  из бочки Гамлета (Гамлет же исчезает) — как 
если бы произошло превращение в самом буквальном смысле. 
Другой пример. В фильме показан издали персонаж, напоми­
нающий фигурой и длинными волосами женщину, полуодетый в 
женское платье; лишь когда персонаж оборачиваются, он оказы­
вается мужчиной (сцена в бане). Это выглядит так, будто бы 
женщина превратилась в мужчину, так что пол обнаружил 
способность к превращениям.
Аналогичным образом обстоит дело и с соотношением персо­
нажа и его ролей. В фильме актер, игравший в таверне убитого 
Полония, играет в сцене пантомимы во дворце Луциана. Сам же 
Луциан из персонажа, соответствующего в “Гамлете” убийце 
Клавдию, превращается в фильме в персонаж, функционально 
эквивалентный Гамлету. В пьесе в пантомиме, разыгрываемой 
актерами, “убитый король играет Полония” (“the murdered king to
3 Здесь и далее, отсутствие уточнений источника цитаты (фильм или 
пьеса) означает, что фраза вошла и в фильм и в пьесу.
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stand in for Polonius”) —  происходит как бы превращение одного 
персонажа в другой. Более того, сама фраза построена таким 
образом, что можно подумать, будто к тому же произошло и 
буквальное смешение персонажей и актеров, так что Полония и в 
самом деле играет убитый король, а не актер, который его играл. 
Когда же согласно действию этой пантомимы, описанному в 
пьесе, корабль прибывает в Англию, “перемена головного убора 
превращает актера, игравшего только что убитого короля, в 
английского короля”. В пьесе Розенкранц рассказывает анекдот, в 
котором представители трех религий (христианин, мусульманин 
и иудей) обмениваются религиозной принадлежностью и име­
нами, создавая немыслимые в реальном мире сочетания. В дру­
гом анекдоте речь идет о том, что христианин на небе встречает 
Савла, который сообщает, что он уже Павел. В таком контексте 
по-особому звучат слова Гамлета “дядя-отец”, “мать-тетя”, 
указывающие на то, что неоднозначность затрагивает и родствен­
ные отношения. Сказанное относится не только к свойствам 
человека и личности, но к целому ряду пар контрастных 
состояний — условность-реальность, явь-сон и т.п.: они не разде­
лены однозначно, а взаимно превращаемы. Например, это 
проявляет себя в пьесе в притче о философе и бабочке: “Один 
китаеза, из династии Тан, — по мнению некоторых, большой 
философ, — ему однажды приснилось, что он — бабочка, и с 
этой минуты он уже никогда не был полностью уверен, что он не 
бабочка, которой снится, что она китайский философ...”. 
Устранение контраста между противоположностями проявляет 
себя и в интертекстуальном взаимодействии. В фильме при­
сутствует цитата из “Blow up” Антониони —  площадка для игры 
в теннис, на которой сама игра заменена условным действом. В 
фильме Антониони это была игра воображаемым мячом, в 
фильме Стоппарда — игра в вопросы и ответы. Однако если у 
Антониони воображение и реальность сохраняли смысл как 
противоположные в норме категории (и именно поэтому нару­
шение нормы становилось значимым), то в произведении Стоп­
парда упразднение границы между противоположностями и 
разными семиотическими уровнями из аномалии стало нормой. В 
частности, в данной сцене стерта грань между вопросами и 
утверждениями, между фразами, входящими в игру, и описанием 
ее правил (т.е. текстом и метатекстом); это находит и наглядное
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соответствие — в упомянутой выше сцене сетка на поле, марки­
рующая границу между противоположными сторонами, приспу­
щена.
Все эти особенности получают простое истолкование на языке 
пространственных отношений, если допустить, что художествен­
ный мир произведения в том, что касается любых альтернатив, 
устроен как лист Мебиуса, т. е. является односторонней поверх­
ностью0'. Подчеркнем, что речь идет не о физическом про­
странстве, а об абстрактном — пространстве выбора. В этом 
случае сразу же становится понятным, почему монета выпадает 
только одной стороной: хотя в обычном физическом про­
странстве у нее есть две стороны (орел и решка), в пространстве 
альтернатив —  только одна. (Как говорит Гильденстерн, “По 
крайней мере, у нас есть варианты. [...] Хотя нет выбора”.)
Важное свойство листа Мебиуса (рис. 1 и 2) состоит в том, что 
он является неориентируемой поверхностью. Если, двигаясь по 
замкнутому контуру вдоль ее края, обносить перпендикуляр к 
ней, то по возвращении в исходную точку он окажется на­
правленным по отношению к исходному направлению в про­
тивоположную сторону. Указанное свойство художественного 
пространства фильма позволяет просто описать на таком языке
4 Замкнутым вариантом односторонней поверхности является бутылка 
Клейна, однако для определенности мы будем в основном говорить о листе 
Мебиуса. Сама по себе актуальность в произведении поверхности такого 
типа достаточно очевидна из-за явного упоминания одностороннего вы­
падения монеты —  в этом отношении мы не претендуем на новизну 
наблюдения. Цель настоящей статьи другая —  проследить, как указанное 
свойство проявляет себя в художественной структуре произведения в целом.
Известная нам попытка связать произведение Стоппарда с тополо­
гически нетривиальными структурами является неудачной. Caris (1987: Ch. 
6) утверждает: “Tom Stoppard makes a Klein bottle transformation in William 
Shakespeare’s Hamlet”. Основанием для этого автор считает тот факт, что 
актеры представляют на сцене события не только прошлого, но и будущего. 
Однако такое “знание будущего” (встречающееся например в “научно”- 
фантастической литературе вне всякой связи с бутылкой Клейна) само по 
себе еще не обязательно означает цикличность времени. Кроме того, даже в 
случае квазициклических условий возможны разные топологии (как это ясно 
при склеивании полоски в цилиндр или лист Мебиуса). В применении же к 
линии (в данном случае линии времени), т.е. одномерному объекту, вообще 
нет смысла говорить о бутылке Клейна, которая является двумерным 
объектом.
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неоднократно происходящее “превращение” Розенкранца в 
Гильденстерна и наоборот. Розенкранц и Гильденстерн в таком 
контексте предстают как две “точки”, задающие “вектор”, однако 
в результате “обхода по замкнутому контуру” (обращения героев 
друг к другу, их взаимных вопросов — ответов, реплик и т.д.) 
ориентация этого вектора меняется на противоположную, так что 
Розенкранц превращается в Гильденстерна, а тот —  в Розен­
кранца (ср. высказанное в пьесе опасение Гильденстерна: “Не то 
будем тут кружить всю ночь, наступая друг другу на пятки”). 
Неслучайно герои Стоппарда столь озабочены проблемами своей 
ориентации, причем это выражено как раз в терминах стрелок и 
компасов: из-за одностороннего характера листа Мебиуса ориен­
тация на нем имеет только локальный, но не глобальный смысл, и 
может измениться в результате обхода. Как говорит в пьесе 
Гильденстерн, “Здесь на компас надеяться не приходится”. Иначе 
говоря, пара Розенкранц — Гильденстерн представляет собой 
своего рода единый объект, определенный на односторонней 
поверхности, а не совокупность двух самостоятельных. В пьесе 
Гильденстерн заявляет “[...] я не в силах считать нас самих чем- 
либо большим, чем парой золотых с орлом и решкой”, но монета 
оказывается на самом деле односторонней, и то же относится и к 
паре этих персонажей — разделение на две самостоятельных 
личности иллюзорно.
Рис. 1. Лист Мебиуса и бутылка Клейна.
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Рис. 2. Лист Мебиуса может быть получен двух противоположных 
сторон AB и CD прямоугольника ABCD так, что точки А и В 
совмещаются соответственно с точками С и D.
Приведем еще ряд примеров подобного рода. Розенкранц выти­
рает яблоко о камзол Гильденстерна, а тот его благодарит — 
очевидно считая, что Розенкранц хотел вытереть не яблоко, а 
камзол товарища. Здесь сочетание “очищаемая сторона — ябло­
ко, чистящая сторона — камзол” (точка зрения Розенкранца), 
поступив к Гильденстерну и отразившись его репликой к Розен­
кранцу, заменилась на “очищаемая сторона — камзол, чистящая 
сторона — яблоко”: произошло как бы перекручивание, характер­
ное для листа Мебиуса. (Как известно, эта поверхность может 
быть получена, если взять обычную полоску бумаги и отож­
дествить концы не так, как это происходит при склеивании в 
цилиндр, а крест-накрест.) Причем актуальность здесь именно 
пространственной модели усилена тем, что “перекручивание” 
относится как раз к свойствам геометрической поверхности — 
соприкасающимся сторонам яблока и камзола (наглядный пример 
перекручивания — состояние теннисной сетки в предшествую­
щей сцене игры в вопросы и ответы, о которой говорилось выше).
Во дворце незадолго до выступления актеров Гильденстерн 
замечает заслонку в стене, резко ее отодвигает, сразу захлопы­
вает, а потом вновь ее открывает. Оказывается, что с внутренней 
стороны дверца зеркальна, и перед этим зеркалом актер в маске 
совершает последние приготовления перед выступлением. При 
этом существенно, что точка зрения, с которой показана сцена, 
меняется по ее ходу. Сначала камера показывает происходящее с 
точки зрения Гильденстерна, так что перед зрителем до захлопы­
вания дверцы быстро мелькает лицо в маске, возникшее в пустом
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проеме, потом сцена дана со стороны актера, так что зритель 
вместе с ним видит лицо в маске, отразившееся в зеркале. Само 
по себе зеркало здесь как физический объект ничем не приме­
чательно: это обычная двусторонняя поверхность, у которой 
только одна сторона покрыта отражающим материалом. Однако в 
контексте данной сцены такая подвижная заслонка функцио­
нально проявила себя как “одностороннее зеркало”: с какой сто­
роны ни посмотреть в него, оно показывает зазеркального двой­
ника, причем одного и того же. Более того, этим двойником 
оказалось лицо в маске — в полном соответствии со сказанным 
выше о связи между односторонней поверхностью и стиранием 
индивидуальности. Заметим еще, что когда Розенкранц в этой 
сцене отвлекает Гильденстерна, показывая ему бумажный само­
летик необычной двойной конструкции, тот в раздражении его 
сплющивает, т.е. проделывает по отношению к самолетику ту же 
операцию превращения двойного в одинарное, которая проис­
ходит в этой сцене и по отношению к зеркалу.
У Стоппарда Розенкранц и Г ильденстерн распечатали письмо 
к английскому королю, узнали, что везут Гамлета на гибель, и 
запечатали обратно; Гамлет же подменил это письмо другим —  с 
просьбой казнить Розенкранца и Гильденстерна. В данном кон­
тексте знаменательно, что этой подмене в фильме предшествует 
эпизод, когда Гильденстерн запечатывает письмо монетой, т.е. 
“односторонним” в контексте фильме объектом: непреложная ги­
бель персонажей письма (“односторонняя” ситуация) сочетается 
с изменением индивидуальности казнимого — Розенкранц и 
Гильденстерн в результате проделанных Гамлетом операций с 
текстом как бы превращаются в Гамлета, о казни которого была 
просьба в первоначальном тексте. Это находит и более наглядное 
воплощение в фильме: когда Розенкранц и Гильденстерн обна­
руживают, что Гамлет попал на корабль пиратов, и таким обра­
зом их миссия провалилась, то чтобы обезопасить себя перед 
английским королем, Розенкранц (забывая вначале, о чем датский 
король просил английского в своем письме) предлагает себя или 
своего друга выдать за Гамлета. В данном контексте приобретает 
смысл и тот факт, что перемена объекта казни происходит в 
результате манипуляций с куском бумаги —  т.е. объектом, при 
помощи которого лист Мебиуса и может быть реализован 
наглядным образом.
В том или ином виде замкнутый контур представлен в фильме 
и непосредственно, будучи связан с мотивом смерти. Розенкранц 
делает из бумаги и запускает “самолетик”, который, скрывшись 
из кадра и описав петлю, возвращается, причем как в момент за­
пуска, так и в момент возвращения между Розенкранцем и 
Гильденстерном шел разговор о неминуемости смерти. В конце 
показаны кольца веревки, на которой вешают героев. Про­
странственная модель с движением по (квази)замкнутой линии, 
приводящая в результате полного цикла не к точному возвра­
щению в исходную точку, а к “перевороту” или “сдвигу”, орга­
низует и собственно временные характеристики. С одной сто­
роны, есть текст с инвариантным сюжетом о гибели: Актер под­
черкивает, что при приближении к финалу “все, кому назначено 
умереть, умирают” —  “Это написано”, а также вспоминает: “Я 
бывал здесь и раньше” —  в данном контексте “раньше” можно 
понимать как относящееся к одному из предыдущих воплощений 
“Гамлета”, включая собственно шекспировский “Гамлет”. Иначе 
говоря, разыгрываемый перед зрителями сюжет —  всего лишь 
один цикл нескончаемого процесса. После раскрытия театраль­
ного сундука разыгрывается вариант “Гамлета”; потом он закан­
чивается, актеры складывают сундук и путешествуют дальше — 
до новых представлений. С другой стороны, сам текст не 
является строго однозначным и допускает “флуктуации”, свиде­
тельством чему является хотя бы то обстоятельство, что сюжет 
фильма (в промежутке между тем, как актеры устанавливают 
сцену и убирают декорации обратно в сундук) представляет 
собой не в точности “Гамлет”, а его вариацию. Как говорит 
Гильденстерн в конце, “Ладно, в следующий раз будем умнее”: 
сюжет предстает не как окончательный и завершенный, а всего 
лишь как один из витков нескончаемой и повторяемой истории, в 
новом цикле которой героям (согласно этому замечанию Гиль­
денстерна) возможно удастся избежать казни. Поскольку, однако, 
в данном контексте сама пьеса (фильм) Стоппарда оказывается 
как раз одним таким “следующим разом” по отношению к 
“Гамлету”, то это свидетельствует о необоснованности упомяну­
той Гильденстерном альтернативы: герои не стали “умнее” и 
вновь гибнут, чем подрывается и надежда на “следующий раз” — 
на новом витке истории, но все по той же односторонней
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поверхности.5 Столь тревожившая героев проблема выпадения 
орла или решки при бросании монеты (“heads —  tail”, “голова — 
хвост”) получает теперь неожиданное решение: накинутые на 
шеи героев длинные веревки представляют собой не что иное, 
как вариант того же сочетания “голова — хвост”, причем казнь 
знаменует собой завершение, конец (еще одно значение слова 
“tail”) показанного витка истории героев. При этом объединение 
в образе висельника “головы” и “хвоста”, отвечающих двум 
различным, казалось бы, сторонам монеты (орлу и решке), само 
по себе отсылает в данном контексте к листу Мебиуса.
Циклический характер сюжета позволяет объяснить и два 
парадокса — почему в таверне в сцене пантомимы показаны не 
прошлые, а будущие события, включая казнь Розенкранца и 
Гильденстерна, и почему во время представления во дворце 
король-персонаж встает раньше, чем это делает “настоящий” 
король. Объяснение состоит в том, что на предыдущих витках 
сюжета все то, что показано на сцене во вставном представлении, 
“уже было” — и казнь героев, и вставание разгневанного короля 
во время представления, так что актеры воспроизводят не одно­
кратные события из недавнего прошлого (как это было в “Гам­
лете”), а инвариантный повторяющийся сюжет. Тем самым со­
ответствующие события на сцене приобретают двойной статус — 
в пределах цикла, который видит зритель фильма, они изобра­
жают будущее, но с учетом предшествующих циклов пантомима 
(как и вставное представление в “Гамлете”) раскрывает прош­
лое6. Таким образом, во вселенной произведения потерю ориен­
тируемости в пространстве сопровождает разрушение однознач­
ной упорядоченности во времени.
5 С актуальным в контексте фильма образом витка можно сопоставить и 
упоминание “восьмерки” (представляющей двойной виток) как числа, 
связанного со смертью героев: в таверне Розенкранц и Гильденстерн 
насчитывают в показанной актерами бойне 6 трупов, однако Актер тут же 
им возражает репликой, что на самом деле трупов 8, и в этом самый момент 
вдергивают двойников Розенкранца и Гильденстерна.
6 Подробнее вставное представление обсуждается в следующем разделе.
К ом п ози ц и я  и то п о л о ги я
Нетривиальные топологические характеристики проявляют себя 
также в необычном соотношении между категориями внутреннего и 
внешнего, которые в фильме не столько противопоставляются, 
сколько нейтрализуются, вновь актуализуя пространственные мо­
дели, основанные на односторонней поверхности. Случаи же 
иного рода (с сохранением противопоставления) носят в ос­
новном пародийный и комический характер, причем оппозиция 
внутреннего и внешнего имеет в них аномальный характер, вклю­
чая взаимную мену этих состояний (“выворачивание наизнанку”).
Примером последнего может служить возникающий в начале 
фильма образ многослойного огромного бутерброда, который на 
привале в лесу (сцена незадолго до встречи с актерами) без­
успешно пытается укусить Розенкранц: содержимое (еда) и 
содержащее (рот) оказались в соотношениях, обратных обычным. 
Во дворце Розенкранц и Гильденстерн, не зная где выход, пы­
таются идти за группой актеров, причем их бег за актерами по 
галереям здания показан с точки зрения извне; однако вслед за 
этим Розенкранц и Гильденстерн вдруг оказываются снаружи, 
смотря в ту же сторону, что и камера, причем их выход из здания 
не показан. Дело обстоит таким образом, как если бы про­
странство “вывернулось наизнанку”.
Игра указанными пространственными категориями организует 
и пространство произведения в целом. В фильме Розенкранц и 
Г ильденстерн зашли во внутреннее пространство театрика, стали 
на сцене снаружи от занавеса, а потом вдруг камера показала, что 
они выпутываются изнутри занавеса во дворце. Причем непо­
средственно перед таким переходом герои услышали странные 
слабые голоса издалека, которые и “превратились” затем в раз­
дающиеся во дворце голоса Офелии и бегущего за ней Гамлета, а 
монета единственный раз выпала не орлом, а решкой — как бы 
“вывернулась наизнанку”. Обратим внимание, что театральный 
занавес был в задней части сцены и отделял не пространство 
сцены от гипотетической публики снаружи, а внешнюю часть 
сцены от того невидимого, что было внутри и куда угодили 
Розенкранц и Гильденстерн, как бы пройдя сквозь занавес в 
театральное “зазеркалье” и фактически реализовав предложение 
Актера самим поучаствовать в действии, а также каламбур об
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“исключительно актерах” и “актерах включительно”. Иначе 
говоря, здесь Розенкранц и Гильденстерн превращаются в героев 
пьесы, представляющей вариацию “Гамлета” (добавим, что перед 
таким превращением в героев текста камера как раз показывает 
пачку старинной бумаги).
Однако утверждать, что они (как могло бы показаться, если 
ограничить анализ лишь указанным эпизодом) просто попали во 
внутреннее условное пространство из наружного реального, было 
бы неадекватным упрощением. Действительно, через некоторое 
время актеры прибывают во дворец, и Актер при встрече с 
Розенкранцем и Гильденстерном возмущенно пеняет тем, что они 
оставили актеров на дороге; Розенкранц в разговоре с Гамлетом 
также упоминает, что они с Г ильденстерном обогнали актеров по 
пути в замок — стало быть, Розенкранц и Гильденстерн после 
встречи продолжили путь по дороге и попали во дворец своим 
ходом (причем эпизод с выпутыванием из занавеса имеет 
реалистическую мотивировку — занавес обрушил на героев не 
заметивший их Гамлет, который пробегал мимо, преследуя 
Офелию). Театр же, который актеры привозят некоторое время 
спустя в замок, остается внутри этого пространства дворца.
Таким образом, театральное пространство оказывается по 
отношению к пространству дворца и внутри и снаружи, т.е. 
фактически однозначное разделение и противопоставление этих 
состояний оказывается невозможным. Если представить себе ху­
дожественное пространство в виде единого целого, то возникает 
топологически нетривиальная структура типа бутылки Клейна — 
односторонней замкнутой поверхности, которая вкладывается в 
трехмерное пространство с самопересечениями. Другой подходя­
щий здесь вариант пространственной модели — лист Мебиуса 
конечной толщины: переход через этот слой напрямую со­
ответствует переходу в пространство дворца мгновенным пе­
рескоком, а по полоске (скручиванием которой получается лист 
Мебиуса) — попаданию героев во дворец обычным ходом.
Следует, однако, сделать оговорку. В отличие от “научно”- 
фантастической литературы или кино, здесь речь не идет о 
необычных свойствах физического пространства как такового, 
поскольку переход в театральное пространство и перемещение по 
дороге имеют разный характер. В 1-м случае меняется статус 
действия и персонажей (повышается условность), во 2-м про­
исходит обычное пространственное перемещение. Таким обра­
зом, упомянутая выше топологическая структура описывает не 
“реальное” пространство произведения само по себе, а пред­
ставляет собой абстрактную модель, интегрирующую в себе 
реальное и условное пространства. Например, можно сказать, что 
Розенкранц и Гильденстерн после встречи с актерами прибыли во 
дворец по дороге, но уже как персонажи пьесы.
Невозможность однозначного разделения на условное и 
реальное (или на заранее фиксированные степени условности) 
присутствует, как сейчас мы увидим, и в сцене пантомимы во 
дворце. В “Гамлете” разыгранная бродячими актерами “Мы­
шеловка” противопоставлена в качестве относительно условного 
пространства “реальному” пространству, в котором находятся 
действующие лица. Будем использовать краткие обозначения; 
тогда в пьесе Шекспира отравленному отцу Гамлета (королю 1) и 
его отравителю Клавдию (королю 2) соответствуют при разыгры­
вании пьесы актерами король 1а и отравитель Луциан (назовем 
его для простоты королем 2а — хотя, строго говоря, “Мыше­
ловка” была прервана королем 2 до того, как корона досталась 
Луциану). Перед этим события пьесы были кратко показаны в 
пантомиме, в которой указанным лицам соответствовали король 
lb  и отравитель (учитывая контекст пантомимы, его можно 
назвать королем 2Ь).
В фильме порядок действия иной. Уже после того, как короли 
1а и 2а (которых играют живые актеры) представляют на сцене 
“реальные” события с отравлением, пантомиму повторяют куклы 
в условном представлении с кукольными королями lb и 2Ь. За 
кукольным представлением наблюдает живой условный король 
2а (чего не было в “Гамлете”), за представлением в целом 
наблюдает “реальный” король 2. Если в “Гамлете” пантомима 
была не самостоятельным целым, а всего лишь частью “Мы­
шеловки”, так что конструкция фактически была двойной 
(актеры — зрители, “Мышеловка” — “реальное” действие “Гам­
лета”), то в фильме эта конструкция оказывается тройной: 
куклы— актеры — зрители. Она является не механическим 
наращиванием условности по принципу “знак знака знака...” 
(“живой” король — актер — кукла), а привносит новое качество. 
Получается, что Актер и его труппа показывают на сцене уже не 
просто реальное преступление, совершенное ранее нынешним
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королем (как было в “Гамлете”), а отрывок из “Гамлета”, 
включающий в себя показ “мышеловки”. Если в соответствую­
щем фрагменте шекспировской пьесы король 2 видел перед 
собой только “мышеловку”, то теперь он может видеть еще и 
собственную реакцию на нее. Это происходит из-за того, что 
король 2а, увидя картину своего преступления в кукольной 
“мышлеловке”, встает, прерывая представление, раньше “реаль­
ного” короля 2. То есть не только король 2а следует за действия­
ми короля 2 (тем, что представляет на сцене его преступление), 
но и король 2, вставая позже короля 2а, фактически следует за его 
действиями. В этом смысле в паре “король 2 — король 2а” резко 
ослаблен контраст в мере условности между “реальными” 
персонажами и актерами, их представляющими. Это полностью 
согласуется с тем обстоятельством, что общий сюжет фиксирован 
(“Это написано”, как говорит Актер), так что ему на равных 
основаниях следуют и те и другие7.
“Мышеловка” в фильме является, с одной стороны, частью 
представляемого в нем варианта “Гамлета”, а с другой — она 
сама содержит в миниатюре “Гамлет”, включающий, как из­
вестно, в себя эту самую “мышеловку” как вставную пьесу. 
Последнее обстоятельство приводит к тому, что (в отличие от, 
скажем, сцены в таверне, где также показываются события 
“Гамлета”, но которая сама по себе в “Гамлете” отсутствует) не 
только удваивается сюжет, но и структура в целом замыкается на 
себя. При этом вместо последовательности вложений, каждое из 
которых условнее предыдущего, получается единая конструкция 
с самопересечением, где однозначное разделение всей структуры 
на разные композиционные уровни или часть и целое не­
возможно.8
Можно было бы говорить о разной мере условности при механическом 
удвоении сюжета, если бы, например, король 2а и король 2 наблюдали 
разное число “мышеловок” со сценой убийства: первый только кукольную, а 
второй — и кукольную, и с живыми актерами. Однако именно этого и не 
происходит: король 2 входит в зал уже после того, как сцена убийства 
сыграна актерами. Так что и король 2а и король 2 видят перед собой только 
по одной “мышеловке”, изображающей их преступление — это кукольный 
спектакль.
s Напрашивается сопоставление со структурами, характерными для 
Борхеса (см. Левин 1981) и Набокова (см., например, Давыдов 1982). Однако 
такое сопоставление выходит за рамки нашей работы.
Поэтому в том, что касается “мышеловки”, конструкция типа 
“текст в тексте” является в фильме принципиально иной, чем в 
“Гамлете” Шекспира, где происходило именно последовательное 
наращивание степени условности: Так, например в Гамлете 
перед нами —  не только “текст в тексте”, но и “Гамлет” в 
“Гамлете”: пьеса, разыгрываемая по инициативе Гамлета, по­
вторяет в подчеркнуто условной манере [...] пьесу, сочиненную 
Шекспиром. Условность первой подчеркивает реальность вто­
рой” (Лотман 1981: 13-14). Здесь мы считаем необходимым 
внести коррективы в эти замечания Ю. М. Лотмана. Поскольку 
убийство Гамлета-старшего относится лишь к предыстории и в 
самом “Гамлете” не происходит, то его показ во вставной пьесе 
еще не означает композиционного удвоения той пьесы, частью 
которой является “мышеловка”. Что же касается самой вставной 
пьесы, то хотя в “Гамлете” она благодаря пантомиме тоже удваи­
вается, эта пантомима всего лишь повторяет в основных чертах 
действие обрамляющей ее пьесы (т.е. собственно “мышеловки”), 
но между “мышеловкой” и пантомимой нет прямых драма­
тургических связей в самом действии. В противоположность 
этому, в фильме Стоппарда между пьесами разных уровней 
прямая драматургическая связь существует — реакция короля из 
обрамляющей пьесы включена во внутреннее представление. В 
результате структурное удвоение текстов разного уровня и 
приводит описанным выше образом к усложнению композиции в 
фильме по сравнению с “Гамлетом”.
Сцена с повышенной степенью театральности возникает также 
в конце фильма. Актер устраивает представление, перевопло­
щаясь в английского короля, и приказывает повесить Розен­
кранца и Гильденстерна, дублируя уже разыгранное актерами 
представление в таверне, а также ту казнь, которая ждет героев в 
Англии. Обратим внимание, что в сцене казни за спинами героев 
просматривается дерево, и слышен щебет птиц — действие 
происходит в лесу, где Розенкранц и Гильденстерн встретили 
актеров. Таким образом, они гибнут втройне —  как герои “Гам­
лета”, персонажи спектакля в театральном “зазеркалье”, куда 
попадают после встречи с актерами, и “реальные” персонажи — 
герои фильма. (Совмещение реального и условного в сцене казни 
находит структурный прототип в предшествующем рассказе 
Актера о том, как реальную казнь одного из своих сотрудников за
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кражу овцы он совместил с его ролью в спектакле, по ходу 
которого персонажа вешали.) 1-я казнь происходит в Англии (о 
чем в фильме, в соответствии с шекспировской пьесой, есть 
сообщение английского посла), 2-я — на корабле, 3-я —  в лесу. 
Насильственная смерть оказывается тем инвариантом, который 
объединяет разные уровни реальности (в той мере, в какой их 
здесь вообще можно различить) в единое целое.9
Доминирующая в фильме нераздельность реального и услов­
ного пародируется в эпизоде в таверне, где такое разделение 
происходит, но подчеркнуто комическим образом. Там актеры, 
изображающие Гамлета и Лаэрта, фехтуют воображаемыми рапи­
рами, от которых, однако, слышится звук реальных ударов, 
причем показан видимый для зрителей в таверне помощник, 
который и производит этот звук, ударяя рапиры одна о другую. 
Этот эпизод содержит прозрачную отсылку к той же сцене в 
“Blow up” Антониони, о которой мы упоминали выше, —  звукам 
ударов о воображаемый мяч при игре в теннис. Но если у Анто­
ниони воображаемое стремилось подменить собой реальность, то 
здесь реальное и условное демонстративно разделены — как если 
бы ударяющиеся рапиры были просто изъяты из рук соперников 
на сцене и перенесены в угол помощнику.
Если говорить о пространственной структуре в целом, то дело 
обстоит таким образом, что внутри театрального сундука нахо­
дится мир “Гамлета”; заканчивается же фильм тем, что актеры 
собирают сундук (вместе с находившимся там ранее про­
странством “Гамлета”) и отправляются дальше в странствие по 
дороге. Казалось бы, “мир” таким образом целиком находится 
внутри театра. Однако то обстоятельство, что актеры сами перед 
этим приняли активное участие в действии (вплоть до казни 
Розенкранца и Гильденстерна), находясь внутри театрика, кото­
рый они же затем захлопнули, препятствует такому однозначно­
му разделению на внутреннее и внешнее. (Об этом же говорят и 
другие описанные нами выше явления.) Произошло как бы 
выворачивание наизнанку в соответствии с высказыванием Ак­
тера “мы нечто обратное людям” и его ответом на вопрос, что же
9 Характерно, что в фильме в речи Актера опущена детализация разных 
видов смерти, присутствующая в пьесе (т.е. различия), и оставлены лишь его 
слова, подчеркивающие ее универсальность — “Deaths for all ages and 
occasions”.
они делают —  “Обычные вещи, сэр, только наизнанку. Пред­
ставляем на сцене то, что происходит вне ее. В чем есть некий 
род единства — если смотреть на всякий выход как на вход 
куда-то”. Однако эти высказывания оказались существенно не­
полными, поскольку актеры в данном фильме не только пред­
ставляют на сцене то, что происходит “в жизни”, но и наоборот 
(“наизнанку”), “в жизни” делают то, что представляют на сцене 
(о чем лукаво умолчал Актер) —  например, вешают Розенкранца 
и Гильденстерна после того, как повесили их театральных двой­
ников в пантомиме, разыгранной в таверне. Если актеры при­
обретают свойства “реальных” персонажей, то “реальные персо­
нажи”, попав в находящееся внутри театрального сундука про­
странство, играют предназначенную им роль. Заметим, что в 
соответствующем высказывании Актера “Ну, одни считают, что 
мы для вас, другие, что вы для нас. Это две стороны одной 
монеты. Или одна сторона — двух, поскольку нас тут так много” 
фактически содержится намек на одностороннюю поверхность. 
Что же касается “выхода и входа”, о которых говорил Актер, то 
из-за нетривиальной топологии “выход” оказывается иллюзор­
ным и не отличимым от входа. В таком контексте знаменитое 
выражение “весь мир — театр” меняет свой статус и перестает 
быть метафорой, поскольку вместо двух разных объектов 
сравнения в фильме присутствует один единый, а “мир” и “театр” 
переходят друг в друга подобно тому, как вектор нормали меняет 
свою ориентацию при обходе по листу Мебиуса. Однако дина­
мика переходов между условным и реальным оставляет не­
изменным инвариант — гибель героев, которой на односторон­
ней поверхности не находится альтернативы.
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Как уже отмечалось нами выше, художественный мир произ­
ведения подразумевает цикличность, так что предстающее перед 
глазами зрителя или читателя следует понимать лишь как виток 
сюжета. Таким образом, имеет место превращение первоначально 
линейного исходного текста (“Гамлета”) в цикл. Такая транс­
формация является типологически обратной по отношению к 
исторически известному превращению циклических текстов в
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линейные. Но если “очевидным результатом линейного разверты­
вания текстов является появление персонажей — двойников” 
(Лотман 1973: 14), на которые распадается единый прежде образ, 
то в данном случае двойники возникают иначе. Персонажи, вы­
ступающие в “Гамлете” как независимые, сворачиваются (как мы 
старались показать это выше) у Стоппарда в единый объект, по 
отношению к которому они и оказываются двумя разными (при­
чем не фиксированными — вспомним взаимные “превращения” 
между Розенкранцем и Гильденстерном) ипостасями —  двой­
никами.
Особенностью циклических текстов является отсутствие кате­
горий начала и конца. “Человеческая жизнь рассматривалась не 
как линейный отрезок, заключенный между рождением и смер­
тью, а как непрестанно повторяющийся цикл” (Лотман 1973: 10). 
Однако эта особенность у Стоппарда усложнена и перео­
смыслена, а начало и конец выделены. Можно заметить, что 
содержанием цикла оказывается история героев от “рождения” до 
смерти. Герои, несмотря на все свои усилия, вспоминают в 
качестве первого события, оставшегося в памяти, отправку их 
посланником на выполнение неясной миссии. В таком контексте 
выкрикивание имен невидимым посланником может быть понято 
как “рождение” Розенкранца и Гильденстерна посредством наде­
ления их именами и миссией. Это “рождение” является чисто 
функциональным — пока за ними не “послали”, у них не было 
никакой предыстории, они просто не существовали. И только 
став позднее персонажами не только фильма в целом, но и 
заключенной в нем пьесы на сюжет “Гамлета”, они приобретают 
такую предысторию, оказываясь старыми друзьями принца.10 Что 
же касается содержания вышеупомянутой миссии Розенкранца и 
Гильденстерна, то она, как становится ясно из фильма (пьесы), 
заключается не в том, чтобы нечто выведать у Г амлета и помочь 
королю (как это было у Шекспира), а в том, чтобы оказаться в 
конце мертвыми. (Ср.: “Розенкранц. Они охотились за нами, а? С 
самого начала. Кто бы мог подумать, что мы такие важные
10 Так, во дворце Розенкранц восклицает: “Ничего не забыл —  я всегда 
прекрасно помнил свое имя и твое тоже. О чем бы ни спрашивали — ответы 
были. Проблем не было — каждый знал, кто я такой”. К сожалению, эта 
определенность относится лишь ко времени, когда герои, как это аргумен­
тировано нами выше, не существовали.
птицы? Гильденстерн. Но почему? Неужто все только ради этого? 
Неужто весь этот балаган сводится только к двум нашим малень­
ким смертям? (С тоской.) Кто мы такие? Актер. Вы Розенкранц и 
Гильденстерн. Этого достаточно”.) Иначе говоря, мир произве­
дения порождает героев только для того, чтобы их убить.
Присущее мифологическому сознанию отождествление рож­
дения и смерти здесь деавтоматизуется. Непреложность развития 
событий, ведущих к смерти героев (а циклические тексты расс­
казывают именно о правилах, а не эксцессах11) непрерывно 
сталкивается с мучительными, но безуспешными попытками 
героев избежать угрожающей им неясной опасности, а характер­
ная для мифологических текстов цикличность — с упорным 
нежеланием индивидуума терять свою единственную жизнь. 
Вместо обычного циклического сюжета об умирании — возрож­
дении получается циклический сюжет о невозможности избежать 
насильственной смерти.
362 Oleg В. Zaslavskii
Локальная физика и геометрия в целом
Топология листа Мебиуса (как и топологические свойства во­
обще) является нелокальной характеристикой, относящейся к 
миру в целом. Субъективно же герои пытаются передать этот 
глобальный аспект в терминах динамики: они ощущают, что по­
пали в поле таинственных деперсонифицированных сил — 
универсальных и дальнодействующих, и пытаются разобраться в 
их природе, определить, откуда же “дует ветер”, который может 
повлиять на их судьбу. При этом Гильденстерн предпочитает 
отвлеченные логико-философские рассуждения, а Розенкранц 
ставит физические опыты. Однако можно заметить, что в этих 
опытах каждый раз что-то не так оказывается как раз с соотно­
шением глобального и локального — т.е. с наиболее значимым в 
данном контексте фактором.
Например, Розенкранц оказался близок к догадке, что при 
свободном падении (т.е. под действием тяготения — дально- 
действующей и универсальной силы) тяжелые и легкие тела 
падают одинаково. Однако его опыт с бросанием деревянного
11 См. Лотман 1973: 11.
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шара и пера явно этому противоречит. Дело здесь в наличии 
воздуха (из-за чего падение нельзя считать свободным), т.е. ло­
кальной среды. В разговоре с Гильденстерном Розенкранц, заме­
тивший, что его конструкция из бумаги вращается, если подуть 
на нее или пустить струю пара (непосредственное, локальное 
воздействие), заявляет, что никакого ветра нет, и тут же эта 
вертушка начинает вращаться. Розенкранц это объясняет 
сквозняком, т.е. внешней непосредственно действующей силой, 
но за этим объяснением следует визуальный намек на роль 
деперсонифицированной и “дальнодействующей” по отношению 
к судьбе героев силы, отправившей их в дорогу — показаны 
ставни, хлопающие подобно тому, как было в кадре с невидимым 
посланцем. Розенкранц также устраивает опыт с цепочкой 
бьющихся друг о друга подвешенных горшков с землей — здесь 
движение передается от одного края к другому на конечное 
расстояние. Однако такое “дальнодействие” в действительности 
получено в результате передачи импульса при непосредственном 
контакте горшков в моменты ударов, что является типично 
локальным эффектом. При увеличении же амплитуды размаха 
крайний горшок при соударении разбивается — соотношение 
между локальным (поведение отдельных предметов) и глобаль­
ным (движение цепочки в целом) остается для озадаченного 
героя в этом опыте столь же не проясненным, как и природа 
глобальных сил в его собственной судьбе. Что касается послед­
него обстоятельства, то локальные опыты являются здесь вообще 
бесполезными, поскольку не могут прояснить суть дела, которая 
связана со структурой мира как целого, включая его топологи­
ческие свойства, и относится к совсем другому уровню абстрак­
ции.
Заключение
Таким образом, на основе односторонней поверхности как ак­
туальной для произведения пространственной модели получили 
единое объяснение самые разные его особенности, в том числе и 
парадоксальные —  то, что монета выпадает все время одной 
стороной, между Розенкранцем и Гильденстерном происходит 
путаница, между показанным и рассказанным есть видимое несо­
ответствие (попадание во дворец, казнь в Англии и на корабле), 
физические опыты могут иметь отношение к надвигающейся на 
героев угрозе и т.д. При этом на более общем уровне при помощи 
указанной модели увязываются в единое целое структурные и 
тематические аспекты произведения — пространственная органи­
зация, соотношение реальности и условности, причинно- 
следственные и сюжетные связи, проблема индивидуальности.
Художественное пространство —  одна из важнейших катего­
рий художественного текста, дающая “возможность про­
странственного моделирования понятий, которые сами по себе не 
имеют пространственной природы” (Лотман 1970: 266). В данном 
произведении мы, однако, сталкиваемся с более сложной и свое­
образной ситуацией. Если, скажем, в случае с двойным попада­
нием героев во дворец категория пространства проявляет себя 
напрямую, то в таких эффектах как повторяющееся выпадение 
монеты одной стороной или путаница имен столь непосредствен­
ная связь отсутствует — актуальная для произведения про­
странственная структура типа односторонней поверхности про­
являет себя в данном случае лишь как модель более высокого 
уровня абстракции. Вместо типичной для художественного текс­
та ситуации “свойства пространства —> моделируемые непро­
странственные свойства” мы имеем в данном случае трехзвенную 
цепочку “непространственные свойства —► свойства про­
странства —♦ моделируемые непространственные свойства”. Со­
ответствующее пространство выступает при этом не как обычное 
физическое, а абстрактное (пространство альтернатив); отвечаю­
щая ему модель также отличается повышенной степенью 
абстрактности и, в отличие от реального “бытового” про­
странства, является неевклидовой. Тем самым область прило­
жения понятий неевклидовой топологии в произведении оказы­
вается шире, чем собственно хронотоп. Тот же факт, что 
неевклидова топология в произведении не ограничена какими-то 
частными проявлениями, а относится к основным свойствам мира 
как целого, придает ей “космологический” характер, заставляю­
щий видеть здесь художественную аналогию концепциям 
теоретической физики 20-го и 21-го века. Речь идет не конкретно 
о листе Мебиуса (который в качестве гипотетической космоло­
гической модели вряд ли имеет какое-то отношение к реальной 
Вселенной), а о том общем обстоятельстве, что топология Все­
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ленной является значимой самостоятельной характеристикой и 
может существенно отличаться от евклидовой.
Почему же для воплощения нового варианта “Гамлета” потре­
бовался концептуальный аппарат, оперирующий с понятиями, 
которые лежат за пределами круга бытовой реальности и связаны 
с таким уровнем абстракции, который стал актуальным только в 
науке 20-го века? Можно думать, что это связано с двумя ос­
новными причинами. В 20-м веке маленький человек претерпел 
(но и совершил) т акое}2 что для описания соответствующего ми­
ра обычные наглядные “классические” средства оказались непри­
годны — так непригодными оказались локальные, мелко­
масштабные способы познания действительности самими героя­
ми. Кроме того, актуальность именно топологических (т. е. гло­
бальных) характеристик (причем ощутимых как раз благодаря их 
неевклидовости) связана с противопоставлением маленького 
человека и тотально контролирующей его глобальной системы — 
у Стоппарда не социальной, а более глубинной экзистенциаль­
ной. Ее свойства предстают пугающе иррациональными, однако в 
действительности имеют собственные законы, определяющие ее 
“неевклидову” природу, по которым дело должно быть доведено 
до гибели героев. Для описания такой системы, которая не 
допускает альтернатив и неизменно приводит к гибели человека, 
односторонняя поверхность как раз и оказалась адекватным 
средством.
Проявление надличной и невидимой силы, объективный ко­
нечный смысл которой состоит в смерти “маленького человека”, 
получает выражение и на интертекстуальном языке, которое так­
же укладывается в рамки обсуждавшейся выше пространствен­
ной модели. Необычный пейзаж в начале фильма Стоппарда 
явственно напоминает аналогичный пейзаж в начале фильма 
Карне “Вечерние посетители”. Текст, который сопровождает со­
ответствующий видеоряд в фильме Карне, недвусмысленно со­
общает о “посланцах дьявола” (у Стоппарда же герои мучительно 
вспоминают, что за ними “послали”). Как хорошо известно (и
12 Обратим внимание, что в отличие от шекспировского “Гамлета” Розен­
кранц и Гильденстерн узнают на корабле о содержании письма, но намере­
ваются и дальше везти Гамлета на гибель. Однако расплачиваются они вовсе 
не за индивидуальный выбор —  как говорит Актер, “Вы Розенкранц и 
Гильденстерн. Этого достаточно”.
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уже стало общим местом), произведение Стоппарда во многом 
отталкивается от пьесы “В ожидании Годо” Беккета, в названии 
которой просматривается наименование Бога. С учетом того, что 
какое-либо спасительное божественное вмешательство в судьбу 
героев Стоппарда отсутствует, бог и дьявол в таком контексте 
оказываются не противоположными сторонами одной медали, а 
разными ликами одной и той же надличной сущности на одно­
сторонней безальтернативно-гибельной для “маленького чело­
века” поверхности.
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Väike inimene mitte-eukleidilises maailmas: 
kunstilisest ruumist Tom Stoppard’i filmis ja näidendis 
“Rosencrantz ja Guildenstern on surnud”
Artiklis näidatakse, kuidas Tom Stoppardi teose erinevad aspektid — 
ruumiline korrastatus, suhe reaalsuse ja sündmuste tingliku iseloomu 
vahel, põhjuslikud ja narratiivsed seosed, valiku ja isiksuse probleemid — 
suhestuvad sellise ainukülgse ruumimudeliga nagu Möbiuse leht või 
Kleim pudel. Kunstiline ruum osutub mitte-orienteerituks, aeg selles 
voolab tsükliliselt. See võimaldab seletada Rosencrantzi ja Guildenstemi 
nimede pidevat vahetusseminekut ja ka teisi paradoksaalseid käike süžees 
ja kompositsioonis. Möbiuse lehe mudel kehastab vaba valiku puudumist: 
maailmal ei ole teist palet ja ei ole võimalust pageda saatuse eest, mis on 
märgitud Stoppardi teose pealkirjas. Topoloogia olulisus seostub faktiga, 
et ohu kandjaks on maailm tervikuna. Lisaks viitab see ka tõsiasjale, et 
maailma struktuur on oma olemuselt mitte-eukleidiline ja seda ei ole 
võimalik mõista tavaelu vaatluste alusel või siis lähtuvalt Rosencrantzi 
poolt läbi viidud “ilmsetest” eksperimentidest.
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Abstract. Since Estonia is in the midst of a national redefinition and exami­
nation of past traditions and future aspirations, it makes an excellent case stu­
dy for the potentiality of theatre as an arbiter of national identity. The 
changing value of the institution itself is part of the equation (will Estonians 
continue to appreciate and attend the theatre in coming years?). In addition, 
the historical role of Estonian theatre as a repository for national narratives, 
especially literary ones, makes it a significant site for struggles around print 
and technology, and between embodied performances and archival perfor­
matives.
This essay introduces a series of articles that address how Estonia and its 
theatre might be regarded and understood in light of its history, memories, 
present experiences, and future possibilities. The idea of pretence that lies at 
the heart of theatricality itself provides an ideal means for interrogating 
national identity in a time of great instability and flux. The examples of 
productions discussed in these three essays share more than a deliberate 
utilization of the rubrics of theatricality. It seems no coincidence that the 
reworking of national classics, Estonian national myths, and ethnic folk songs 
and ceremonies takes place concurrently with the representation of new 
technologies, commodity capitalism, and diasporic collisions. Embodying 
precisely the predicament of culture in a country reassessing its past and 
confronting its future, the theatre is an important institution for national 
resignification.
For several decades now, scholars in many fields have examined and 
theorized national identities and the relationship between their 
formations and modifications. Joining social scientists and humanists, 
theatre and performance scholars have also participated in this project, 
dating most clearly from Loren Kruger’s The National Stage: Theatre
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and Cultural Legitimation in England, France, and America (1992). 
As the century turned, questions concerning the limitation of the very 
concept of “nation states” in light of the rapidly changing global world 
became more frequent and insistent, and a need to reassess the role of 
national identity in contemporary culture began to assert itself. From 
one perspective, the creeping globalization of media and technology 
seems to have saturated the national imaginations of many countries, 
where children may be more familiar with Disney characters than their 
own nation’s folklore or children’s literature. On the other hand, local 
traditions, practices, and cultures continue to persist and provide deep 
structures of meaning and identification for many. No where is this 
problematic dualism more apparent than in the former Soviet-bloc 
countries, the Eastern European nations, that since 1989 have been 
redefining their self-understandings.
Precisely because Estonia is in the midst of such a redefinition and 
examination of past traditions and future aspirations, it makes an 
excellent case study of the efficacy of theatre as an arbiter of national 
identity. The changing value of the institution itself is part of the 
equation (will Estonians continue to appreciate and attend the theatre 
in coming years?). In addition, the historical role of Estonian theatre 
as a repository for national narratives, especially literary ones, makes 
it a significant site for struggles around print and technology, and 
between embodied performances and archival performatives.2
At a recent conference, “National Theatres of Europe: Con­
structing National Identities”, the Irish journalist Fintan O’Toole 
remarked, “National theatres pretend that a nation exists, at least for 
the duration of the theatre piece”.3 Whether the theatre in question is a 
monumental building carrying official status as National and sup­
ported by state subsidy, or whether it is a small, independent company 
performing in a warehouse, both theatres can pretend that a nation 
exists — this pretense consists of the address to the audiences 
assembled and its absent but imagined compatriots, and it can take the 
form of any subjunctive stage reality. The assembly of actual material
1 For other recent scholarship on this topic, see for example Kobialka (1999), 
and Mäkinen et al. (2001); my own related work can be found in these volumes 
and in Colleran, Spencer (1998).
: See Diana Taylor’s discussion in The Archive and the Repertoire: Performing 
Cultural Memory in the Americas (2003).
3 Organized by Stephen Wilmer at Trinity College Dublin, March 11-13, 2005.
bodies in the theatre may itself invoke a nation more strongly than 
either print or media cultures.
In the case of Estonia, the question is, of course, not whether a 
nation now exists, but how it is to be regarded and understood in light 
of its history, memories, present experiences, and future possibilities. 
Nevertheless, this idea of pretence is at the heart of theatricality itself, 
and provides an ideal means for interrogating national identity in a 
time of great instability and flux. As Luule Epner writes in her 
contribution, “The action defined as play in a ludic space of theatre 
makes it possible to easily deconstruct and reconstruct fictional 
worlds.” All the essays collected here mention the high levels of 
reflexivity and meta-theatrical strategies present in the recent Estonian 
theatre performances these scholars discuss. The theatrical apparatus 
itself at once puts in play a kind of promiscuous and variable set of 
diverse signifiers, and offers the stage as a contrastingly material and 
even stable space for public experience and consideration of shared 
identities.
This reaffirmation of a public sphere is perhaps more potent in 
small countries where gathering together groups of citizens to 
consider their own shared polity may still, because of matters of scale, 
stimulate and symbolize democratic participation within a nation. 
(This achievement seems much more difficult in a large country like 
mine where the actual geographical distances separating people com­
bine with an experience of postmodern fragmentation and disaffilia­
tion to dissipate the gesture to a national fabric symbolized by an 
isolated audience in a theatre that always appears from some vantage 
point to be situated at the periphery of the nation.) Although many of 
the Estonian productions described here had comparatively small 
audiences, 53% of its citizens attended the theatre during 2003, which 
means that the theatre as a cultural institution is still viable as a 
potential site for a meaningful rethinking of national identity. Epner 
reports that 12,000 Estonians saw Kalevipoeg in the summer of 2003, 
not a negligible number for only fifteen performances. The smaller 
audiences that attended the other performances discussed in these 
essays may still constitute an important intellectual and artistic group, 
and probably comprise a significant representation of Estonians 
positioned in the civil service or governmental sectors. In other words, 
the theatre tends to address audiences who hold or aspire to leadership 
roles in the making of a futural national identity.
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The examples of productions discussed in these three essays share 
more than a deliberate utilization of the rubrics of theatricality. It 
seems no coincidence that the reworking of national classics, Estonian 
national myths, and ethnic folk songs and ceremonies takes place 
concurrently with the representation of new technologies, commodity 
capitalism, and diasporic collisions. Embodying precisely the predica­
ment of culture in a country reassessing its past and confronting its 
future, the inability of the binary “global/local” to adequately account 
for present experience is undeniable. Anneli Saro points to the power 
of performativity to both confirm and repeat but also to unsettle 
preceding norms and traditions. In fact, sometimes the same series of 
signifiers can paradoxically affirm and oppose at the same time, as for 
example in the Midsummer Night scene in Jalakas’s second Werewolf. 
The contribution of these productions to the process of national 
identity construction is perhaps contained in their ability to use the 
ludic processes of the theatrical to interrogate the multiple possibilities 
and constraints facing the national project of re-imagining Estonian 
identity.
Raymond Williams provides one fruitful intellectual avenue for 
understanding what is at stake in these theatrical productions. 
Convinced of the powerful role of culture in shaping the dominant 
mode of production in any given society, Williams theorized the 
categories of residual and emergent cultural practices as a way of 
accounting for the dynamism of social change. Not merely left-over 
from the past, residual practices linger because they are necessary to 
make sense of the present, and “will in many cases have had to be 
incorporated if the effective dominant culture is to make sense of 
those areas” (Williams 1980: 41). Emergent features are likewise not 
only the novel expressions of totally new impulses; they are also 
always already partially incorporated into the dominant sociality. This 
model explains how the past and the glimmers of the future can be 
reworked productively in the present without merely serving as 
markers of pastness or of futurity. Williams claims that both residual 
and emergent practices may be either oppositional or merely 
alternative, may exist alongside each other or challenge each other. 
Whatever will contribute, over time, to a new social formation will 
inevitably be made up of just such interpenetrations of past and future. 
Looking at the Estonian theatre productions described in these essays 
with Williams’ theories in mind, the deconstruction of classical texts,
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myths, and folkloric practices and artifacts can be seen as operations 
on materials that need to be reworked and partially incorporated into 
an evolving notion of national identity instead of merely being 
rejected or destroyed. Indeed, Estonians may need to recall and look 
again at earlier versions of themselves (as Werewolf, as Setu peasant, 
as “ironic Estonian”) to recognize how far from earlier meanings and 
values they have moved, but also to interrogate what is worth keeping 
or refashioning in order to remember the past and create a viable 
future. Both Epner and Saro point out the way these performances 
split or displace the traditional narratives and typical national 
characteristics familiar from the Ur-texts. The character of Tiina in the 
1998 version of The Werewolf unravels both earlier interpretations of 
her figure as either fearful Other to the “blond hair, blue eyes, 
modesty and slowness of the [...] typical representatives of the 
Estonian nation” (Saro), or as heroic Dionysian individual who suffers 
to be free; however it also creates a sense of an alternative, “new, un­
familiar, and cosmopolitan identity of a contemporary Estonian” 
(Epner). The narrative of Oskar Luts’s Springtime may have proved 
useful to directors Kõiv and Unt because they were able to stimulate 
the audience’s desire for “good old friends” while simultaneously 
criticizing the basis for these feelings of intimacy. In this case, it is not 
only the criticism that is important; it is also important to acknow­
ledge the intimate connection with and comfort of the mythical 
romance of the nation’s childhood. A similar complexity of feeling 
and apprehension is stimulated in Estonian Games. Wedding. First, the 
Setu ethnic group appears to symbolize both self and other — that is, 
while in the past Setus have been discriminated against and viewed as 
outsiders to the Estonian national body, their folk songs turn out to be 
highly valued for being old and original — and representative of 
Estonia! Second, the bride was portrayed as a stereotypic Estonian 
doll-like figure, blond and charming (Saro). This casting ironizes both 
the stereotype itself (and its gender construct) as well as any possible 
identification between this figure and the “natural” or “original” Setu 
people. Thus in the present time of the performance, spectators were 
looking at the embodied contradictory role of the Setus as abject and 
prized examples of Estonian identity.
Deconstruction and other poststructuralist methodologies have 
often been criticized because they depend on a binary structure which 
reinscribes the original term while purporting to demolish it. At first
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glance, these Estonian examples seem to exhibit this problem. Philip 
Ausländer, paraphrasing Jacques Derrida, describes this deconstruc- 
tive procedure:
To attempt an exit and a deconstruction without changing terrain, by repeating 
what is implicit in the founding concepts and the original problematic, by 
using against the edifice the instruments or stones available in the house [...]. 
Here one risks ceaselessly confirming, consolidating [...] at an always more 
certain depth, that which one allegedly deconstructs. (Ausländer 1992: 25)
However, I want to argue a different, almost opposite interpretation of 
this procedure, more in keeping with Raymond Williams than with 
Derrida. Because the attack on Estonian cultural myths, classical texts, 
and folkloric practices is built on the assumption of intimate 
knowledge of them, and personal as well as collective itineraries of 
memory, experience, and desire, the insights of these performances 
are predicated on an ongoing utilization of these cultural materials. 
The inadequacy of the old nevertheless becomes the ground of the 
insight into something else, something new or different. The ability to 
analyze, for example, the condition of internal differences within 
Estonia, whether in terms of Russians or Setus, is partially built on the 
history of past relationships with both groups and the material changes 
that have transformed the self/other perceptions of national conscious­
ness. Similarly, the insights into the nature of the theatre apparatus as 
a memory machine and an organ of re-imagining emerge because a 
previous knowledge of theatre as a cultural institution is taken for 
granted and invoked in order to represent the tremors and fault-lines in 
its current socio-cultural operations.
Furthermore, most of the performances stage an encounter with 
technology as part of the representation of the new operations of 
globalization and postmodern living practices. Yet these do not 
function either as a vision of a preferable cultural paradigm or as an 
evil threat to indigenous culture. Instead, a complicated interrelation­
ship is figured on the stage. In Estonian Games. Wedding, a series of 
tensions between the technology of the screen, the theatre, the singers, 
and the wedding ritual on the one hand, and the naturalness or perhaps 
better — humanity — of the songs, the actors, the dances, the stage, 
on the other hand, make for a dis-ease of knowing where to look, what 
to privilege, what to value. This dilemma actually constitutes the 
productive “work” of the performance for its viewers and artists.
Even in an intracultural project such as Estonian Ballads, the clash 
of Estonian folkloric ballads and Butoh bodily techniques seems to be 
posited not to maintain the mutual estrangement, but to complicate it by 
showing traces of each in the other, and furthermore showing bodies 
trained in one art form but taking on and expressing another in such a 
way that the traditions seemed compatible and productive. Here the goal 
seems to be to incorporate something emergent without completely 
losing its oppositional possibilities and maintaining something residual 
without the result of validating an unreconstructed return to the past 
folkloric traditions. The body as a site of competing and simultaneous 
signifying practices gives this dance theatre its power. Indeed, as Stan 
Gamer has pointed out concerning this phenomena,
embodiedness is subject to modification and transformation, multiple and 
varying modes of disclosure, and [...] the forms of ambiguity that characterize 
the phenomenal realm represent experience in flux, oscillating within and 
between modes of perceptual orientation. (Gamer 1994: 5 1)4
Once again we find performance a highly suitable medium for 
capturing and rendering the ambiguities of experience together with 
the transformational possibilities of artistic creation. Ester Võsu and 
Alo Joosepson point out in their essay that “staging” functions analo­
gically as well as theatrically. I would argue the properties of staging 
contribute to making theatre an ideal form for generating the 
necessarily dense and fluctuating images of national identity 
appropriate to Estonia in the present time.
These essays chart a history of theatrical representation in which 
we can see great change in the portrayal of national identities. If the 
practice during the Soviet years was to consolidate national opposition 
through the “manifestation of repressed national feelings” (Epner), the 
period immediately following independence celebrated the new 
freedoms by embracing the market economy and dispersing cultural 
cohesion. However, by the late 1990s and the early years of the new 
century, something else is clearly evolving — characterized by an 
inward turning in a global context. In other words, the internal 
complexity of Estonian identity as indicated from the examples above 
becomes a preoccupation not unlike the focus on preserving national
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A further important discussion of a phenomenological model of actors’ modes 
of experience can be found in Zarrilli 2004: 353-666.
identity during the Soviet period —  it seems critical that an 
examination and reformulation of Estonian identity be pursued. On the 
other hand, this inward examination must grapple also with the 
relationship between Estonia and the “New Europe”, and between 
Estonia and a global cultural matrix in which it is clearly embedded. 
So any inward turning must at the same time be coupled with an 
outward turn as well — there is a dancing figure here — reaching to 
comprehend and represent a world of commodified capitalism and 
homogenized culture in relationship to life on the ground, “at home”. 
Amidst the deconstructive and ironic representations created through 
the performances described in these essays, one non-ironic figure 
seems to stand out: in Ain Prosa’s parodic production of Kalevipoeg, 
the character of Kalevipoeg himself seems to have been played 
without irony, “in a humane manner, freed from both the heroic aura 
as well as the belittling reputation of a dim-witted barbarian. 
Kivirähk’s Kalevipoeg was a solemn peasant who experienced the 
tragic loneliness of a leader” (Epner).
In the discussions of reception of the various productions, I can feel 
my Estonian colleagues’ disappointment that some of the audiences 
were small and that discussion and debate about these richly devised 
and executed performances did not pursue in depth the socio-cultural 
implications of these productions. However, perhaps like Kalevipoeg, 
theatre scholars, artists, and other intellectuals have to face the 
somewhat lonely task of leading others to explore the issues and 
experiences raised in these performances. If we cannot overcome 
commercialism and the more shallow claims of global culture, we can 
engage in certain residual practices of appreciation and scholarship that 
may become intertwined with the newly emergent discourses that will 
mark the future. I am delighted and honored to join them in this project.
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Национальные знаки: эстонский идентитет и театр
Тот факт, что Эстония занята переосмыслением своего националь­
ного идентитета, изучением традиций прошлого и поиском путей в 
будущее, делает ее замечательным объектом для исследования 
возможностей театрального искусства в решении вопросов, связан­
ных с национальным идентитетом. Ценность самого театра как 
институции — категория изменчивая и зависит от разных культур­
ных процессов. Историческая роль эстонского театра в качестве 
сокровищницы национальных нарративов (особенно литературных) 
превращает театр в значимое место, где сталкиваются печатное 
слово и технология, представления “вживую” и архивные записи.
Настоящее эссе является введением к последующим статьям, в 
которых исследуется то, как Эстонию и ее театральную культуру 
можно понимать в свете их истории, воспоминаний, современного 
опыта и будущих возможностей. Идея о том, что “театральное” 
изначально связано с притворством, уже сама по себе дает прекрас­
ный материал для пересмотра национального идентитета в периоды
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нестабильности и крупных изменений. У постановок, о которых 
пойдет речь в дальнейшем, точек соприкосновения разумеется боль­
ше, чем только сознательное использование театральности. Пред­
ставляется неслучайным, что переработка классиков национальной 
литературы, мифов эстонской национальной культуры, народных 
песен и церемоний происходит одновременно с представлением 
новых технологий, коллизий потребительского капитализма и 
диаспорических конфликтов. Театр является важной институцией 
при переоценке национального, он отражает культурные проблемы в 
стране, которая переосмысливает свое прошлое и встречается со 
своим будущим.
Rahvuslikud märgid: eesti identiteet etenduses
See, et Eesti on hõivatud oma rahvusliku identiteedi ümberdefineerimise 
ja minevikutraditsioonide ning tulevikupürgimuste uurimisega, teeb 
temast suurepärase uurimisobjekti, mille näitel vaadelda teatri võimalusi 
rahvusliku identiteedi üle otsustajana. Teatriinstitutsiooni enda väärtusta­
mise muutumine on osa kultuurilistest tasandumisprotsessidest (kas eest­
lased hindavad teatrit ja teatris käimist ka tulevikus?). Ka eesti teatri 
ajalooline roll rahvuslike narratiivide, eriti kirjanduslike, varamuna muu­
dab teatri siinmail tähenduslikuks kohaks kus põrkuvad trükisõna ja 
tehnoloogia, kehastatud etendused ja arhiivi-esitused.
Käesolev essee on sissejuhatuseks järgnevatele artiklitele, kus uuri­
takse, kuidas Eestit ja selle teatrikultuuri on võimalik mõista nende kahe 
ajaloo, mälestuste, tänapäevaste kogemuste ning tulevikuvõimaluste 
valguses. Idee sellest, et teaterlik/teatripärane on olemuslikult seotud 
teesklusega, pakub juba iseenesest suurepäraseid võimalusi rahvusliku 
identiteedi ülevaatamiseks ebastabiilsuse ja suurte muutuste perioodil. 
Lavastustel, millest järgnevas kolmes artiklis räägitakse, on muidugi 
suurem ühisosa kui teaterliku/teatripärase teadlik rakendamine. Näib, et 
see pole juhus, et rahvuslike kirjandusklassikute, eesti rahvuskultuun 
müütide ja etniliste rahvalaulude ning tseremooniate ümbertöötamine 
leiab siin aset samaaegselt uute tehnoloogiate, tarbimiskapitalismi pingete 
ja diasporaaliste kollisoonide esitamisega. Teater on oluline institutsioon 
rahvusliku uuesti-tähistamisel, ta kehastab kõige otsesemas mõttes kul­
tuurilist kimbatust maal, mis hindab ümber oma minevikku ja seisab 
vastamisi oma tulevikuga.
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Abstract. National identities are to a great extent based on common mythical 
stories (re)produced by literature and arts; in the long run, the core texts of 
literature themselves start to function as cultural myths. Performing classical 
works theatre relates them to the changing social context and thus actualises 
their meaning. Theatrical representations of national characters and mythical 
stories participate in reinforcing or redefining national identity. In independent 
Estonia of the 1990s-2000s the need for reconsidering national values and 
myths that served to consolidate society in the Soviet period, has become 
evident. The article focuses on theatrical productions in the turn of the 
century, which are based on active rewriting of well-known Estonian classics 
(August Kitzberg, Oskar Luts, and the national epic Kalevipoeg). The article 
tries to answer two questions: how ingredients o f national identity (for 
instance, the relation to the Other) are displayed and (de)con struct ed by 
adapting or rewriting of above-mentioned classics; how textual strategies 
aimed at semantic transformations are motivated and shaped by the principle 
of self-reflexive theatrical play.
Introductory remarks
This article deals with the study of interrelations of national identity, 
literary classics, and theatre, as exemplified by some Estonian stage 
productions of the 1990s-2000s. Although the building of a national 
identity with the help of the arts (including theatre) is a much-exploited 
research topic, it has not lost its importance at the beginning of the 21st 
century, but, quite the contrary, has gained new actuality because of social 
and cultural processes that are shaping contemporary world.
People, states and nations are nowadays affected by two strong yet 
contrasting tendencies: globalization, expressed through economic and 
cultural standardization, similarities in lifestyles and more intense 
communications, and localization, which conversely stresses local 
uniqueness and strives to preserve or reproduce indigenous forms of 
culture and living. Their complex, partially paradoxical intertwinings 
are deeply influenced by cultural identity (including national identity 
as one of its dimensions), and on the other hand these processes place 
a great strain on the cultural identity. According to Rien T. Segers, the 
localization tendency is based on cultural identity, whereas the globa­
lization tendency is driven mainly by technological and economic 
flows; he even speaks about a “cultural turn”, meaning that contem­
porary developments, whether they have a global or a local nature, can 
not be understood without taking into account the concept of cultural 
identity (Segers 2004: 87).
Discussion about the impact of the current wave of globalization 
(which started in the late 1980s (Therbom 2000, as referred in Sevä- 
nen 2004a: 17)) is in fact closely linked to the discussion about 
postmodemity in the same period. Robert G. Dunn argues that the 
fragmentation of symbolic experience in postmodemity, together with 
cultural pluralization, lead to the destabilization of identities (Dunn 
1998: 222-223). Speaking about the political changes that have taken 
place in the late 20th century, the sociologists have, in their turn, 
suggested that national identity is the most principal problem of the 
newly established post-communist countries (like Estonia): “[...] a 
fundamental question o f  transition fo r  all East Europeans is ‘who are 
we? (Lauristin 1997: 28). Whether we look at the past decades from 
the perspective of developments in globalization, postmodemity or 
postcommunism, the question of identity becomes the focal point. 
There is reason to discuss the problematization or crisis of traditional 
identities, accompanied by a need to reconstruct or readjust them. One 
way or the other, it is too early to cast the concept of national identity 
into the garbage heap of history as something old-fashioned and 
superseded in our “global village”.
National identity, one o f the most salient layers of the broader 
concept of cultural identity, is itself multi-dimensional. It is generally 
based on ethnic bonds, articulated in the people’s belief in their 
common origin, but can not be reduced to them. According to 
Anthony D. Smith, the national identity is composed of a number of
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components: a historic territory (homeland); common myths and 
historical memories; a common, mass public culture; common legal 
rights and duties for all members; a common economy (Smith 1991: 
14). It is evident that the relative importance of those components may 
vary across periods and/or nations. Common myths, historical 
narratives, traditions, values, beliefs etc. form the symbolic aspect of 
the national identity, which has been regarded as the most decisive for 
its durability, since it serves as a basis for the individual’s emotional 
connection with the nation as a super-individual unity (Smith 1993: 
162). Construction of the symbolic aspect of identity occurs to a great 
extent via representations produced by the arts. It has been noted that 
the creation of national myths by the arts has been exceptionally 
important in case of nations lacking political independence (Sevänen 
2004b: 38); meaning that the relative weakness of one component is 
compensated with the (over)production of a cultural (symbolic) 
“generator”. Estonia belongs amongst such nations; its national 
awakening took place in the second half of the 19th century, an 
independent nation was declared in 1918, only to be abolished again 
in 1940 by the Soviet occupation. The cornerstone of the Estonian 
national identity has generally been considered the Estonian culture, 
especially literature (see Veidemann 2004: 110). The less politic and 
economic freedom, the greater the need for unifying cultural events — 
a claim supported by an unusually high prestige of the arts in the 
Estonian society, as well as the high nationalistic coding of theatre 
productions during the 19th century, during the dominion of German 
landlords as well as during the Soviet regime.
Let us resume: national identity as a part of cultural identity is not 
something primordial and inherent in the human nature, but is 
constructed during a process of socialization; representations of 
(idealized) national narratives and myths by the arts are of vital 
importance for producing and maintaining it. The means, options and 
the ways of operating vary to a great extent both on a historical as well 
as (artistic) morphological scale.
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Literature and theatre
As was pointed out, literature has been considered the central factor in 
building up the Estonian identity, and it has been noted that the
foremost goal of Estonian literature has been the production and 
reproduction o f  national and cultural identity, which in the 20th 
century is supplemented with attempts at creating the Estonian world 
literature (Undusk 1999: 249). One of the reasons is that literature is a 
language-based art — the Estonian language, not the geographical 
Estonia is regarded as the space of Estonian literature (Undusk 1999: 
250) — , and the national language is the most important and sensitive 
component of the identity of a small nation. Secondly, the formation 
of a nation is to a great extent dependent upon the creation of a 
national narrative, partly composed by the works belonging to the 
literary classics (canon), that articulate national mentality or character, 
based on the collective self-image, as well as values and ideals 
regarded as characteristically national (concerning the relationship of 
literary canon and national identity, see Annus 2000). The figurative 
concept of a core or root text is used in Estonian literary criticism; 
such texts bring forth collective characteristics, desires and fears of the 
nation and form the “energetic field” of patriotic feelings (Veidemann 
2003: 891). “Core” texts carry essential national myths through ages 
and, in their turn, in time they themselves begin to function as myths, 
becoming a part of the body of fictional stories the national self- 
consciousness is resting upon. Examples of works, functioning as such 
myths, include the national epic Kalevipoeg, written by Fr. R. 
Kreutzwald (1853-1862), the drama The Werewolf { 1912) by August 
Kitzberg, Springtime (1912-1913) together with its sequels by Oskar 
Luts, the novel Truth and Justice I-V  (1926-1933) by Anton Hansen 
Tammsaare,1 poetry by Lydia Koidula, Juhan Liiv, etc. In addition, 
the treasury of common myths comprises mythologized biographies of 
writers such as Kristjan Jaak Peterson (the first Estonian poet who 
died very young), Lydia Koidula (a romantic poetess, the personi­
fication of Estonian patriotism, who died abroad), Juhan Liiv (the 
original Estonian “mad genius”), etc.
But what is the role of theatre in the creation of Estonian identity? 
The Estonian national theatre emerged during the 19th century (in 
1870), led by the poetess Lydia Koidula. Theatre as an art form, i.e. a 
system of stage conventions and practices, did not stem from national 
culture (although theatrical games of singing and national traditions 
are not absent from the Estonian folklore), but was borrowed from the 
(Baltic) German culture. The role of the theatre, which had turned
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professional in early 20th century, sprung from the European cultural 
system of the 19th century: the theatre is an institution of art for the 
purpose of performing and interpreting literary works. Initially, the 
Estonian theatre was untouched by the emancipatory movement of 
Western theatre taking place under the banner of a (re)theatralization. 
Supported mainly by the productions of original literary works, theatre 
has performed the task of producing national self-consciousness, 
working as a cultural amplifier of literary texts.
Attention should be paid to the specific manner of influence of the 
theatre art. First, the production and reception of theatrical perfor­
mances is collective in nature. Due to this collective nature (some­
times even akin to a congregation), they have a strong emotional field 
of impact; theatre is a medium capable of amplifying the social field 
of influence of the otherwise “solitarily” received literary texts. 
Second, theatre is an institutional art. Loren Kruger has emphasized 
the character of theatre as a legitimate public sphere, and as a 
consequence, the appropriate site for nation building; it is not only a 
place, but also an occasion for the articulation of national prestige 
(Kruger 1992: 6-11). Of course, experimental performances of 
alternative theatres can form a part of the discourse of national identity 
as well as representative performances in big state theatres. Partici­
pation in a theatrical event can also be considered as a social ritual,
where belief in a particular ethical-moral worldview is reinforced, and
2certain common myths are repeated (Paavolainen 1992: 15).
The interrelation of theatre and literature in culture can also be 
described in terms of memory. According to Juri Lotman, culture is a 
collective intellect and a collective memory, a trans-personal mecha­
nism for storing and exchanging texts, as well as for creation of new 
texts. The cultural space can indeed be outlined in terms of common 
memory. In the memory of the arts, which is of a creative type, the 
“forgetting” and “remembering” of pre-existing texts is taking place in 
a pulsating rhythm, the texts sometimes become actualized, sometimes 
fade (Lotman 1992: 200-201). This of course does not take place 
automatically. The theatre, bringing past works into the limelight —
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In his research, Paavolainen brings out two myths important to the Finnish 
public of the 1960s: the myth of a united nation and the myth of a strong woman 
in control of her destiny. They are both carried by classic texts (Aleksis Kivi’s 
Seven Brothers, Hella Wuolijoki’s Niskamäe-series) and both are clearly suppor­
tive of identities (both national and gender).
into the cultural consciousness of new generations — is for literature 
one of the mechanisms for “remembering”, evaluation and re-evalua- 
tion. Staging as an intersemiotic translation of a literary text is also an 
active creation of relationships between the past texts and the 
temporally alternating social and ideological contexts of both the 
creators and the recipients of the stage production. Theatre (re)con- 
textualizes literary texts, whereby the tradition of interpretation of the 
classic work and its author are part of the makeup the context, with 
which the new staging will inevitably form a dialogue. By updating 
the classics and activating new layers of meaning, theatre both 
preserves and renews the spiritual connection of the people with the 
legacy of the past.
When talking about theatre, its ephemeral and transient nature is 
often stressed (theatre is “written on sand”), yet on the other hand 
repetition and the tendency to recycle stories, characters, design 
elements etc. is also inherent to it. This side of theatre is pointed out by 
Marvin Carlson, who calls theatre a memory-machine and a repository 
of cultural memory — however, subject to continual modification as the 
memory is recalled in new circumstances (Carlson 2001: 2). Due to the 
close relationships between theatre and memory, national myths and 
historical stories utilize theatre to represent, reinscribe, and reinforce the 
nation as a cultural construction (Carlson 2001: 3).
The relation of theatre with literary classics is not limited to 
amplification and/or memory operations that suggest the primacy of 
conserving functions. Rather, stage productions balance between the 
two opposing attitudes: sometimes they insist on the present-day 
resonance of the classics, sometimes on their everlasting significance. 
Below, we examine how Estonian stage directors have treated 
Estonian classics at the turn of the 20th century.
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Stage production of The Werewolf by August Kitzberg
During the Soviet period the Estonian theatre largely operated as a 
memory machine and a medium for manifestation of repressed 
national feelings. In the stage productions of the literary classics of the 
1970s to 1980s the emphasis laid on the everlasting and the 
archetypal, articulated in criticism through the image of renewing
contacts with national roots. This purpose was also served by some 
rewritings of classical texts aimed at purifying and intensifying their 
very core by means of a powerful ritualistic theatrical language, for 
example We Are Looking fo r  Vargamäe based on Tammsaare’s Truth 
and Justice (1976, directed by Kaarin Raid) or A P eop le’s War based 
on historical novels by Eduard Vilde (1981, directed by Jaan 
Tooming); characteristically they combined work-based themes with 
folklore. Although during the Soviet era stage productions of classics 
in an ironic key were also put on stage (e.g., by Mati Unt), these, 
nevertheless, were rather exceptional. One has to agree with Piret 
Kruuspere: typical of the 1980s was a unidimensional national pathos, 
replaced by a more ambiguous point of view in the next decade 
(Kruuspere 2000: 188).
The break in the Estonian political and economic system in the 
early 1990s coincided with rather sharp changes in the spiritual 
atmosphere — the shift to the post-modern lifestyle and worldview. 
The situation in general was quite contradictory: the fight for 
independence boosted nationalism, yet at the same time in literature, 
for example, myths were deconstructed rather than created. As usual, 
theatre was more conservative compared to other forms of art; 
moreover so since the theatrical system remained principally the same. 
Upholding an extensive network of state-subsidized repertory theatres 
under the circumstances of the market economy (no state theatres 
were shut down) has even been called the “third way” of Estonia in 
the field of culture. The paradigm shifts mainly started to take place 
during the second half of the 1990s. The need for the double-coding of 
nationality, characteristic of the Soviet period, disappeared; the natio­
nal self-consciousness ceased to consolidate the rapidly stratifying and 
unstable society of the so-called transition period. Thus, theatre lost its 
former role as a place of consolidation and had to reformulate its 
relationship with audiences. The market economy and the diversi­
fication of cultural consumption promoted more commercial produc­
tions. On the other hand, the need for reconsideration of national 
values from the present-day perspective has become a new challenge 
for the theatre.
The Estonian theatre of the 1990s has been reproached for 
avoiding the topics of social and political problems. In contrast, the 
national past is reinterpreted in a number of productions of both 
Estonian classics and original contemporary dramas, rewriting
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significant national myths. There are, of course, many traditional 
productions merely reproducing familiar stories and characters (e.g. 
the very popular open-air production of Truth and Justice I  by A. H. 
Tammsaare (1997), performed at the writer’s home farm, largely 
perceived as an “authentic” environment of the novel). However, 
besides these there are also productions the aim of which is a self- 
reflexive and critical dialogue with the national past. Among the most 
intriguing ones there are some rewritings of the “core” texts that 
perform a kind of deep ploughing on the field of national identity.
August Kitzberg’s The Werewolf (1912) originates from the 
“golden era” of Estonian drama of the early decades of the 20th 
century. It is the most often produced Estonian play: approximately 40 
stagings in professional Estonian theatres, as well as two screenings 
(one of them shot by exile Estonians living in the USA), and a ballet 
by Lydia Auster called Tiina. The story of the play takes place during 
the time of serfdom (19th century). The conflict between a young girl 
Tiina, aspiring for love and freedom, and the conservative village 
people (family of Tammaru) is motivated by her “foreign blood”: 
different descent (Tiina’s ancestors were free chiefs of people, her 
mother has been put to death as a witch), different appearance and 
temperament (a black-haired and hot-blooded girl versus the fair­
haired and sluggish village people). Her otherness is emphasized by 
associations with wild nature, as opposed to human culture. As a 
consequence of a love intrigue she is publicly accused of being a 
werewolf and expelled from the village society; she stays living in the 
forest among the wolves. The play ends with Tiina’s tragic death, 
struck by a bullet intended for a wolf. Kitzberg uses folklore in 
abundance: folk songs and games, chants, a scene during a Mid­
summer’s Eve, which is one of the most important Estonian holidays, 
as well as the folk faith concerning werewolves.
The W erewolf functioned as a text constituting a national myth by 
presenting traditional culture and looking back to the ancient slavery. 
The impressive display of the people’s mental life and of the ancient 
history was credited in synchronous criticism. The historic-ethno­
graphic layer was probably one of the reasons why The Werewolf was 
chosen to represent the recently incorporated Estonia in the Moscow 
art decade of the Soviet Union, which was supposed to take place in 
1941. Identity formation is more deeply affected by the grand opposi­
tion of Tiina and the Tammaru family, in which the idea of a personal
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freedom collides with the primeval wisdom demanding self-sacrifice 
for the survival of the people. This antagonism expresses the tragic 
dilemma of the Estonians, who have been living under the yoke of 
foreign powers for centuries: the burden and price of the preservation 
of the people, the inevitability and danger of the self-preservation 
programme (see Lauristin 1987: 51-52). Tiina performs the role of the 
exceptional and the alien, upon which the ideology of self-preser- 
vation leans. However, an alternative interpretation is also present in 
literary criticism, according to which it is the passionate Tiina who 
represents the primeval Estonian archetype, whose dionysian vitality 
cannot be extinguished by the imposed Christian worldview (Valge­
mäe 1990: 38). The Soviet-era stage productions of The Werewolf 
were concerned with the aforementioned dilemma, sometimes 
emphasizing the idea of freedom, sometimes the endurance.
In the 1990s, The W erewolf was staged twice in the Von Krahl 
Theatre, which has an avant-garde alternative theatre reputation, on 
both occasions by the leader of the theatre, Peeter Jalakas. Von Krahl, 
the first private theatre of the newly independent Estonia, was 
established in 1992 and its inaugural play was The Werewolf Picking 
a classic core text was a symbolic gesture, which however did not 
manifest a continuing tradition but instead a desire to demolish 
cultural myths. The stage director was interested in unlocking the 
functional mechanics of cultural cliches. The Werewolf was used as a 
source for stereotypical situations, which the company of non-pro­
fessional actors played in a comical-parodying key, accompanied by 
the stage director’s commentaries played from tape. For the second 
time, Jalakas turned to Kitzberg’s drama in 1998. As a matter of fact, 
it was The Werewolf based on Kitzberg, compiled by Jalakas himself 
and Margus Kasterpalu. Their basic strategy was to frame Kitzberg’s 
story by means of the theatre-within-theatre technique: present-day 
actors just rehearse The Werewolf and discuss the play, as well as the 
situation and functions of the Estonian theatre in general. The 
production was defined as an experiment, and its main goal was 
clearly worded at the beginning of the performance: theatrical investi­
gation of the validity of play’s values and problems in today’s society. 
The questions directing the production were specified in more detail in 
the programme; several of them concerned identity formation, for 
example: Why should the world care about Estonia? Why should 
Estonia care about the world? Are Estonians turning into Russians?
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Are Russians turning into Estonians? Does a border separate or unite? 
Etc.
In the course of the rehearsal on the stage, the actors tested different 
interpretative models, such as the realistic-psychological, the national- 
romantic, the ritualistic, and finally rejected all of them as inappropriate 
from the contemporary perspective. The actress playing Tiina (Liina 
Vahtrik) showed up to the rehearsals later, as someone from outside just 
like her character, but her singularity was not insisted upon (externally 
she did not differ from the rest), so that her threatening and alien 
character was dependent upon psychological motivation, which the 
actors however could not find. The theatre-within-theatre technique was 
supplemented with a fragmented stage and stage activities, by which 
The Werewolf as a myth was split; its elements were inserted into 
multiple new contexts and related with metatextual commentary, both 
visual and verbal. First, a man called August (an allusion to August 
Kitzberg; played by Raivo E. Tamm) was sitting on a little platform 
above the stage (suggesting author’s supremacy over the work). He read 
out Kitzberg’s stage directions, some passages from the prose on the 
theme of werewolf by another writer, August Gailit, and quoted critical 
interpretations with regard to the play. Secondly, new technological 
media were used: the stage was fragmented with video and tele-screens, 
where different images and episodes were seen in parallel with the main 
stage activity. A large video screen at the back of the stage was 
reminiscent of a window, from which scenes of contemporary social 
reality could be seen: a populous city street, weird wolf-shaped figures, 
who were later identified as the outcasts of contemporary society, etc. 
The most significant image on the big video-screen was of a man 
walking through various landscapes and winding a string on a reel; at 
the end he was identified as a collector of frontiers (perhaps referring to 
the (future) Europe without frontiers). There was also a large television 
set on stage, in which an “investigation” of a slaughter of a foal was 
presented in the form of a parodic TV report — the leitmotif of the 
tragedy was drowned in a mass mysticism characteristic of a mass 
culture, so that it lost all credibility. On both the visual as well as the 
verbal level the opposition of human — wolf was elaborated (often in 
an ironic key), which was often analogous with the opposition own — 
alien.
One of Jalakas’s favourite techniques is a simultaneous combi­
nation of culturally, stylistically and ideologically different theatre
signs, which support and/or cancel each other out. For example, in the 
Midsummer Eve scene, the actors jumped over a small television set 
placed on the floor, in which a bonfire was shown, and at the same 
time scenes from the movie The Werewolf by exile Estonians were 
shown on the big TV screen: modem theatrical play clashed with a 
rather naive-romantic film with its primitive ethnographism (disso­
nant, in its turn, with English subtitles). After that, a no less than 
fourfold combination was displayed: August’s hysterically nationalist 
speech about the need to drive away the Russians (and to bum Tiina), 
in order to protect our blue-eyed race; a nationally emblematic man 
with a shepherd’s horn on the centre stage; a seduction scene between 
Tiina and Margus carried out with wolf-like movements on the apron; 
everything accompanied by the music of Rammstein. The theatre- 
within-theatre technique allowed the free fusion of elements of 
traditional, high and pop culture. The musical design was effectively 
eclectic: from Tchaikovsky’s First piano concerto through national- 
romantic songs to Rammstein. Such combinations revealed an 
antagonism between the modem and the mythical in the discourse of 
cultural and national identity.
Staging strategies and the fragmented stage enabled to split The 
Werewolf as a national myth, to explore its components by means of 
recontextualization and relating with metatexts — and to abandon it. 
First and foremost, the inadequacy of the sharp opposition between 
“us” and the “other” (with a special allusion to the relationship 
between Estonians and Russians) in modem society was emphasized. 
At the end of the performance the actors turned to the author (August), 
refusing to accept and perform the tragic conclusion of the play. The 
characters have become empty signs without any meaning, they say. 
So the classical story remained unfinished, the initial question was 
answered in the negative. The production can be viewed as a gesture 
of denial of a fossilized nationalism, and of an ideologized image of 
the Other as an enemy. At the same time, as a critic has remarked, it 
manifested a new, unfamiliar, and cosmopolite identity of a contem­
porary Estonian (Kruus 1998). However, the production did not 
initiate a wider discussion about identity, and the interest of the critics 
was focussed on the use of technological media. As a small hall 
production only played during a single season, it did not accumulate a 
lot of audience.
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Two theatrical interpretations 
of the work of Oskar Luts
Oskar Luts’s novel Springtime, dating from the same period as The 
W erewolf (published in two parts in 1912-1913) portrays the life of 
schoolchildren —  the beauty and pain of the first love, funny pranks, 
conflicts with German cadets, and so forth. Springtime, together with 
its sequels concerned with the further life of the same characters 
(Summer (1918-1919), Toots’s Wedding (1921), Weekday (1924), 
Autumn (1938)) play a central role in the cultural consciousness of 
Estonians, primarily due to the colourful characters, who rapidly 
became well known to everyone. This was encouraged by numerous 
dramatizations, staged from 1930s onwards. Stagings of Oskar Luts 
belong to the core of Estonian theatre classics and have usually been 
very popular. (For example, from 1955-1965, three dramatizations of 
Oskar Luts led the attendance rankings (Toots’s Wedding, Springtime 
and Summer) and the top ten included two more (Kask 1987: 465).) In 
addition to theatrical productions, there are also screenings, TV 
productions and Ülo Vinter’s comic ballet Springtime.
Springtime has become a sort of a mythologeme of national dis­
course, referring to the “golden past”, to the childhood of a nation, and 
to archetypal Estonians. A director Voldemar Panso, who staged 
Springtime in 1969, drew parallels with Seven Brothers by Aleksis 
Kivi: for him, the primordial soul of the Estonian nation finds its 
expression in Springtime, just as that of Finnish people is found in 
Seven Brothers (Panso 1969). The above-mentioned cycle by Luts has 
also been called a grand myth of the seasons, and an Estonian national 
allegory of the dance of life (Undusk 1994a). Luts has been 
considered as the Estonian national writer par excellence, who is 
loved by all Estonians, but hard to translate and hard to understand 
outside of the national cultural space. As a writer and a director Mati 
Unt has said: “Every nation has secret writers o f  its own, who grasp 
its originality with a particularly intimate authenticity” (Unt 1993: 
91). The expectations of the theatre audiences have been led by the 
desire to meet “good old friends” from the pages of the books, to see 
familiar humorous stories, or to borrow the words of a critic: “Л has 
become so intimate to the people that a change would bother” 
(Rosenvald 1984).
However, at the second half of the 1990s, two strongly altered 
versions were staged: Winter by Madis Kõiv (1996, Vanemuine 
theatre, directed by Raivo Adlas) and Tonight We Play Ducks and 
Drakes by Mati Unt (1998, Estonian Drama Theatre, directed by Unt 
himself); the title of the latter makes a pun on the name of Luts (to 
play ducks and drakes = to play ‘luts’)3. The creative impulse behind 
both productions seems to be the unique intimacy shared by the 
authors. Madis Kõiv considers Luts to be a constitutively relevant 
writer for Estonians; perhaps Estonians have shaped themselves 
according to Luts’s characters, he smirked at a literary gathering. For 
Unt, Luts forms a part of his self-myth: they are united through the 
same childhood landscapes and being melancholic.
Winter and Tonight... are so-called “derived plays” {pieces 
derivees, Tadeusz Kowzan), of which one domain is constituted by the 
rewriting of well-known classical texts. The concept of rewriting 
covers different far-reaching thematical and diegetic transformations, 
resulting in texts that stand in a complicated inter- and metatextual 
relationship with the primary texts and sometimes tend to function as 
an autonomous work. Matei Calinescu has pointed to post-modern 
sensitivity to the phenomena of textual transformations or rewriting, 
although it is by no means a monopoly of the post-modems (Calinescu 
1997: 247-248); in Estonian theatre this practice dates back to the 
modernist theatrical renewal in the late 1960s.
Winter is, as its title indicates, a continuation and the finale of 
Luts’s cycle, following A u tu m n Kõiv inscribes the characters, these 
representative Estonians, into the period of the Soviet occupation and 
Stalinist repression of the 1940s. Winter, together with the imagery of 
snow and blizzard refers both to the death-phase of the cycle of the 
seasons and to the Stalinist period of history prior to the so-called 
“thaw”, i.e. to the ruin of the good old times of national past, which in 
its turn are symbolized by “the spring” and “the summer” — from 
these Luts’s works, extensive passages are quoted. Under the pressure 
of history, the national myth of the “golden past” (or the “old-time 
tale”, as is said in Köiv’s text) breaks up. The stick-together
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Unt has also written and directed a short play after Luts People in the Sauna 
(1999) and published his works on Luts’s motifs as a collection titled Huntluts 
[Wolf-Burbot] (1999).
Actually the title can be interpreted also as an allusion to the central character, 
whose name is Amo Tali (tali = winter).
community of the schoolchildren splits along different tracks of the 
historical destiny of Estonians: some of them become “forest 
brothers”, desperately fighting against the Soviet rule (the prankster 
Toots), or deportees and refugees, some others become communist 
potentates or collaborators (Visak, who is an illegitimate child), and 
some try to creep into hiding in order to survive (Amo Tali). The 
characters on the stage seemed old, exhausted and tattered, being in 
sharp contrast with the original types in Oskar Luts’s story. Similarly 
to The Werewolf, the writer (Oskar Luts, played by Ants Ander) 
himself was one of the characters — but as an author who has lost 
control over the world he has created, and forced to obey communist 
rulers (or —  supremacy of the history?) himself.
The world of Winter undergoes rapid metamorphoses on account 
of alternation and blending of different layers of fictional time — that 
of the Springtime and the Summer and that of the 1940s. In some 
episodes this overlapping produced grotesque contamination. For 
example, the chrestomathic scene about Kiir’s lost boot-buttons was 
presented in the form of a KGB interrogation: the schoolboys were 
threatened with deportation, Toots’s fire hook turned out to be a rifle 
and cartridges were found instead of boot-buttons. The author, Oskar 
Luts, was forced to act as a transcript writer. The funny images of old 
times were crossed with mde violence of historical processes, and 
Luts’s gentle humour was mixed with harsh Stalinist rhetoric, even on 
the level of sentences — for example, the parish clerk (a KGB agent 
in the reality of the 1940s) said to the students: ‘Том better learn 
[Bible] verses and slogans \ ”
The temporally complex stage activity can also be interpreted as 
mental images or dreams of Amo Tali (Aivar Tommingas), in which 
the pressures of a collective subconscious find their expression. The 
subjectivity of temporal cognition was indicated by lighting design, 
alternating from all-encompassing darkness to full bright in images of 
the past. The people were portrayed not only as the victims of history, 
but collective guilt and fear was also illuminated. The splitting of the 
cast into two hostile camps was derived from the “golden past” itself: 
the boy who was bullied in Springtime became a Soviet militia in 
Winter, the son of a wealthy farmer became a well-groomed old 
gentleman in an American manner, i.e. a successful exile. The Amo of 
Winter wanted to take the blame for the etemal class struggle upon 
himself, to redeem the people from punishment. (The “translation” of
392 Luule Epner
causal processes into ethical categories of guilt and punishment is a 
recurring theme in Köiv’s work.) When the hope for a possible 
individual responsibility failed, he too, similarly to the characters of 
The Werewolf turned to the author, and demanded him to be “taken 
back”, as if he had never existed. Oskar Luts, as presented by Kõiv, is 
an author without power, who cannot change the past: “[...] which 
was, has been and is inevitable.”
History (or the course of time) was denoted by several theatrical 
images: the snowdrift into which Arno was sinking (reminiscent of 
Happy Days by Beckett); the wind, flying banners and pictures of 
statesmen, etc. The monstrous, grotesque monument built of school- 
desks with characters’ faces appearing in its openings was the most 
impressive one, both evoking and concealing memories. It impres­
sively visualized the metamorphoses of the myth of a national 
childhood under the impact of a historical experience of violence, and 
also functioned as an image of the work Springtime itself, which has 
become a sort of “cultural monument”.
One of the main themes of this adaptation was memory — 
individual, collective, and cultural. In the world of the play (that of the 
1940s) it is dangerous to remember and to recognize each other — 
during an interrogation, this would mean betrayal. The past has to be 
forgotten. The production spoke of an outrageous abolition of 
memory, ensuring the continuity of identity. In opposition to Luts’s 
work, Winter began to manifest rupture, cleavage, and difference, both 
in the (historical) time and (social) space of Estonian nationalism. As 
for the reception, Winter provoked some perplexity, even indignation 
among the spectators. Already the open dress rehearsal caused 
polemics: is Springtime a proper basis for treating political issues and 
collective guilt of Estonians (Kaija 1996). One protested against the 
demolition of a beloved myth. The audiences remained pretty small — 
about 3400 spectators.
Mati Unt’s productions of national classics have been charac­
terized as sceptical “studies of the Estonian archetype” and the 
cultivation of a self-ironic view of a small nation’s complexes 
(Kruuspere 2000: 193). Tonight We Play Ducks and Drakes is a 
comprehensive collage of about 25 works by Oskar Luts, as well as of 
documentary materials concerning the writer’s biography and the 
reception of his works among critics. The so-called seasons-cycle 
constitutes the main line of the composition. The production’s
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aesthetics were based on unconcealed playfulness and meta-theatri­
cality: the fictional world was defined as a stage, where the actors 
perform situations originating from Luts’s work. Initially, they were 
dressed in plain peasant tunics, later to be replaced with fashionable 
apparel. The stage design was laconic and functional, scenes were 
marked with scant items. The non-illusionist stage space was 
contrasted by scenes from the proto-landscapes for Springtime (Pala­
muse, Vooremaa), as a sign of “authenticity”, projected onto a screen 
located at the back wall. The stage, divided into zones capable of 
smooth changes in meaning, would come to indicate the entire lived 
world of Estonians. The fictional time was just as all-inclusive. All of 
the layers of time — narrative, psychological, and theatrical — 
behaved similarly, bringing forth repetitions and variations.
Similar to Kõiv, Unt too opened Luts’s fictional world to the 
history but unlike Kõiv he accentuated historical recurrence, not 
rupture. History repeats itself: the crucial historical events of the 20th 
century fused into each other, and were performed as a series of 
variations on the basic conditions of the life of Estonians. With the 
help of a playful manipulation of time and space and pattern of 
repetitions, the overall history of the Estonian people in the 20th 
century —  that of unending fight for independence, wars and 
subsequent rebuilding — was displayed in a slightly ironic manner. 
The mythical “golden past” of Estonians, too, broadened on account 
of the history. For instance, Luts’s “old Russian time” was transferred 
onstage to refer both to the czarism and to the Soviet era; in this 
manner, the concept of the “golden past” itself as an object of 
permanent nostalgic yearning was highlighted. The purpose of the 
production’s treatment of time and space was not a reiteration of a 
historical myth, but its mythical nature, i.e. the disclosure of the 
mechanisms constructing the myth.
A similar fusion could be observed in characters: stage figures 
were synthesized from several different characters from Luts’s works, 
and often associated by means of intertextual techniques with different 
cultural texts. The premise was to define the environment of existence 
of the characters as a stage: “[...] the characters are neither lived nor 
historical but are unfortunately real on the s tage” (Unt 1999: 179). 
For example, Imesson “included” Imelik and Tõnisson from Spring­
time', the latter’s patriotic hatred towards the Germans were 
emphasized by quotations from Eduard Bomhöhe’s historic novel The
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Avenger, the protagonist of which is a symbolic figure of the national 
fight for freedom. Luts’s comical Kiir was alternately quoting Hamlet 
and the amorous Bottom from A Midsummer N ight’s Dream. By 
fusing different characters, Unt reinforced their psychological do­
minants, so that they could be perceived as representations of national 
archetypes (or basic psychological types) on an international back­
ground. However, the actors were playing Luts’s characters in an 
untraditional manner, sometimes even in direct contradiction with 
expectations: the feeble redhead Kiir (Taavi Eelmaa) was a stout and 
sturdy man of action, the melancholy dreamer Arno (Mait Malmsten) 
was played with a certain ironic distance, etc. The psychological 
summary of Estonians was in an uncanny displacement with Luts’s 
“good old acquaintances”, empathic identification was also hindered 
by a theatrically overblown manner of acting.
Similarly to Kõiv and Jalakas, Unt introduced the character of the 
author — Oskar Luts (Andrus Vaarik). The author was accompanied 
by his biography (inscribed into the text based on his diaries and other 
documentation), on account of which the fictional time embraced the 
Stalinist period from 1940s to 1950s; the campaign for uncovering 
“formalists” of that time as well as the fate of Luts’s writer colleagues 
was incorporated through textual references. The Author in Unt’s 
stage production was not primarily a commentator, but communicated 
actively with the other stage characters, sometimes from the author’s 
(or rather, from the director’s) position, and sometimes acted as a 
spectator, giving meaning of theatre-within-theatre to the scene.
From the viewpoint of identity formation one of the most 
intriguing supplements by Unt were two characters, acting in couple: 
the Russian Bolotov (Aleksander Eelmaa) and the German Sumpfen- 
tropf (Sulev Teppart). These were explicitly marked characters who 
embodied both the political forces that have determined the fate of 
Estonia (attention should be paid to the similarity of the names to 
those of Molotov and Ribbentrop, who contracted the infamous secret 
protocol) and cultural mentalities that have influenced Estonian 
culture. Their speech was full of cultural cliches; when one called in 
German Lebensraum!, the other replied in Russian Derzhava!, one — 
Angst! Weltschmerz!, the other — Toska! Krassotaa spasayet mir!, 
one advocated Pushkin, the other Goethe, etc. Their thematic function 
was to perform the role of bog bogeys (from Luts's short story Bog; 
their names also have the bog-stem). From an ideological perspective
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they appeared as aliens engraved into the collective subconscious 
(“the bog”) o f Estonians, who are fought but never disposed of. So the 
archetypal Other built into the mental space of a nation was made 
visible by theatrical means.
Unt’s rewriting also thematized the status of Luts’s works as 
classics: with fragments of criticism and the actors' memoirs inserted 
into the dialogue, which caused the “memory” of the text to emerge, 
or by performing some of the most famous phrases with an emphasis 
on demonstrating masterful acting, so that they sounded like quota­
tions.
The reception of the stage production was quite controversial. It 
was well received by the critics, but attracted little audience, quite 
similar to Winter (less than 20 performances, about 3400 spectators), 
while the most popular production of Luts’s work in the 1990s (The 
Backyard) gathered 21,000 spectators.5 The audiences seemed to 
prefer safe and familiar interpretations of classics.
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Kalevipoeg by Andrus Kivirähk
With such a background in mind, the success of young writer Andrus 
Kivirähk’s comedies paraphrasing national myths during the recent 
seasons is somewhat surprising. One of them, Kalevipoeg, was per­
formed as an open-air production (2003, directed by Ain Prosa). 
Kivirähk’s play is a parodic travesty of the Estonian national epic, 
compiled by Friedrich Reinhold Kreutzwald in the middle of the 19th 
century, and regarded as the national creative text, and ideological 
axis o f  the Estonian national spirit (Undusk 1994b: 148), even as a 
sacral text o f  Estonian literary culture (Veidemann 2003: 891). The 
cultural context of the stage production could have supported a 
sanctifying interpretation: 2003, the year in which two hundred years 
had passed since the birth of the creator of the epic, was declared 
Kreutzwald’s Year, and the playing location was a landscape (Neeruti 
Sadulamägi), where, according to a folk legend, lie the furrows 
ploughed by Kalevipoeg. It is noteworthy that the Estonian political 
elite, including the President and the Prime Minister attended the
5 For comparison: the most successful stage production o f the 1955-1965 
period (Toots’s Wedding) gathered 136,000 spectators.
performances of Kalevipoeg. Yet the production counteracted the 
sacral context, operating more like a blasphemous counter-balance to 
an event organized the very same spring on the ancient Vallimägi in 
Rakvere, where approximately 80 volunteers (including the actors and 
actresses of the Theatre of Rakvere) recited the full text of Kalevipoeg  
during a 14 hour time span. The ritual recital, striving for a resuscita­
tion of the epic in the collective memory, was contrasted by the bitter 
parody of the production. Parody, according to Linda Hutcheon, is a 
perfect post-modern genre, for it simultaneously incorporates and 
challenges its object (Hutcheon 1988: 11). The parodic stage pro­
duction actualised the story of Kalevipoeg (extremely rarely per­
formed in the Estonian drama theatre), but decisively redefined its 
characters and the motivation of events. On the stage, Kalevipoeg, the 
mythic king of Estonians, was not a powerful giant but an entirely 
ordinary young man of small height (played by Anti Reinthal), 
distinguished only by a sense of honour and responsibility. With the 
help of additional episodes originating from Kreutzwald’s story 
Kilplased (an adaptation from the German folk book Schildbürger) 
common Estonians were depicted as being a fool-proud nation; the 
spirit of resistance of the nation degenerated into envious cursing and 
contempt for the rulers. The roles of the three men, representative of 
common people, were performed with coarse comic. Some heroic 
deeds of Kalevipoeg that have a rather negative impact, such as the 
killing of the son of a Finnish blacksmith, turned out to be the 
exaggerations of people’s spiteful gossip. Some others, such as the 
defeat of the Devil, were resolved through purely theatrical tricks: the 
gigantic Devil, played by two actors inside the same costume, literally 
broke into pieces, when one of the actors dropped down from the 
other’s shoulders. The prophetic closing lines of the epic (Kalevipoeg 
will return, to bring happiness to his children) were lies invented by 
the corpse-trading Hedgehog. The generative mechanisms of heroic 
tales were revealed, and meaning hence abolished; the production 
demonstrated in a comical manner the constructed nature of the 
national myths and demythologized them by shifting the viewpoint. In 
fact, two different demythologizing operations were executed. On the 
one hand, popular wisdom, expressed in utterances such as live simply 
and quietly and we are little people was mocked, and Estonians were 
cast in a poor light. On the other hand, the mythic Kalevipoeg was 
conveyed in a humane manner, freed from both the heroic aura as well
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as the belittling reputation of a dim-witted barbarian. Kivirähk’s 
Kalevipoeg was a solemn peasant who experienced the tragic 
loneliness of a leader.
The problems of identity and the criticism of Estonian democracy 
in the stage production were pointed out in critical reviews, however a 
meta-theatrical level started to dominate: Kalevipoeg as a self-parody 
of a rag-tag summer theatre. For this purpose, Tuuslar (Andrus Vaa- 
rik) from the epic was turned into an aggressive entertainer who 
constantly tried to instigate both the actors and the spectators to play 
and merrymaking. The theatricality of the staging was emphasized by 
scenography (a small revolving stage amidst nature) and kitsch 
costumes. A small walk to the staging place preceding the 
performance, called a national expedition, during which the spectators 
could participate in folk games, sing folk songs and purchase Estonian 
handicraft products, showcased the rather ambivalent connection of 
nationality with commercial interests. Kalevipoeg was one of the most 
successful summer theatre productions in 2003 — about 12 000 
people watched the 15 performances — and as such it was more a 
social than an art event.
Concluding remarks. Play
The stage productions covered in this article are based on rewritings of 
core texts constructing the national identity. In the transitional society 
of Estonia in the 1990s, in which adaptations with an individualist 
mentality and the conditions of a market economy are taking place, 
the traditional national identity no longer has the power to unite 
people and to offer security. Some theatre practitioners have attempted 
to give new life to national myths with the help of their reproduction 
to big audiences, in order to make them experience national unity. 
Some others, presuming that theatre must reflect today’s unstable 
world and fragmentation of identities, prefer to de- and reconstruct the 
traditional contents of identity.
Identity is constructed through relations with the alien/other. In this 
connection the reinterpretation of the sharp opposition between us vs. 
the strangers in terms of acceptance of the other and the different 
should be considered as being especially important (The Werewolf, 
Tonight...). It also concerns the relations inside the Estonian com­
munity, considered not as a monolithic national body but as including 
inner discrepancies and differences (Winter, etc). National narrative 
includes an imbedded “golden past”, the cultural representations of 
which are also several literary core texts. In theatrical adaptations, 
these are opened up to history and contemporary social reality through 
the support of an intertextual reference networks, demythologizing 
them ( Winter, Tonight..., Kalevipoeg). It is in the power of theatre as a 
visual and activity-based art form to demolish through casting and 
manner of acting the stereotypes of the national character, embodied 
in characters and systems of figures of classical works, and to 
critically expose national psychology. This facet is relevant in Andrus 
Kivirähk’s rather blasphemous texts. It seems that the popularity of 
his plays is on the one hand based on the recognition effect and on the 
other hand on the pleasure of laughing self-ironically at national 
sanctities. (It should be noted that through this they unavoidably 
cultivate the stereotype of a self-ironic Estonian.) So the above- 
mentioned productions undermine the current myths and disclose the 
hang-ups and illusions of a small nation and by doing this encourage 
the self-conscious creation of identity, including national identity. The 
starting-point is the explication of myths forming the basis of identity 
as cultural constructs, in order to indicate that identity is not a self- 
evident and pregiven, but “made” and alterable.
Let us ask what sort of theatrical strategies are used in the stage 
productions described. First of all, the explicit “presence” (“visibi­
lity”) of the theatre situation in these adaptations of the classics is 
noteworthy: they contain clear signals that tell the audience — this is a 
theatrical play (as opposed to the mimetic representation). Therefore, 
rewriting is coupled with meta-theatricality. According to Gerard 
Genette’s Palimpsestes typology, we are dealing with semantic 
transformations that use and/or bring about a diegetic (transposition to 
a different spatio-temporal world) and a pragmatic (modification of 
events) transfer (see Genette 1982: 418). The initial stimulus for 
semantic changes is provided by the transposition into a world whose 
framework is formed by theatre-time and theatre-space that is the 
stage. The world of the production is firstly and openly defined as 
theatre. Diegetic transfer to the stage establishes initial conditions, 
which together with the openly playful nature of the activity motivate 
further transformations. Theatre is not regarded as a neutral medium 
for conveying classical works, but is presented as a specific situation
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of showing and looking. The action defined as play in a ludic space of 
theatre makes it possible to easily deconstruct and reconstruct fictional 
worlds. Klaus Schwind has argued that theatre play is an ambivalent, 
dynamic and genuinely dialogical process in which the spectator is an 
active co-player; it tends to complicate the structures and elements 
used in the play rather than simplify them, but it also makes them 
observable (Schwind 1997: 425). The theatre can play with texts, 
using them as game guidelines and playthings — playthings in the 
sense that due to the play they acquire new meanings, different from 
those that were valid before (Schwind 1997: 434). Playing as an 
explicit basic attitude motivates and permits the fragmentation of texts 
and putting of the elements into new contexts, created during the 
performance. Through play a strong present-day perspective can be 
established, the activity of playing splits cultural myths, opens new 
dimensions therein, and generates new meanings.
Theatre play (with the inscribed position of the spectator as a co­
player) may be seen as a mechanism for modelling cultural reality: 
“ [...] theatre can be understood as an act o f  s e lf  presentation and 
self-reflection on the part o f  the culture in question” (Fischer-Lichte 
1992: 10). The productions under discussion thematize and 
foreground the theatrical act of cultural self-presentation in itself, 
using various staging and acting strategies. The explication of the 
theatre situation builds into the play a complementary reflective level. 
The status of literary core texts as cultural myths or monuments is 
indicated by stage images ( Winter) and/or by bringing in previous 
interpretive models (Tonight..., The Werewolf). Characters of classical 
works as icons of national archetypes are interpreted and acted as 
theatrical roles, displaying the understanding of “the Estonian as a 
role” (see also Kruuspere 2000: 198). The demythologized character 
of the author is also included in the stage production (The Werewolf, 
Winter, Tonight...) as a creator who has forfeited the symbolic power 
over the work.
The play, as has been argued, needs co-players, i.e. spectators, but 
the audiences of the productions under discussion have mostly been 
rather small. In addition, theatre in general is shifting into a more 
peripheral sphere of social life of Estonians in the 1990-2000s. 
According to recent inquiries, 47% of Estonians have not visited 
theatre within a year (compared to 13% some twenty years ago); one 
can speak about a drastic decrease in cultural consumption in its
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entirety in the post-communist Estonia.6 Thus the impact on the 
processes of identity formation of the stage productions, crumbling the 
traditional national narrative by means of theatrical rewriting of the 
classics, cannot be overrated. The questions concerning who or where 
the most influential “architects and constructors” of national identity 
are in the present-day Estonian society, can obviously not to be 
answered within the frame of theatre studies alone.
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О переформулировании национального 
идентитета с помощью игры с классиками
Национальный идентитет в большой мере основывается на общих 
мифах, (вос)производимыми литературными и художественными 
произведениями, которые в течение времени могут сами начать 
функционировать в качестве национальных культурных мифов. В 
постановках классических произведений театр соотносит эти мифы с 
постоянно изменяющимся социальным контекстом и обновляет, 
опровергает или вновь подтверждает их смыслы. Театральные репре­
зентации актуальных для нации нарративов и типов персонажей 
является частью механизма создания идентитета. В 1990-2000 гг. 
национальные ценности и общие мифы, которые в советское время 
сплачивали общество, утратили свою консолидирующую силу. В 
статье рассматриваются постановки эстонского современного театра, 
которые основываются на активном переписывании эстонской клас­
сики (Август Китцберг, Оскар Лутс, национальный эпос Калеви- 
поэг), и пытаются ответить на два вороса: как составляющие нацио­
нального идентитета (например, отношение к Другому) представле­
ны и (де)конструированы при адаптации или переписывании выше­
названной классики; как текстовые стратегии приводят к семанти­
ческим транформациям, вызванным игровым характером театраль­
ного действа.
Rahvusliku identiteedi uuestimääratlemisest 
klassikamängude kaudu
Rahvuslik identiteet on suurel määral rajatud ühistele müütidele, mida 
(taas)kujutavad kirjandus- ja kunstiteosed, mis aja jooksul võivad ise 
hakata funtsioneerima rahvuslike kultuurimüütidena. Kodumaist klassikat 
lavastades suhestab teater neid müüte pidevalt muutuva sotsiaalse kon­
tekstiga ning uuendab, kummutab või taaskinnitab nende tähendusi. Rah­
vuse jaoks oluliste lugude ja tegelastüüpide teatraalsed representatsioonid 
on üks osa identiteediloome mehhanismidest. 1990.-2000. aastate Eestis 
on rahvuslikud väärtused ja ühismüüdid, mis nõukogude ajal ühiskonda
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koos hoidsid, minetanud oma endise konsolideeriva jõu ning kuuluvad 
küsimuse alla seadmisele. Käesolevas artiklis vaadeldakse eesti nüü- 
disteatri lavastusi, mis põhinevad Oskar Lutsu proosa, August Kitzbergi 
tragöödia “Libahunt” ning rahvuseepose “Kalevipoeg” ülekiijutustel: 
“Libahunt” (lav Peeter Jalakas, 1998), Madis Kõivu Lutsu-aineline “Tali” 
(lav Raivo Adlas, 1996) ja Mati Undi “Täna õhta viskame lutsu” (lav 
Mati Unt, 1998), Andrus Kivirähki “Kalevipoeg” (lav Ain Prosa, 2003). 
Kui 1980. aastate eesti teatrile oli tüüpiline rahvuslik paatos ja identiteedi 
kinnitamine, siis järgmiste kümnendite üleminekuühiskonnas, kus toimub 
kohanemine globaliseerumise, multikultuurilisuse ideoloogia jm uute 
mõjuteguritega, on teatri toimimine identiteediloomes muutunud mitme­
plaanilisemaks ja keerukamaks. Tähelepanu väärib oma — võõra konf­
liktse vastanduse ümbertõlgendamine teise ning erineva aktsepteerimise 
vaimus (“Libahunt”, “Täna õhta...”). “Kuldse mineviku” müüt, mida 
mitmed klassikateosed representeerivad, avatakse teatriadaptsioonides 
intertekstuaalse viitevõrgustiku varal nii ajaloole kui ka tänapäeva sot­
siaalsele tegelikkusele, ning seeläbi demütologiseeritakse (“Tali”, “Täna 
õhta...”, “Kalevipoeg”). Teatri kui visuaalse ja tegevusliku kunsti 
võimuses on samuti osajaotuse ja näitlejate mängulaadi toel lammutada 
rahvusliku karakteri stereotüüpe ning kriitiliselt valgustada rahvuslikku 
psühholoogiat. Vaadeldud lavastused eksplitseerivad identiteeti põhis- 
tavaid müüte kui kultuurilisi konstruktsioone ning näitavad, et identiteet 
ei ole etteantud, vaid “tehtud” ja muudetav. Tekstiloome seisukohast 
köidab tähelepanu alustekstide ülekirjutamine ja lavastamine nii, et selgelt 
tuuakse nähtavale teatrisituatsioon; lavategevus kätkeb ilmseid signaale, 
et tegemist on teatrimängu, mitte mimeetilise reproduktsiooniga. Klas­
sikat n-ö mängulises režiimis esitavad lavastused lammutavad kultuuri- 
müüte ja toovad neis esile uusi ulatuvusi.
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Abstract. In the 1990s Estonia underwent a process o f radical socio-political 
changes: a periphery o f the Soviet conglomerate became a country with an 
independent political and economic life. The new situation also brought about 
a revision o f cultural identity, which in the Soviet Union had been grounded 
primarily on the dichotomy between national and Soviet culture. Since these 
oppositions were rendered unimportant with the changed politico-economic 
conditions, a time o f ideological vacuum followed. Estonia as an independent 
state and a cultural island between the East and the West turned its face 
toward Europe, questioning for its new or true identity in the postmodemising 
and globalizing society. In this article three productions o f Estonian theatre as 
examples o f identity construction will be analysed, investigating the rewriting 
of cultural heritage, intercultural relationships and implicit ideologies.
The 1990s were a period of new emerging subgroups and identities, so 
establishing a common national identity was no longer a primary 
concern. Sooner or later, almost all customary social structures and 
collective values and beliefs collapsed, forcing persons — as indivi­
duals and as a members of particular groups —  to question their 
position in the rapidly changing society. The continuously fluctuating 
social and cultural contexts through which identities are constructed 
made the process particularly complicated and infinite. In the post­
modern art practice classical texts and national myths are used mostly 
as material for deconstruction and free play with other cultural 
sources.
The Von Krahl Theatre (the first private theatre in Estonia, 
founded in 1992) with Peeter Jalakas acting as an artistic director, has
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been interested in performing and researching cultural myths about 
Estonians, while at the same time mixing them with modem inter­
national culture. Productions of Jalakas have been grounded on clear 
oppositions: our own — foreign, old —  new, while ‘our own’ is 
usually the old and ‘new’ is mostly foreign. In “The Werewolf’ 
(1998), for example, the characters and story-line of a play by August 
Kitzberg from early 20th century, depicting the social system and 
superstitions in Estonia at the beginning of the 19th century, is bound 
together with persons (characters and actors) from the end of the 20th 
century, while at the same time being conscious of the new techno­
logical world-view. “Estonian Games. Wedding” (1996) exposes the 
wedding traditions of an ethnic group, Setus, and Estonian history in 
the frame of a computer game. The latest production of the Von Krahl 
Theatre, “Estonian Ballads” (2004) uses the techniques of Japanese 
modem dance, Butoh, for visualising the world-view inherited with 
ancient folk songs.
In the present article I am going to concentrate on the above-men­
tioned productions, investigating the rewriting of cultural heritage, 
intercultural relationships and implicit ideologies.
Stuart Hall states:
In common sense language, identification is constructed on the back of re­
cognition o f some common origin or shared characteristics with another 
person or group, or with an ideal, and with the natural closure o f solidarity and 
allegiance established on this foundation. In contrast with the ‘naturalism’ of 
this definition, the discursive approach sees identification as a construct, a 
process never completed —  always ‘in process’. (Hall 2000: 16)
But here an inevitable question arises — to what extent identification 
and identity construction depend upon a person’s free and conscious 
will and to what extent the process depends on ideology, on discursive 
practices. There are eras and domains where one discursive practice 
clearly dominates the other and subjects’ wills — such as the com­
munist ideology of the Soviet regime, for example. Nowadays it is 
widely acknowledged that a person is constituted by a plurality of 
identities, some of them inscribed by social or cultural systems, and 
some of them taken on voluntarily.
Like all signifying practices, it [identification —  A. S.] is subject to the ‘play’ 
of differance. It obeys the logic o f more-than-one. And since as a process it 
operates across difference, it entails discursive work, the binding and marking 
of symbolic boundaries, the production o f ‘ fronti er-effects’. It requires what is 
left outside, its constitutive outsider, to consolidate the process. (Hall 2000: 
17)
Thus we can conclude that not only different identities but also the 
Others against which these identities are constructed should be taken 
into consideration.
Since Estonia has been an oppressed nation for most of the time of 
its notorious history, the identity of Estonians is constituted not so 
much in opposition to neighbours but in opposition to conquerors and 
rulers. The most important landmark of identity has been language, 
however since the Estonian language also indicated a social class up 
until the beginning of the 20th century, change in language often 
accompanied the ascent in social hierarchy. The second constituting 
component of the self-image has been the Estonian culture, of which 
the traditional peasants’ culture was considered to be the most genuine 
and original, and also the most valuable, almost continuously until the 
beginning of the 1990s. An influential Estonian folklorist, Oskar 
Loorits, has treated the traditional culture as a static (using the word in 
a positive sense) element and foreign cultural influences as dynamic 
elements in Estonian culture. He admits in 1938 that these two flows 
lead to different directions but should be united to a common power- 
station that would explore the heritage of the old folk culture for 
enriching modem life even on an international scale, and for 
transforming foreign loans and influences into an original creation 
(Loorits 2000a: 218). A slogan of the Soviet culture was “socialist by 
content, national by form”, and results of this policy were generally 
quite ridiculous and artificial. Thus until the 1990s and even nowa­
days folk music and folk dance, national costumes and anniversaries, 
old beliefs and stories play an important role in the Estonian mind-set 
and way of life.
Analysing gender and queer identity, Judith Butler relies on the 
concept of ‘performativity’, which is relevant also in the context of 
performing the national identity.
In no sense can it be concluded that the part o f gender that is performed is 
therefore the ‘truth’ o f gender; performance as bounded ‘act’ is distinguished 
from performativity insofar as the latter consists in a reiteration o f norms
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which precede, constrain, and exceed the performer and in that sense cannot 
be taken as the fabrication o f the performer’s ‘w ill’ or ‘choice’; further, what 
is ‘performed’ works to conceal, if  not to disavow, what remains opaque, 
unconscious, unperformable. (Butler 1993: 234)
Both individuals and communities need certain public identity 
statements that are often organised as performances or rituals in the 
broad sense of these terms. There is a repertoire of identification per­
formatives (John Austin’s concept — Austin 1975), which are widely 
known and repeatedly practised (verbal statements, dress code, 
attendance of particular events, etc.) and all these performances 
signify a corresponding identity. But performativity is not unalterably 
attached to preceding norms and traditions, quite the contrary, there is 
a certain individuality (conscious or unconscious) and contingency 
concealed in every performance, not to speak of intentional denials of 
norms. For example, in the end of 1980s, demonstrating one’s national 
identity or sympathies became fashionable in Estonia. The use of 
national colours (blue-black-white) and elements of national costumes 
in clothing was one of the most evident ways of performativity that 
still left some room open for improvisation and individual differences. 
Such performances as signifiers of a larger concept can not fully cover 
all the range of meanings connected to the theme of identity, which is 
at least partly opaque or indefinable, but despite of them having a 
reductive nature, performances play an important role in confirmation 
and creation of communities. Thus performativity can be interpreted 
both as a kind of reiteration of the norm and a guarantee of con­
sistency and coherence that is indispensable for a particular identity. 
The ways in which identities and performative strategies signifying 
them might be altered or modified will be analysed below by some 
examples from the repertoire of the Von Krahl Theatre.
“The W erewolf’—  confrontation of mentalities
First and foremost, the Von Krahl Theatre has been a place for cultural 
exchange, a meeting place for liberal creators from different fields of 
art and different countries for interdisciplinary and intercultural co­
operation. We’ll start the examination of the aesthetics of theatre with 
a stage production of “The W erewolf’ (orig. published in 1912) by
August Kitzberg. This text has been a volume of school classics, a 
programme text in identity construction for Estonians during the 20th 
century, explicating its abiding value and changing meanings in 
numerous stage interpretations; deconstructive stagings of this (and 
other) plays have become a part of the programme of the Von Krahl 
Theatre and its leader Peeter Jalakas as well. The latter has staged 
“The Werewolf’ twice: in 1992 the Von Krahl Theatre was 
inaugurated with its production and in 1998 the second version of the 
play was brought on the stage with a new troupe. The first production 
relied on the profanation and (post)modemisation of the tragic village 
life, using rock music, rollerskates, bullfights and other heterogeneous 
elements of popular culture. It was a rewriting of the topic of Estonian 
slavery and servility in an era of political and aesthetic freedom 
(Estonia became an independent state in 1991). The second interpre­
tation was consciously more political and retrospective, according to 
Peeter Jalakas (Adorf 1998). (In the following analysis, I will rely on 
the video taken on the 9th of September, 1999, at the Drama festival 
in Tartu and on my own on the spot experience of the performance 
that took place in the summer 1998.)
The production starts with a video clip that introduces the actors in 
their everyday surroundings, preparing for rehearsals of the play. The 
attentive viewer, who knows that the main character, the werewolf, is 
called Tiina, notices the surprising similarity of the first names of 
actresses: Liina Vahtrik (plays Tiina), Tiina Tauraite, Katariina Lauk- 
Tamm. (In the 1992 production Margus was played by Margus Värav, 
Mari by Mari-Liis Roos and Tiina Kristina Paškeviõius.) In this way, 
the stage director has created a space for investigating the free play of 
differance and difference: Tiina as a generalised subject trapped in the 
opposition with society and her self, actresses re-enacting the 
existential situation as players and as characters. This interpretation is 
supported by a prologue presented by the author, August Kitzberg 
himself, who announces that the reason for gathering all these people 
is a sociological experiment through which the stage director attempts 
to answer the following questions: are the values and truths that were 
valid in ancient times, described in “The W erewolf’, also relevant in 
this particular community of people? (The actors were chosen to be 
representative of the character types in the play.) Is the system that 
worked without failures in a society of that time and which is so 
accurately depicted in “The W erewolf’ also transferable to our
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modem times? Or has something changed so radically that the 
problem is utterly unfamiliar to our society? Kitzberg himself has 
aesthetic interests in the project — what sort of possibilities are there 
for an authentic performance of the text in a time of stylistic pluralities 
of the modem theatre? Kitzberg opines that an authentic staging of his 
play is possible in principle.
August Kitzberg is sitting on a scaffold in the upper right comer 
for most of the duration of the play and tries to direct the game down 
on the stage by reading stage directions of his own play. His godlike 
physical position over the theatrical scene also gives him the role of a 
stage director, the creator of a fictional world. The author is not dead, 
as we might conclude after an acquaintance with Roland Barthes and 
his articles, instead his overt authority over the performance is 
unravelled on the stage on both the physical and the mental level.
There are four different areas on the frontal stage of black-box 
theatre: the central area is a play-ground for the actors; the upper right 
hand comer is a platform for the author, the director of the game; on 
the back of the stage there is a huge video screen, shaped rather like a 
window that extends the stage to different virtual or subconscious 
worlds, and a television on the right side of the stage. The latter has 
various functions and identities: sometimes it functions on the same 
level with the actors, who watch a programme about criminal 
activities (specifically about a wolf killing several animals), some­
times Kitzberg uses it as a tool (appears on the screen) for amplifying 
his comments, sometimes the actors use a video camera and the 
television for creating close-ups of characters’ faces in their 
performance. A feminist reader interprets it as a male gaze following 
the female body that is taught to perform (Adorf 1998).
The fragmented and unsynchronised stage activities explicitly 
depict a sensation of a dispersed, unstable and bizarre world. There is 
also a figure on the video screen that strengthens the feeling — an old 
man coiling up red rope on a snowy landscape that might be 
interpreted as a demarcation of borders (state borders inside and 
between (?) the Soviet Union and Europe, as well as frontiers between 
different mentalities and clear notions, and between fiction and reality 
on the level of production).
Different times and identities (‘real’ and fictional) are also mixed 
on a personal level. The production depicts a postmodern world-view 
with its obligatory identity crises. Whereas identities are quite stable
and coherent on the fictional level, they become fragmented and/or 
fluid on the performative level. Theatre as a certain model of com­
munity especially reflects and illustrates social roles and role playing 
in general. For example, Tiina Tauraite as an actress has to perform 
two fictional roles close to her own nature, Mistress and Grandmother. 
Even though she tries to impersonate different characters, some of her 
lines sound strangely modem and ambivalent, and as such dropping 
between the past and the present discourse. Multiplied identities and 
the (subconscious) heritage of the past as one of the constructive 
factors for this phenomenon is also explicitly questioned in the 
production.
Tiina Tauraite: Who has drawn off the curtains? [It remains unclear whether 
she means stage curtains or window curtains. —  A. S.] The curtains must be in 
front of the window; someone might cast an evil eye.
Erki Laur: Did you say it as yourself, as Mistress or as Grandmother?
Tiina Tauraite: My grandmother spoke like that.
The central character of the play, Tiina, has a double identity; she is a 
human being and a werewolf. In the metatheatrical level she has 
become an object and a symbol of superstition, which is believed in 
and denied at the same time. (The actress performing the role is called 
Tiina by other actors even though her real first name is Liina. Also, 
her acting style allows us to deduce that she is more tightly connected 
with the fictional world than the other performers, or she is checking 
the limits of fictional and real.) Tiina’s identity in the play is built up 
on her Otherness, on clear physical and behavioural differences from 
other characters — she has dark hair and eyes, she is lively and 
cheerful, as opposed to blonde hair, blue eyes, modesty and slowness 
of the others as typical (chosen, wishful) representatives of the 
Estonian nation. In the production this physical confrontation is 
extinguished. The actresses, playing Tiina and Mari, opponents in a 
love affair and in their respective mentalities, who are naturally (of 
course, in the postmodern era of corporal manipulations we should 
prefer here the constmction ‘in public life’) quite blonde, perform 
dark-haired and relatively inward-turned persons, similarly to most of 
the others. The appearance of the whole troupe indicates that nowa­
days blonde hair and blue eyes are rather exceptional characteristics of
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the local people and represent stereotyped and outdated visual repre­
sentations of Estonians.
The otherness in general and this particular case especially (the 
werewolf) is frightening, but also admirable and desirable. The actor 
playing the humpbacked Master (Erki Laur) implores his beloved 
Tiina to make him an animal, a werewolf, so that he too could be free, 
equal with Tiina and able to escape to the forest. He refuses his human 
identity. An Estonian theatre researcher living in New York (multiple- 
identity!), Mardi Valgemäe, has commented upon this problem 
already in 1971:
It seems as if  Kitzberg would want to say that light is actually dark and the 
dark-haired Tiina is the real original Estonian type, whose Dionysian thirst for 
life is not suffocated by Christian piety obtruded to our nation. (On one level, 
the conflict in “The W erew olf’ is presented as a conflict between Christianity 
and superstition.) (Valgemäe 1995: 69-70)
The quotation also illustrates the search for authenticity from the 
preferable primordial times that we discussed earlier.
Dispersal and deferral of fictions, events, spaces, meanings and 
identities comes to the fore with distinctive clarity in the bonfire scene 
on Midsummer Night. Some of the first representations of Estonians 
as a nation in the theatrical discourse have been folk traditions. At the 
turn of the 18th and 19th centuries, when researchers began to divide 
the socio-cultural reality up into different national cultures, they 
became interested in the peculiarities and “spiritual” characteristics of 
nations and national cultures (Sevänen 2004: 57-58). Interest in native 
people also spread among the Baltic German nobility in the beginning 
of the 19th century, resulting in productions in the Tallinn City 
Theatre, depicting local language and customs. The most favoured 
topics were bees, Midsummer Night bonfires and weddings, enabling 
the presentation of ‘authentic’ songs, dances, customs and national 
costumes. Such a practise has been, and still is quite common in 
colonised countries. It should be noted that the Midsummer Night 
bonfire is still the most relevant, alive and widespread national 
tradition in Estonia at the present time.
Different world-views and traditions are explicitly opposed in the 
bonfire scene: one of the actors proposes to organise a primitive pagan 
ritual, another offers a modem urbanised conception, paraphrasing a 
well-known folk song: “Bring us petrol, bring us diesel, bring us
tyres...” But on the stage a rather postmodern or theatrical version is 
carried out, with multicoloured dust brushes as fireworks and jumping 
over the bonfire (= television set showing burning logs), in accordance 
with the old custom of Midsummer Night. Simultaneously with this 
activity, the movie “The W erewolf’ is shown for entertainment on the 
other television. This pseudo-romantic movie, shot by Estonian 
emigrants living in Canada, where Estonian is spoken with a heavy 
accent and supported with English subtitles, evokes the feeling of a 
truly campy style and makes both the actors and the audience roar 
with Homeric laughter. One more layer is added to the heterogeneous 
intertextual discourse of “The W erewolf’ — half-mythological marsh 
creatures, urgveelased, from a short story “The W erewolf’ by August 
Gailit appear behind the window (on the screen). Gailit warns us that 
these scary beings bear the sign of death and their appearance 
forebodes the death of a domestic animal. (Later it is proposed that 
urgveelased are in fact trumps who watch the television from behind 
strangers’ windows.)
The party gains momentum and the stage activity turns into a 
Dionysian celebration: on the video screen, there is a mechanically 
dancing trumpeter, familiar from a well-know vodka label “Viru 
valge”, acting as a sign of intoxication and mental inebriation,1 Tiina 
and Margus are dallying around in front of the TV showing a bonfire 
like wolf cubs bringing out their werewolf potential, etc. In a state of 
released subconscious another implicit connotation of the notion of 
werewolf is opened: the actor playing Kitzberg, who is physically 
present on the stage during the whole performance, is now shown in 
another television. With the monotonous voice of a news announcer 
he tries to dissect the relationship between Estonia and Russia and the 
circumstances of Russians in Estonia, the most problematic topic in 
Estonian foreign policy, and by which an attempt is made to evoke a 
subconscious feeling of guilt among the local populace. Although the 
speech of Kitzberg/news announcer/politician is buried by the tumult 
of the party and it is difficult to follow his train of thought, the 
spectator nevertheless concludes from the political commentary an 
allusive assertion that the fear of werewolves (Others, strangers) has 
today changed into the apprehension and hostility towards Russia and 
Russians, so that “they [Russians? — AS.] must be burnt on the stake
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for the preservation of the blue-eyed [the word also carries a 
connotation of naivete —  AS.] people as long as they exist”. 
Mounting is one of the most well known and widespread methods for 
modifying messages (‘truth’) and manipulating with audiences. This 
television transmission problematises both the form of the 
presentation (how does a neutral commentary about a common living- 
space for different nations turn into a hysterical Nazi manifestation?) 
and content (for example, where does the vague border between 
nationalism and Nazism run? In Estonian these words are even more 
similar: natsionalism-natsism).
In any case, the national myth about the slavery of Estonians, 
lasting for 700 years, is abased in the production through the sublime 
and pathetic incantation of words by the Grandmother, an ideologist 
of Estonian ideals and the only light-haired person in the group. 
Actress Tiina Tauraite (the last name is Lithuanian in origin) recites an 
anthem for conservativity, patience, long suffering and blood, 
following the rhythm and melody of Tchaikovsky’s “Piano Recital No 
1”. Compiling Kitzberg’s sentences, she is stressing that there is not a 
drop of foreign blood in our veins, it is pure and there are generations 
upon generations of light-haired people standing in a line, all of them 
having suffered greatly. The pathos and exorbitance give the 
incantation a clearly ironic meaning.
The influence of television as a mediating and manipulative 
medium comes more clearly to the fore later on in an interview with a 
countryman whose foal was tom by a wolf. Answering an ambiguous 
question, “did the wolf resemble a human being”, the respondent 
discusses a pantheistic world-view in which the two are generally 
quite similar but that a wolf is more beautiful than a man. The reporter 
summarises the conversation as follows: “It is evident from the 
testimony of Mr Kaarel Kivest that the wolf who tore the foal was 
clearly a human being. Everyone can draw this conclusion on their 
own.” The retort seems to suggest a freedom for interpretation but still 
leads the recipient on the path of misunderstanding. There is an 
obvious parallel with a legal procedure concerning a 77 years old 
shepherd Gaston Dominici, described by Roland Barthes in 
“Mythologies” (Barthes 2004: 55-60). Both stories describe a conflict 
between different linguistic discourses, between ways of thinking and 
living.
The topic of a time of transitions and a relativization of values is 
activated several times in this production. Already in the beginning, 
the half-blind Grandmother/Tiina Tauraite uses the words of Kitzberg:
[...] the world is full o f things that are unreachable to the mind and senses. 
You watch and watch but you cannot see anything. The old religion/faith 
made a difference between good and bad: there were evil sorcerers and clever 
people who knew more than others. The new religion/faith makes no 
difference, everything is the same —  the same kind o f witches! But yet some 
good and bad is concealed underground like little veins o f water. Good and 
bad that do not make sense. (Kitzberg 1969: 10)
The play by Kitzberg offers a general existential, situational and 
linguistic pattern (it is non-hierarchical and flexible) which has been 
carried further by cultural institutions and genes. ‘Pattern’ can be 
interpreted as a factor of social and cultural stability and continuity but 
which is also open to certain changes — a pattern can be filled with 
different substances. Certain structural changes are also possible, 
although they are strongly resisted. Yet the deconstruction of a pattern 
confirms and strengthens the vitality of a structure, or at least activates 
it in the memory and consciousness of a community. The charac­
ters/actors of “The Werewolf’ rebel against the traditional ending of 
the play and against the power of the author to direct their lives. Thus 
Mari and Margus go to the attic to confront Kitzberg, similar to 
characters from a Pirandello play (“Six Characters in Search of an 
Author” or “Tonight We Improvise”) and demand changes to be made 
in the conception of characters and that in the end, love would win all 
social obstacles. Mari/Katariina Lauk declares the failure of the social 
experiment of testing the suitability of the system described in the 
play for modern times:
“The Werewolf’ is not written about humans, but about talking dolls. We are 
like signs that are supposed to mean something and may-be once we did mean 
something, but not anymore, since everything is changed. The world is not 
divided into black and white, us and strangers, the Tammaru’s people and 
urgveelased, any more. Everything is much more complicated! When dolls 
revive, everything will change.
Margus protests against the pattern of life and decisions prescribed by 
his ancestors, he marries Tiina out of passion, instead of rational 
calculations and prescribed traditions. He shouts at the Grandmother:
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“I do not care about your race and brush. We draw new borders, me 
and Tiina, with the blood of our love. Rammstein!”
The time of transitions also raised questions about the role and 
structure o f theatre in Estonia. Thus the actors in “The Werewolf’ are 
discussing several issues on a meta-theatrical level: are state subsidies 
for theatre justified, what would happen if one day the system would 
be turned down, what kind of needs theatre would meet, etc. There is a 
plenitude of different opinions but the conclusion is that theatre- 
making is possible without state support and theatre’s most important 
task is to create an emotional contact between people.
We may conclude that “The W erewolf’ is an assiduously typical 
postmodern production, yet these kinds of deconstructive ironical 
metatheatrical games with a national heritage and cultural myths have 
been replayed in every single culture, because only in this way can 
local peculiarities confront global structures.
2
“Estonian Games. Wedding” — engagement of cultures
“Estonian Games. Wedding” (for the first time played in 1996, staged 
by Peeter Jalakas and Priit Raspel) is created on the principles of a 
computer game and with an authentic Setu female choir “Leiko”, six 
actors and a huge computer screen. Setus, an ethnic group living 
mostly in south-east Estonia, as well as on the other side of the 
Estonian-Russian border, have received special attention at home and 
abroad because of their living folk song tradition and by their special 
national costumes that clearly differ (at least those of women) both 
from Estonian and from Russian traditions. Due to several differences 
in behaviour and life-style, the word ‘Setu’ has also obtained pejora­
tive connotation and the ethnic group has been often excluded from 
the original national body.
Estonian folk songs are traditionally divided into two groups: 
authentic Estonian folk songs that are based on “primary rhyme” 
(alliterations and assonances) and parallelism of thought; songs with 
end rhyme were domesticated here through German chorales only in 
the beginning of the 19th century (Loorits 2000b). Until the 1990s, the
2 Linguistic word play: suguvõsa (meaning ‘family’ in Estonian) = sugu (race; 
sex) + võsa (brush) —  A. S.
old stratification of songs has been more valued than the newer ones, 
mostly for their authenticity. Folk songs of Setus are based on 
alliterations and assonances and thus they are considered to be old and
original.
Peeter Jalakas has admitted a constant conflict between two diffe­
rent mediums in theatre: human beings and a video screen. He finds 
that the problem results partly from the collective nature of theatre 
art _  usually one person is responsible for video images, another for 
stage directions and these two persons and two mediums are rarely 
working in unison. Ideally video and stage activity should form an 
integrated whole that mostly depends on the location of the centre of 
gravity in the production. When the moving picture is alone then its 
centre of gravity is situated mostly behind the screen, depth o f space 
opens up to the other side of the screen. In theatre the intensive place 
should be located in front of the screen — the picture must be 
sufficiently sparse for filling the space between spectators and the 
screen with energy (Jalakas 2004: 10-11). Speaking about the core of 
energy on the stage also concerns the centre of the spectators’ 
attention and producers’ intentions in directing it.
In “Estonian Games. Wedding” the computer images are insis­
tently flat ethnographic drawings depicting Estonian living conditions 
through changing times and socio-cultural influences — thus the 
centre of gravity of the production was meant to be situated in front of 
the screen and the source of the energy should be the choir of 7 
women. But most of theatre critics and other spectators stated that 
their centre of attention was attached to the screen since most o f the 
information originated from this space. First, verbal information on 
the screen was written in plain English, contrary to the songs 
performed in Setu language and actors consciously mumbling their 
lines in Estonian, probably for imitating naturally spoken Estonian. 
Second, all of the characters played by the six actors enter the stage 
through the screen, upon which they are introduced humorously or 
self-ironically from a national point of view. Third, television and 
computer game strategies and stylistics were the most familiar for the 
majority of the spectators. Critic Raivo Kelomees declares in his 
article “The screen as the main character”:
In the case in question, the screen can be understood as big mother whose 
apertures are used by actors [the author probably means the characters, for 
actors are only vehicles — A. 5.] for arriving to the real reality (stage
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conventionality). From here we might proceed to psychoanalytically in­
fluenced discussions about ‘sex' o f the screen and about stage director as the 
‘father’ whose phallic indicating cursor is moving on the screen... (Kelomees 
19%)
But the screen can also be considered as condensed national memory 
or knowledge about the historical past that is in part relatively 
independent and fixed (facts and chronology) and partly constantly 
changing, depending on its human or material carriers, demanding 
both retaining and rewriting. A single subject, such as a perceiving 
spectator, can never possess the whole information about the national 
body but when certain details pop up on/out of the screen from this 
discourse he/she as a member of the community knows intuitively its 
meaning and significance.
While the informative computer game tell us a story about the 
Estonian history from 1130 up to the present day, singers perform 
Setu wedding rituals in parallel. Both the narrated history and the 
performed wedding can be considered isomorphic — grand narratives 
formally based on observing and strengthening the tradition but 
concentrating on change and transition by content. But in the 
production the diachronic perspective is expressed only in the screen, 
on the stage time is almost congealed: a bride is constantly waiting for 
her groom, a father wants to match his son, brothers are fighting for 
the girl, a war is going on somewhere and one of the brothers has an 
obligation to go to the war, and for that reason the girl can not get 
married. There are many speculations, derived from a language with 
no future tense (Masing 1993: 53) or from the life-style and folklore 
(Loorits 2000b: 97) that the epic, future-oriented forms are extraneous 
to the Estonian mentality. Thus they concentrate on the present 
moment, on descriptions of static situations and feelings.
Estonians lack the Faustian urge for infinity, the feeling o f constant travel and 
change, they do not fight with time in time like an Indo-German. — Instead, 
he lays the time over himself, the future exists only so far as far it can be done 
in the past. O f course, this also is a certain urge for infinity but in another 
form, instead o f fighting development, a simple step over the limits/borders of 
time, outside o f  motion. (Masing 1993: 53)
At last the marriage act is performed in the production but the date 
onscreen refers to the future, the year 1998 (the performance analysed 
here was recorded on Oct. 31,1997), or perhaps to the positive and
ever-existing potential for success, not situated in the mythical past or 
in the dreamed future.
I would like to mention a detail which in a manner questions the 
topic presented in “The Werewolf’. In “Estonian Games. Wedding” 
the bride represented as a stereotypic figure of an Estonian woman — 
blonde, charming, smiling, silent, a doll-like being, performed by 
Kristina Paškevicius (a Lithuanian surname!). The reception o f the 
production in the festival Theater Der Welt in Berlin, an Estonian 
living in Germany for the 9th year mentions that that the word Estland 
(Estonia in German) denotes something very blonde and Nordic yet at 
the same time also something from the East (Kasterpalu 1999). Thus 
the conventional sign of the bride was probably also supposed to 
stress to the representational/performative nature of the character in 
context of the slightly ironic production, yet at the same time it 
reinforced the stereotype.
In contrast to the bride and the other fictional characters on and in 
front of the screen, the Setu signers have an untheatrical, perhaps even 
a natural, but at the same time quite an inward-turned effect on the 
stage, which is an artificial environment for the singers and not their 
regular performance space. Therefore constant conflicts appeared on 
the stage between the artificial (technology, 2-dimensional ‘space’ on 
the screen, theatre discourse in general, acting as such) and natural 
(non-actors, performing rituals, folk songs in an original rendition), 
new and old, borrowed (technology, theatre as an institution and an art 
form) and own (songs, dances and rituals, even their originality is 
questionable). Many people reacted as follows: “They [the Setu 
singers — A. 51.] symbolise consistency of the national identity, a self- 
confident mental strength that still lasts and continues to do so from 
century to century” (Liivrand 1999). Thus a marginal exotic ethnic 
group and its peculiar culture became a source for national pride, 
admiration and partly even identification, although they represented a 
difference in language, place of residence, lifestyle, worldview, as 
well as age, compared to most of the spectators. All this happened in a 
time when Setus themselves had been striving for cultural inde­
pendence and recognition by Estonians. And this is only one aspect of 
the complicated notions ‘national identity’ or ‘us versus others’ in a 
globalizing and individualising world.
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“Estonian Ballads” (2004), the latest production of the Von Krahl 
Theatre, uses the techniques of Japanese modem dance, Butoh, for 
visualising a world-view inherited with ancient folk songs. This 
became a significant and non-debatable event in the Estonian cultural 
field, but Peeter Jalakas has confirmed the stability of his intentions 
and working methods from the end the 1980s, although the means of 
expression as well as the context of reception have changed (Jalakas 
2004: 10). Jalakas reached a level of artistic maturity and perfection 
already in 2003 when he brought out a post-modern dance production 
“The Swan Lake” in the Von Krahl Theatre together with Sasha 
Pepeljajev, famous Russian choreographer.
“Estonian Ballads” unites several different discourses: music for 
the folkloric ballads was written by the famous ‘nationalist’ composer 
Veljo Tormis already in 1980, the production is staged by an avant- 
garde director Peeter Jalakas, Butoh dancer Aki Suzuki and the well- 
known conductor Tõnu Kaljuste, the troupe consisted of actors, 
dancers and singers. “Estonian Ballads” was performed in a huge bam 
built during the Soviet regime located some 60 kilometres from 
Tallinn. Whereas the aural side (ballads and music) of the production 
stressed the archetypical and national topics, the visual level relied 
almost entirely on Butoh aesthetics: faces and costumes of performers 
covered with clay, slow minimalist movements, naked bodies, dancing 
Aki Suzuki etc. Other dancers were carrying the bodily techniques 
inscribed on them by European/Estonian cultural tradition and training 
methods but at the same time exposed new, learned technique of 
Butoh that seemed artificial and strange at the first glance but 
managed to display some hidden phenomenological qualities of the 
local pre-Enlightenment society and national/tribal values. Since the 
ballads chosen for the production mostly represented a female point of 
view and the main characters were all women, the performances might 
lead also to feminist interpretations, though this possibility was not 
realized in the reception process. (Which is in fact characteristic of all 
three productions analysed here.)
Thus the task and result of the collage of cultures was not some 
sort of a postcultural production (of course, I can not totally deny the 
possibility of this reception strategy) where the origin and original 
meaning of different elements is reduced or forgotten. “Estonian
“Estonian Ballads” — merger of cultures
ballads” might be classified mainly as an intracultural project, 
proceeding from Pavis’ definition, according to which intracultural 
“refers to the search for national traditions, often forgotten, corrupted 
or repressed, in order to reassess the sources of a style of performance, 
to situate it better in relation to external influences and to understand 
more deeply the origins and the transformation of its own culture” 
(Pavis 1996: 5-6). Both “The Werewolf’ (the version staged in 1998) 
as well as “Estonian Games. Wedding” can be gathered under this 
notion because deconstructive strategies were used not for demolition 
but for revisiting the national cultural heritage.
The conclusion of the analysis of the aesthetics of the Von Krahl 
Theatre and of staging the Estonian national identity might be asserted 
in a manner similar to William Butler Yeats almost a century ago — 
our world is caught between the two eternities of blood and soul, 
blood: reflecting the tribal past, and soul: anticipating the cosmo­
politan future (Segers 2004: 80). But some complicated questions 
remain in the air: will Estonians manage to remember and value their 
tribal past (as well as other sources for creating cultural differences), 
and will they succeed in the preservation of their national body 
geographically and genetically or will they become a mere display in 
an ethnographic ghetto/museum.
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Театр фон Краля переигрывает эстонское культурное наследие
В 1990-е гг., в связи с изменением социально-политической ситуа­
ции в Эстонии, произошли сдвиги и в местном национальном иден- 
титете. Если в Советском Союзе эстонский культурный идентитет 
строился в основном на противопоставлении советского и на­
ционального, то в новых условиях эстонцы ощущали свое проме­
жуточное состояние между Востоком и Западом, им вновь нужно 
было определиться как в смысле национального, так и государс­
твенного идентитета в постмодернистском и глобализирующемся 
мире. В этот период уменьшилась роль национального идентитета в 
самоопределении эстонцев, важнее стали новые возникающие 
субгруппы. В художественной практике наступило время нацио­
нальных мифов и деконструирования классики. Театр фон Краля 
(первый частный эстонский театр, основанный в 1992 г.) и его 
художественный руководитель Пеэтер Ялакас в нескольких своих
постановках расследовали культурные мифы эстонцев, противо­
поставляя свое-чужое и старое-новое. В статье анализируются три 
постановки Ялакаса: “Оборотень” (1998), “Эстонские игры. Свадьба” 
(1996) и “Эстонские баллады” (2004), в которых (во всех трех) 
интерпретируются основы национальной культуры.
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Von Krahli teater eesti kultuuripärandit ümber mängimas
1990. aastatel seoses Eesti sotsiaalpoliitilise situatsiooni muutumisega 
leidsid aset nihked ka siinses kultuurilises identiteedis. Kui Nõukogude 
Liidus oli eestlaste kultuuriline identiteet üles ehitatud peamiselt sovjet­
liku ja rahvusliku vastandusele, siis uutes tingimustes tajuti oma vahe­
pealsust Ida ja Lääne vahel ning tuli taas küsida oma rahvusliku, aga ka 
riikliku identiteedi järele (post)modemiseeruvas ning globaliseeruvas 
maailmas. Sel perioodil vähenes rahvusliku identiteedi osatähtsus eest­
laste enesemääratlemisel ning olulisemaks muutusid uued tekkivad sub- 
grupid. Kunstipraktikas saabus rahvuslike müütide ja klassika de- 
konstrueerimise aeg. Von Krahli Teater (esimene Eesti erateater, asutatud 
1992) ja selle kunstiline juht Peeter Jalakas on mitmetes oma lavastustes 
uurinud eestlaste kultuurilisi müüte, vastandades oma ja võõrast ning  
vana ja uut. Artiklis analüüsitakse semiootiliselt kolme Jalaka lavastust: 
“Libahunt” (1998), “Eesti mängud. Pulm” (1996) ning “Eesti ballaadid” 
(2004), mis kõik tegelevad rahvusliku kultuuri aluste interpreteerimisega.
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Staging national identities in contemporary 
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Abstract. This paper focuses on the ways in which national identities are 
staged in recent film and theatre productions in Estonia. We want to 
complement the prevalent approaches to nationality (Anderson 1983; Gellner 
1983; Bhabha 1990), where the role o f theatre and film as modellers o f  
national identity are undervalued. National identity is a complex term that 
presupposes some clarification, which we gave by describing its dynamics 
today; its relation to ethnic identity, a thread between the lived and declared 
national identities, and the relevance o f culture-based national identity. Herein 
we consider the concept o f staging to have two implications: (1) as an 
aesthetic term it incorporates an artistic process, comprising several devices 
and levels; (2) as a concept in cultural theory it describes cultural processes in 
which something is set on stage for public reflection. Accordingly, in our 
analysis we considered national identities in theatre and film stagings in both 
senses. The results o f our analyses demonstrated that our hypothesis about 
emerging new national identities in Estonia was valid, though deconstructed 
and hybrid national identities are not exactly and absolutely new types o f  
identities but rather strategies o f creating space for new identities to develop. 
A deconstructed national identity refers to the state o f  high self-reflexivity in 
which the existing elements o f national identity are re-examined, re- 
contextualised and re-evaluated. Further, a hybrid national identity 
demonstrates the diversity and coexistence o f the components o f national 
identity. Both strategies o f staging are characteristic o f the transformation o f  
national identities, confirming that a single homogenous staging o f national 
identity seems to be replaced by bringing multiple new self-models on stage.
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Artists help to create and reproduce the very 
fabric o f national communities 
to which they belong, and thereby disseminate
and perpetuate 
the idea o f the nation itself its history, 
development and destiny.
Anthony D. Smith (2000: 57)
Scripts and roles, stage management, directing, improvisation 
and reflexivity— all frinction as parameters o f national identity
Tim Edensor (2002: 69)
In social sciences and humanities today, ‘identity’ is a complex term, 
evoking numerous definitions and interpretations. Literally signifying 
sameness in qualities or conditions between different entities, its 
diverse contemporary uses make it impossible to find a single satis­
fying formulation for the concept. In this sort of a situation ‘identity’ 
is described through various characteristics, such as constructedness, 
dynamics, processuality, multiplicity, fragmentation, etc. This con­
temporary comprehension of the fluidity of identity, however, does 
not mean that all coherence is lost, instead it underlines the fact that 
the latter is continually reproduced.
By focusing on the concept of 'national identity', we support the 
idea that national cultures and identities are not disappearing from the 
globalizing postmodern world, but instead resist the process of self- 
destructive fragmentation. In post-soviet countries, including Estonia, 
the rise of nationality and the need to redefine national identity seems 
to be a sign of the cultural logic of post-socialism (Annus 2000a: 769— 
780; Binder et al. 2001: 7-9). National identity apparently does not 
vanish in the European Union nor in other international political and 
economic associations. Instead, the subject of the national undergoes 
changes and needs to be redefined in complex systems of contempo­
rary socio-cultural relationships, where identities are processes that 
“weave together” multiple elements such as “fragments of discourses 
and images, spaces and times, things and people” (Edensor 2002: 29- 
30). Finally, it is inadequate to talk about a single national identity 
today, but of plural national identities; and, of course, national identity 
in its own turn should be considered within the pattern of other 
cultural and personal identities of the (post)modem human being.
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1. National identities in change
Although recent discussions about the changing nature and approaches 
to national identity have concerned themselves with aspects of popular 
culture, such as tourism or sports, as well as with less visible forms of 
“banal” or “popular” nationalism (Edensor 2002; Pretes 2003; Porter, 
Smith 2004; Billig 1995), we prefer to stay within the more traditional 
genres of “high” culture, such as theatre and film. First, because we 
think that distinguished works on cultural nationalism (Anderson 
1983; Gellner 1983; Bhabha 1990) have underestimated the role of 
theatre and film in the processes by which the various forms of 
cultural expression have been instrumental in helping to construct 
notions of national identity. In addition, theatre and film as 
(re)creators of national identity in Estonia have not heretofore been 
sufficiently studied. Second, theatre and film do not function only as 
high-culture institutions subsidised and thereby controlled by the state, 
but because of their communal creation and reception they also serve 
as public and popular forums for reflecting, discussing and inter­
preting national identities. One could say that theatre as well as film 
facilitate the revelation and exhibition of latent practices and lived 
identities.
Several criteria can be advanced that distinguish one nation from 
another (e.g. membership of an ethnic group, shared language, shared 
culture, shared values, etc.). National identity refers both to these 
defining criteria as well as to the sense of belonging to a particular 
group. When distinguishing national from ethnic identities , one of 
their most conspicuous discrepancies is the heterogeneous nature of 
ethnic culture, whereas national cultures attempt to bring different 
ethnic traditions under the denominator of one nation2. Indeed, it is 
vitally important for every nation to develop a sense of integrity and to 
recognize and acknowledge the boundaries that differentiate it from 
other national cultures. Ethnic and/or national symbols provide good 
evidence in the process of dissociating “us” from “them” (Edensor 
2002: 8) and here both film and theatre have “offered a particularly 
effective means of conveying notions what is national and what is
1 For the attributes that distinguish ethnic and national identity, see Smith 1991: 
14,21.
On the other hand, national cultures today are themselves part o f a multi­
farious world that contrasts with the global tendencies o f homogenization.
alien” by considering their “rhetorical and semiotic features” (Wilmer 
2002: 1). In the spatial dimension, identity manifests itself in the 
tension between the poles of the opposition in-out and its variants 
(me-the other, we-the others), revealing the inherently dialogic nature 
of identity. In the temporal dimension, identity is about a subject 
being able to change and remain the same simultaneously (cf. Lotman 
1992: 7-8), making the existence of conflicting representations of 
national identity possible. Thus one can say that in addition to 
retaining its sameness (traditional core), the capacity to change makes 
national identity dynamic and thereby viable in the contemporary 
cultural environment.
Due to its homogenous nature the formation of national culture is 
mostly based on normative self-models that fit the mental image of 
national culture in which various phenomena that unfold in the actual 
cultural process of a community are excluded. Such a unified declared 
collective identity explicit in self-models of the nation often conflicts 
with the implicit, lived identities experienced and perceived in the 
actuality of the cultural everyday life (Edensor 2002; Friedman 1994; 
Lotman 1990: 128-129; Kotov 2005: 185-188). Therefore a certain 
tension between the declared and lived identity inevitably remains, “as 
lived identity is always project, not settled accomplishment” (Calhoun 
1998: 27), but in order to sustain and communicate national identity 
some stable and typical elements in it are inevitable. In Estonia, the 
conflict between declared and lived identities arises mainly from a 
tradition that rejects ethnically foreign (primarily German and 
Russian) and socially unaccepted “others” (e.g. numerous socially 
challenged rural inhabitants) from the image of national identity and 
only recently has began to include them. At the same time, lived 
identities in Estonia have developed within a manifold of alien 
influences and at this point both the recent disposition towards the 
deconstruction of traditional self-models and the acceptance of 
hybridity as an inherent constituent of Estonian national identity are 
examples of renewed self-models.
It is important to stress here that similarly to many other small 
nations, Estonian national identity has been primarily culture-based, 
mostly concerned with engaging in our ethnic heritage (language; 
values, symbols, myths, narratives; music, folklore, literature; 
clothing; festivities, etc.) and the creation of new efforts in various 
cultural practices. Cultural nationalism differs from political
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nationalism — whereas the latter has its roots in the modem legal- 
rational society, the former is first and foremost
a movement o f moral regeneration which seeks to reunite the different aspects 
o f the nation —  traditional and modem, agricultural and industry, science and 
religion —  by returning to the creative life-principle o f  the nation. Its propo­
nents are not politicians or legislators, but are above all historical scholars and 
artists who form cultural and academic societies, designed to recover this 
creative force in all its dimensions with versimilitude and project it to the 
members o f the nation. (Hutchinson 1987: 14 —  cited in Mäkinen et al. 2001: 
57-58)
For this reason the key role played by intellectuals (writers, historians, 
artists, scholars) is often stressed in building national cultures. 
Creators of national theatre and film productions are part of the group 
of nation-designers, being members of the very same national com­
munity, embodying the same identities, and offering manifestations of 
these identities in their works, although often unintentionally. Direc­
tors may stage particular versions of national identities, suggesting 
opportunities for identification, but it is the audience who decides 
whether these models will function as accepted self-models or not. 
Although the conceptual language of self-models of a nation is usually 
formed by the elite, national cultural hegemony is not simply an 
asymmetric process, enforced by cultural leaders to whom the masses 
are subjected, instead “it must be achieved, must offer plausible points 
of identification” (Edensor 2002: 8).
We have chosen the insider’s viewpoint for analysing some of the 
new self-models and self-representations of Estonians in contempo­
rary theatre and film productions. Our paper focuses on the ways in 
which national identities are staged in contemporary film and theatre 
productions, by observing the effects that appear when the established 
canon encounters artistic interpretation; furthermore, we examine how 
the emergence of new national identities might be associated with the 
changing self-models among present-day Estonians.
430 Ester Võsu, Alo Joosepson
The term staging is a relatively uncommon noun in English, and in 
theatrical discourse the term production is usually used instead. 
However, the latter has connotations that hinder its use as an analytic 
metaphor, therefore we find staging to be more appropriate for 
discussing the development of national identities. For instance, the 
German and French equivalents, Inszenierung and mise-en-scene, both 
originating form theatre practice, are today used as critical analogies 
for describing and analyzing various cultural phenomena (Willems, 
Jurga 1998; Müller-Doohm, Neumann-Braun 1995; Pavis 1992). In 
fact, differences between the three terms are unsubstantial, as they all 
refer to (a) putting a play on a stage (by a director) as well as (b) 
producing or organizing something for a public viewing. Below, we 
will concentrate both on aesthetic as well as culture-theoretic 
meanings of the concept.
2.1. Staging as a cultural concept
If we consider culture as staging, two implications of the concept for 
contemporary theoretical discourses may be distinguished. One domi­
nant viewpoint associates staging of culture with everything that is 
unauthentic, insincere, simulated and false. The other approach, in 
similar manner, sees staging mainly as the activity of certain 
ideologically-motivated figures in politics, media etc., with the pur­
pose of manipulating people to think and act in certain ways3. A third 
alternative, suggested by Erika Fischer-Lichte (2004: 17-18) con­
ceives staging primarily as a general “descriptive concept” in cultural 
theory that does not necessarily contain value judgments. This latter 
sense, in conjunction with a semiotic perspective, sees staging as 
incorporating three actions — setting something/somebody on a stage, 
performing something/somebody on a stage, and perceiving some­
thing set on stage as a signifying model (see Eco 1990: 104-105).
2. Staging national identity
3 From this aspect, the idea o f staging the nation involves staging it for 
outsiders (e.g. tourists) or observing it from an external point o f view (i.e. staging 
“the other” for “us”); presenting the nation in international events or in the media, 
and the manipulation o f the people by local authorities or elites.
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Therefore, the study of stagings and performances4 of a culture refers 
to a “a critical way of grasping how persons choose to present 
themselves, how they construct their identity, and ultimately how they 
embody, reflect, and construct their culture”. (Fine, Speer 1992: 10 -  
cited in Ruby 2000: 245)
Thus, we cannot consider staging as a simple and purely asym­
metrical and unidirectional ideological form of communication, where 
actors as well as spectators are manipulated by an omnipotent director. 
Culture is a collective staging, formed by the cooperation of various 
intentions; to a certain extent, everyone participates in the staging of a 
culture, in the processes of rehearsal, performance or in the reception.
2.2. Staging as an aesthetic concept
Although theatre is a live and film a technologically mediated art 
form, and their modes of representation differ in many respects, we 
consider staging to be the uniting concept that refers to the strategies 
and aspects that are similar in both arts. Film and theatre actually 
share various common sign systems, such as acting, costumes, props, 
design, make-up, music, dialogue, etc. Martin Esslin (1987: 23-38) 
defines fictionality, acting, spectatorship, and synthesis of various arts 
as characteristics that are inherent in all dramatic media. Both theatre 
and film derive from “the mimesis of human interaction through its 
embodiment by human beings assuming the identities of (fictional or 
real) human beings and presenting this interaction to an audience as
The concepts performance and staging often intermingle in critical discourse, 
although the former is usually preferred. However, a distinction between them is 
necessary in the present context, as they stress different aspects o f a cultural 
process: staging indicates the imaginary and performance points to the material, 
manifested dimension. Staging is not a direct perceivable empirical object, but 
above all “an object o f knowledge, a network o f associations or relationships 
uniting the different stage materials into signifying systems, created both by 
production (the actors, the director, the stage in general) and reception (the 
spectators). [ ...]  Mise-en-scene as structural system exists only when received and 
reconstructed by a spectator from the production. [ . . .]  The aim is not one o f  
reconstructing the intentions o f the director, but o f understanding, as a spectator, 
the system elaborated by those responsible for the production” (Pavis 1992: 25). 
The study o f cultural performances is inevitably related with the analysis o f  
staging -  the principles that frame and model the former both in the processes o f  
rehearsal, enactment and reception.
though it was happening at that very moment before their own eyes” 
(Esslin 1987: 23-38). Although the devices may differ, the creation 
and exchange, representation, and evaluation of identities are always 
present in theatre and film. In the following pages we will discuss six 
primary meaning-generating choices of staging that we will proceed 
from later on, in the analysis of four specific stagings in theatrical and 
film productions.
Staging evolves from two parallel sources: the individual author’s/ 
authors’ creation and from a particular cultural context. Often a 
written play or some other literary text is the starting point from which 
every director proceeds to make his or her concretisations. The very 
choice of text itself is the first step in the staging process — whether it 
is an international or national classic, a contemporary unfamiliar 
foreign author, a local infamous celebrity, etc. Choosing the text, or in 
a broader sense, material for the scenario, is therefore not a neutral but 
an evaluative decision. Reception today is not viewed as an isolated 
act. The intertextual world of other cultural texts and previous 
interpretations of the same text form an intermedial textual network 
which begins to influence the processes of ongoing and upcoming 
stagings. Furthermore,
the same texts appear, more or less lightly adapted, in all the dramatic media: 
many leading actors tend to be prominent in all o f  them; many of the best 
directors and designers work in theatre, film and television and can switch 
from one to the other without undue difficulty. (Esslin 1987: 34-35)-5
Other important aspects that determine the choice of signs and codes 
and refer to the intentions of the creators with respect to future 
reception are the choice of a viewpoint (from “outside” or “inside”, 
for “us” or for “the others”) and the genre (comedy, drama, etc.) of a 
production. Dominant sign systems and the relations between them are 
in the heart of a staging as a fictional world; the staging space and the 
actors being of utmost importance here.
The actor forms the core of performing arts and is a major element 
for the spectator to identify with in the theatrical/film production. 
Casting as the process of choosing the actors to perform the roles 
therefore involves fundamental questions such as — who will play the
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5 This is especially true o f  the conditions o f  cultural production in Estonia, 
where human resources are rather limited.
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main roles and why, how will they play these roles (acting style, 
appearance, bodily movements, etc.), what is the relationship between 
the actor’s identity and the character he or she embodies?
In the contemporary sense, stage is not just mere setting and 
decorations, but instead all spatial circumstances and characteristics 
that influence and shape the movements of the actors, as well as the 
relationships between the fictional characters and events. Performance 
places are rarely as neutral as an empty stage or a black-box would be; 
they are always already saturated with meanings and memories. The 
objects displayed in stage space often acquire a symbolic and an 
indexical meaning besides the iconic one.
Finally, from each staging a general conception, style, idea(s) and 
theme(s) hatch that in turn make it possible to return the aesthetic 
staging back to a wider cultural context and thereby the understanding 
of certain aspects of culture (e.g. national identity) may be cast in a 
new light.6
2.3. Staging national identity
The concept of staging is equally useful for focusing on a particular 
aspect of culture, such as national culture. To a certain extent, national 
identity is always a staging, although its concepts and representations 
might differ inside and outside national culture. National identity as a 
staging evolves from different choices of cultural signs (from 
national/ethnic heritage as well as from contemporary culture; what 
symbols, values, ideas become significant; who are the main 
characters/heroes; what is the setting for a particular staging, etc.) and 
their combinations, as well as from their “ostension” (Eco 1990: 103), 
the way they are put on public display and meant to stand for an entire 
class of objects. Staging of a nation is first and foremost
[...] the analysis o f symbolic communication that plays a central role in the 
apprehension o f the collective concept o f national identity. [ ...]  Hence the 
central question is: how the semantics o f the national becomes translated and 
reset in concrete cultural representation and mobilization strategies. Nations
This process o f interaction between an artistic model and the world —  reality 
as reinterpreted in light o f artwork —  is described in more detail by Juri Lotman 
(1967).
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are “set on stage” and thereby into the space o f experiencing the community
as “us” [...] . (Binder et al. 2001: 10)7
Although in the above quote the staging of national identity is under­
lined as an important strategy for a community to achieve public 
agreement about who they are, we accordingly want to emphasize the 
dialogic nature of the process of self-staging (Selbstinszenierung). 
Whereas the processes and strategies of self-staging are better 
explicated in theories of social identity of individuals and minority 
groups (e.g., subcultures) associated with the public presentation of 
self, social roles and lifestyles (see Früchtl, Zimmermann 2001: 10- 
18), we consider it appropriate to pay attention to self-staging in the 
context of national identity. As indicated above, national identity 
concerns both certain characteristics and a sense of belonging to a 
certain group. Proceeding from the Canadian sociologist Erving 
Goffman (1959) and Russian sociologist Leonid Ionin (1996), the 
phases of staging in culture are described as particularly characteristic 
of societies in transformation (such as Estonia and other post-Soviet 
countries), where the need to stage new identities is urgent. The 
process of self-staging can accordingly be divided into two phases: (1) 
rehearsing the new identity (Goffman’s “backstage”), and (2) 
acquiring and fixing the new identity by performing it (Goffman’s 
“frontstage”). In the second phase the reception of the new identity is 
equally important — the conceptual base and the ways by which a 
group will be “known by certain others” (cf. Cohen 1993: 195) is 
formed here. In conclusion, both staging the self in the auto­
communication of a national culture as well as the process of dialogic 
communication with other cultures are needed to establish a developed 
model of national identity.
Since national identities are always created collectively, it is 
difficult to pinpoint their precise “director”. Cultural stagings are em­
bodied practices where the borders between the collectively es­
tablished “scripts” and individual realizations are not always evident.
7 “Bewust sprechen wir von der “Inszenierung” des Nationalen und weisen 
damit der Analyse symbolisher Vermittlungsformen eine zentrale Rolle für das 
Verständnis nationaler kollektiver Identitätskonzepte zu. [ ...]  Eine zentrale Frage 
war daher, wie die Semantiken des Nationalen in konkrete kulturelle Representa­
tions- und Mobilisierungsstrategien übersetzt bzw. umgesetzt warden. Nationales 
wird “in Szene Gesetzt” und dadurch zum Raum für die Erfahrung von Wir- 
Gemeinschaften [ . . . ]” (Binder et al. 2001: 10).
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We want to lend our support to the approach that takes agency into 
active consideration and sees staging of a nation not as something 
external to the people, but as something that unfolds between the 
interaction of the people (Edensor 2002; Thompson 2001). Unlike in 
theatre, where explicit individual authorship is valued, the strength of 
staging a national identity lies in its collectivity and heterogeneity — 
the more coherent the staging of a national identity and the more 
recognizable the position of the director(s), the more ideologically 
manipulated and asymmetric is the communication of identity.
At this point we would like to remind the importance of diffe­
rentiating between the political, state-based national identity and 
cultural identity; we would also like to add the consumable national 
identity to the list. In the contemporary world, staging a nation is more 
and more often associated with the aim of branding a nation in the 
global market (especially for touristic purposes), where often an ideal 
national identity is staged, involving elements such as “generic land­
scapes and attractions, and promoting particular sites and events” 
(Edensor 2002: 85). Consumable national identities are often staged in 
theatre as well as in film productions that are targeted at international 
audiences. Frequently, the official identity of a nation staged by 
governmental or business authorities conflicts with the usually much 
more heterogeneous8 popular stagings and representations of a nation. 
Some of the significant features of national identity may nevertheless 
coincide (e.g. in Estonia, the national flag, the national anthem, sym­
bolic landscapes). Accordingly, staging self for the others inevitably 
needs an auto-communicative phase, where various self-models are 
considered, analyzed and rehearsed.
8 Although the project Brand Estonia, realized between 2001-2002 and co­
ordinated by Enterprise Estonia, wished to distance itself from presenting a new 
national identity, it still provoked a controversy in Estonia, since it was managed 
in an asymmetrical way and still touched several aspects o f pre-existing national 
identities. The essential conflict o f the project consisted o f an ambition to create 
visual and textual representations that would simultaneously describe what 
Estonians are fo r  themselves as well as how they are seen by the others. (See 
http://www.eas.ee/?id=12 .) See also footnote 25.
The problem of representing national identity in theatre and film 
brings together both the aesthetic and cultural aspect of the concept of
staging.
National identities are not just mental constructs, their formations 
and reproductions are still grounded in spatially and temporally rooted 
“material, performative and representational dimensions of everyday 
life” (Edensor 2002: 20). In other words, stagings operate through 
concrete and perceptible manifestations that should create precon­
ditions for a common understanding of valid representations of 
national identity. (Although they may be differently accepted and 
interpreted among different groups in the same national community.)
Theatre and film productions can be considered as concrete self­
representations of national culture. Theatre and film reflect the reality 
of the culture in which it originates in a sense that it “depicts that 
reality and presents it in such a depiction” (Fischer-Lichte 1992: 10). 
Traditionally, theatre and film directors have actively participated in 
this “project of popular national representation and renewal”. They 
have staged the “ideal of the nation and its historical myths, memories 
and symbols” mostly in a realistic mode of expression, executing it in 
“palpable, dynamic forms which are easily accessible to the mass of 
the ‘national’ membership” (Smith 2000: 48). The innovative poten­
tial of theatre and film in staging a nation must be especially stressed 
in the contemporary cultural situation. Today, national identities as 
cultural identities are not predominantly determined by the past, 
although their historical dimension is undeniable; they are undergoing 
a constant transformation. Present identities are “the different names 
we give to the different ways we are positioned by and position 
ourselves within, the narratives of the past” (Hall 1994: 394). The 
coexistence of different aesthetics and theatrical/film styles initiates 
and brings out new alternative strategies o f positioning national 
identities, some of which may be ironic, grotesque, and parodic. The 
fondness by which such critical positions are adopted stands witness 
to the strong conventional core of national identity —  the persistence 
of its mythical and archetypical elements that form the basis from 
which new identities and representations emerge.
Estonians have traditionally employed art culture for the purposes 
of creating coherence within an imagined community as well as for
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2.4. Staging national identity in Estonian theatre and film
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claiming political independence and for creating a feeling of resistance 
against alien occupying cultures. Drama was a powerful tool for 
awakening the people of the post-romantic period to a common 
heritage, and to oppose external political and cultural influences 
(Carlson 1994: 152). By first modelling themselves after Germans and 
later creating their own original plays and theatre societies, the 
Estonian cultural elite “awakened the nation” in the second half o f the 
19th century.9 During the Soviet occupation, a period o f national 
crisis, theatre in particular functioned as “a political and ideological 
tool to help reconfigure the nation” (Wilmer 2002: 3); theatre could 
often fulfil the function of resistance better than film, because its 
“liveness” made it more difficult to be controlled by Soviet censorship 
and made it a substitute for the missing free broadcast media. Using a 
different medium, national film likewise functions as the creator of 
stagings of national identity through choosing
identifiable national narratives and myths, tradition o f  particular genres; 
conventions o f acting and characterization (bodily and paralinguistic codes), 
signs and values carried by national stars, and finally, the audience for whom 
the film is meant (home, international). (Gledhill 2001 —  cited in Edensor 
2002: 143-144)
During the Soviet period, several admired comedies in Estonian film 
turned a number of local star-actors into “national heroes” (who were 
later identified with the roles they played) and excerpts from their 
dialogues became popular catch-phrases that still function to create a 
feel of community among Estonians. From the end of 1980s and 
1990s, Estonian film has served as an important enlivener and 
reappraiser of national history, staging themes that could not be dealt 
with during the Soviet period. Today, art culture has lost its earlier 
function of resistance, although theatre and film still offer “symbolic 
stages where national identity can be dramatized, broadcasted, shared 
and reproduced” (Edensor 2002: 69).
Staging national culture in Estonian theatre and film is connected 
with the question about the relationship between political and cultural 
national identities. First, theatre in particular, but film as well,
v The popularity o f amateur theatre and theatre going today still testifies to the 
importance o f this medium among Estonians.
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function as national cultural institutions that present certain views of a 
nation, influencing
the emergence o f certain types o f texts by legitimizing them and giving them a 
point o f insertion in society. These institutions constitute the main part of the 
dominant system and ideology, and as such play a central role in the 
distribution and consumption o f cultural texts, (de Toro 1988: 44)
In this sense, theatre as well as film have played an important role in 
Estonia as institutions of national culture. Second, as an effect of 
governmental subsidies, a tension between the official and hegemonic, 
and the alternative artistic interpretations of national identities seems 
to emerge. In practice, neither theatres nor films that get financial 
support are expected to make considerable profit themselves; national 
cultural institutions cannot be strictly market oriented. It should be 
clarified, however, that in contemporary Estonia, the state of film is 
markedly different from the theatre system, and this definitely 
influences the position of film as a medium for representing national 
identities. Theatres in Estonia have been subsidised by the state from 
the 1920s onward (although they were turned into national institutions 
only after World War II) and as an institution theatre is still con­
sidered a crucial component of national culture. A poll analysing the 
consumption of culture by Estonians conducted in 2003 indicated that 
53% of the inhabitants visit theatre at least once a year; the number is 
rather noteworthy, considering that the Estonian population is a mere 
1.5 million.10 Although Estonian film also received state support 
during the first decade of independence, it soon lost it and remained in 
an unstable situation until becoming part of the heavily censored 
Soviet system of film production and distribution. This state- 
controlled and financed system of studios and network of cinemas 
crumbled after the collapse of this political system. During the 1990s, 
Estonia as a developing state lacked resources to finance the local film 
industry, and consequently domestic film-making went to a decline. 
The Estonian Film Foundation, established by the government in 
1997, is intended to create favourable conditions for the development 
of national film by financing the creation, production and distribution 
of professional national film. Nevertheless, the funds available are too 
limited for the creation of a sufficient number o f films and thereby
10 See http://www.kul.ee/index.php?path=0x917&sona=kultuuri tarbimise.
ensuring artistic development and diversity (e.g. between 2002 and 
2003, the budget was 34,34 million EEK per year11). The fact that 
films from 1960s and 1970s still form a significant component of 
national identity and that Estonians prefer comedy12 both on stage and 
on screen indicates that staging of national themes should take this 
genre earnestly into consideration.
In conclusion, it is not so much the Estonian state that controls 
what is staged and how; rather, the genres, themes, styles, con­
ceptions, devices, etc. are influenced by the rules of a liberal market 
economy and consumer preferences of contemporary theatre and 
filmgoers in Estonia. All in all, the directors still have possibilities to 
stage alternative, ironic, critical, parodic, etc. interpretations o f natio­
nal themes and characters. For the object of our analysis, we chose 
new stagings of national identity that deviate from the traditional — 
four theatre productions and films from 2002-2003 whose identity 
strategies can be considered as deconstructed and hybrid. Only the 
first one of them “Estonian funeral” deals explicitly with Estonian 
national identity. In the other 3 stagings the question of national 
identity is implicit and its crucial role in the formation of the con­
ceptual system of the staging has to be explicated through analysis.
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3. Deconstructed national identity
To be able to deconstruct, one first has to realize that something is 
constructed. To specify which of the multiple meanings of the concept 
'‘deconstruction” is employed here, some references to classic 
definitions are necessary. Deconstruction started out as a label for a 
specific way of “reading“ and criticizing philosophical texts, first 
initiated by Jacques Derrida, but the uses of the concept have proli­
ferated during the past few decades (see Norris 2003: 134-135). For 
the purpose of our analysis we take as a starting point the widest 
categorisation of deconstruction as an “intellectual strategy” (Culler 
1983: 85) that has significantly influenced the creation of the sub­
sequently analysed theatre and film texts.
Identity as a mental construct relies extensively on hierarchical 
oppositions of differently valued categories (in-out, self-other, us-
1! See www.efsa.ee.
12 See http://www.kul.ee/index.php?path=0x917&sona=kultuuritarbimise.
them, now-before, normal-abnormal, city-countryside, etc.). In the 
present context, deconstruction does not directly refer to the reversal 
of the hierarchies in a Derridaean sense; instead, it opens up develop­
mental perspectives for national identity, forcing one to acknowledge 
the constructedness of the prevailing identity, making it questionable 
and thereby creating space for the emergence of new identities. The 
dichotomous categories can be criticized and their repressive power 
can be decreased by inserting them into new contexts (for instance, 
artistic texts), where their inner contradictions and unjustified, 
arbitrary values become explicit. An important part of tracing this 
questioning is the critical examination of theatrical and filmic repre­
sentations (more specifically, the key signifiers of Estonianness) that 
embody the conceptual oppositions.
Other strategies also exist that use different techniques for similar 
purposes, such as “demythologisation” or “demystification”, as 
Roland Barthes (1957) has employed them to criticize the “natural­
ness” of secondary meanings of cultural signifiers. We prefer the term 
“deconstructed identity”, since it refers to the whole complex domain 
of questioning national identity, which is not based solely on myths.
A parodic mode of textual production is one such deconstructive 
strategy, applied to stagings analysed later in this paper. Parody 
includes any cultural practices that provide a relatively polemical, 
allusive imitation of another cultural production or practice (Dentith 
2000: 9). Humorous effect arises from the displacement of recognized 
textual elements into a new context, making them conflict with the 
expectations of the spectator. (A single film or theatre performance 
can simultaneously parody, that is imitate allusively and polemically, 
several other cultural texts or practices). Usually, this polemical 
moment urges the recipient to reconsider his/her reading of and 
attitude towards the parodied texts or practices, including the values 
and identities conveyed by them.
Deconstruction of national identity accordingly consists of a 
specific interpretation of canonical texts (e.g. presenting stereotypical 
self-models) of national culture that entails the dismantling of 
conceptual and hierarchical oppositions in those texts, bringing out the 
repressed and silenced aspects which, when explicit, render the text 
paradoxical, self-contradictory and thereby decrease its authority. This 
deconstruction does not necessarily have to be done “in a spirit of 
game-playing nihilist abandon and without the least concern for
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constructing a better alternative” (Norris 2003: 135). An ethically 
responsible deconstruction is possible.
It has been noted that in Estonia, a former socialist country, the 
essentialist concept of national identity is still preferred to 
constructivist approaches (Sevänen 2004: 50-51). This preference is 
prevalent mainly among the older generation of Estonian intellectuals, 
who have felt a crucial need to preserve the national past. However, 
during the 1990s, a younger generation o f Estonian researchers has 
welcomed postmodern theories concerning the constructedness and 
mutability of identity, social reality and national community (Annus 
2000b: 115-130; Viires 2004: 130-139). The postmodern perspective 
has influenced not only the critics but also the creators of artistic texts, 
encouraging them to deconstruct the commonly held perceptions of 
Estonianness that emphasize historical narratives, ethnic heritage, etc. 
in national identity.
3.1. “Estonian Funeral”13
“Estonian Funeral” (“Eesti matus”) is based on a recent play by 
Andrus Kivirähk (2002), a writer of the younger generation, who has 
already achieved a cult status in Estonia today. He is prolific in a 
variety of genres, from newspaper columns and pamphlets to dramas 
and novels, as well as co-hosting a hilarious, socially critical radio talk 
show. For him, national history serves as fictional material for 
creating new fiction — tales and myths that (re)construct our popular 
national consciousness. The primary devices employed by Kivirähk 
are parody, irony and the grotesque, which he applies to national 
stereotypes and common cliches well known to most Estonians. 
“Estonian Funeral” is probably one of his most successful dramatic 
texts, with its excellent comic characters and, as with all good 
comedies, a bitterly serious dimension as well.
Although the dramatic situation — a funeral where various 
relatives meet again after a long separation — is one of the most 
viable archaic rituals in all cultures, the topics and problems that 
emerge in the present text are for the most part specifically related 
with Estonianness. This claim is grounded on the fact that “Estonian
1' Premiere: June 8th, 2002, Estonian Drama Theatre. Text: Andrus Kivirähk. 
Director: Priit Pedajas. Scenographer and costume designer: Pille Jänes.
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Funeral” is a parody of the epopee "Truth and Justice ( Tõde ja 
õigus”) by the most distinguished national writer Anton Hansen 
Tammsaare, who through his writings offered a model of national 
values for many generations of Estonians.
The staging in the Estonian Drama Theatre sets the play into a 
stylized backyard of the deceased grandfather’s old farmhouse. The 
central element of the scanty stage design is a huge stack of firewood 
that functions on several levels, referring both to the practical and the 
symbolic. Firewood, especially in the countryside, but also for many 
urban dwellers, is still the main source for heating. Buying, chopping 
and piling firewood are familiar activities for most Estonians. These 
practices are also displayed on stage — the axe is a significant prop. 
The end of the stack disappears into distance, symbolising the never- 
ending need to work in a farmhouse. In the scenography, the stack 
restricts the fictional world the audience can see — most of the action 
takes place in front of the stack and one can only guess as to what lies 
beyond. On the other hand, this is a place in a periphery, hidden form 
the neighbours’ gazes, suitable for solving family problems or even a 
nice place for a garden party. Similarly, the location of Estonia in the 
European Union is comparable with the fictional place in the staging 
of “Estonian Funeral” — somewhere behind a stack of firewood.
The main theme both in the play and in the staging is a parodic 
representation of the Estonians’ work ethic, powerfully described in 
the aforementioned novels by Tammsaare, something that is accepted 
at face value by most Estonians — “work hard and love will come”. 
The most commonly accepted self-description states that Estonians are 
a laborious people and because of this they survived all difficulties in 
the past and are going to survive them in the future. “Estonian 
Funeral” shows us several different types of workaholics, who are 
created by using well-known cultural and theatrical stereotypes. 
Grotesque or freakish types are created by the costumes and make-up 
of the actors. The bodily shapes of some female characters are 
exaggerated, stressing the stereotypical figure of an Estonian mother 
who can support three children and a husband, who is either a duffer 
or a drunkard. In general, the characters and aesthetics of the staging 
embody the very essence of a popular comedy (e.g. situation comedy), 
resulting in tours to various different locations in Estonia and is a 
guarantee for full houses even today. However, in spite of the 
plenitude of comic situations and characters, the general message of
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Estonian Funeral is far from funny; quite the contrary, it is very 
tragic, but it replies to painful national memories with a liberating 
laughter. Critical reception has called it a refreshing “national 
therapy” that offers a possibility for comic distancing from the painful 
memories and taken-for-granted national values (Vellerand 2003: 
137).
We can observe the older generation (mother and father) in 
“Estonian Funeral” who for most of the time live and work in town, 
but nevertheless do several farm jobs in their parents’ household — 
potato planting and harvesting, berry-picking and cooking jam, etc. At 
a first glance, the middle-aged businessman (uncle) with his career- 
making wife are the exact opposites o f mother and father, but in fact 
their labour-mania is just directed into other channels — office work 
till late hours. Even their holidays pass as hard work — from training 
to sailing and riding etc, etc. The majority of the characters form a 
group subjected to the protestant work ethic.
The protagonist and supposedly the alter ego of the playwright — 
young Andres (Jan Uuspõld) —  is an ambivalent character, who also 
performs the role of the antagonistic narrator. He argues against this 
deeply rooted workaholism and has a “geopathologic” (Chauduri
1995) relationship with his grandfather’s farmstead. For his parents, 
this household is a locus of various obligations, for his uncle and his 
wife it is a pastoral area, a good place for a brief vacation. For young 
Andres, his topophobia stems from unpleasant childhood memories, 
when he was forced to work in this farm during summertime. The 
grandfather’s old farmhouse becomes a symbol of national labour- 
worship and repression. This place has lost its value for Andres and 
the only reasonable solution for him is to sell the house (cf. Chekhov’s 
“Cherry Orchard”). For the characters of the older generation in 
“Estonian Funeral”, the father’s “home is the foundation of [their] 
identity as individuals and as members of a community”(Relph 1976: 
39). Andres wants to escape his grandfather’s farm, because he 
defines it as a “house” and not a “home” and believes that selling it 
helps to erase his memories and prevent him from becoming like his 
parents and relatives. Selling homesteads as a result of lifestyle 
changes is a painful problem for rural inhabitants in contemporary 
Estonia, especially in the western part of the country and the islands, 
where many households are inhabited by new owners from Finland or 
Sweden. Homogenous rural communities are decaying, most new­
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comers stay only for seasonal vacations. Declared national identities 
(e.g. Estonians —  the hardworking farm people) are more stable and 
in this case they conflict with the real new lived identities.
3.2. “The Old and the Bold Get on Their Feet”14
The Estonian feature film with an international distribution title Made 
in Estonia (2003) is a parodic comedy (with elements of travesty, drag 
and slapstick humour) that aims to be funny and serious at the same 
time, having a tragicomic and also some bittersweet tonality in it. The 
original Estonian title —  Vanad ja  kobedad saavad ja lad  alla (a literal 
English translation could be “The Old and the Bold Get on Their 
Feet”) —  summarises the characters and the storyline in a nutshell.
“The Old and the Bold” is a well-known and rather popular 
trademark in the Estonian cultural scene. The project started as a radio 
show of comic sketches (by two male radio DJ-s who are not profes­
sional actors), followed by a series of TV sketches and eventually 
summer tours of open-air performances around the country. The film 
was a logical next step in the production chain, but it entailed a new 
challenge for the script writer, director and the two actors (the same 
former radio DJ-s) behind the TV serial. A much longer, more 
nuanced and multilayered story (compared to the TV or radio series 
format) had to be created for a viable feature film. And the storyline 
had to be comprehensible for a foreign audience as well.
The fictional world of the film models present day Estonia, the 
locations and landscapes are easily recognizable. So for an Estonian 
audience a close connection with the real space is established from the 
outset. There are two opposite surroundings where the action is set: 
the capital city o f Tallinn vs. the peripheral, “in-the-middle-of- 
nowhere” countryside of southern Estonia. In the fictional world there 
are two levels (i.e. a fiction within fiction device): the level of the two 
radio DJ-s (that serves as the “real” in comparison with the second 
level) and a world created by their imagination in the live comic 
sketches they create through voice-acting. On the first level the 
characters are realistic in their appearance and behaviour. On the
14 Premiered in 2003. Script: Peep Pedmanson. Director: Rando Pettai. 
Cinematographer: Mait Mäekivi.
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second level the characters are qualitatively more exaggerated and 
stereotypical — their costumes, make up, the props (especially 
vehicles as lifestyle markers) mock certain genuinely existing 
Estonian stereotypes by developing their distinct characteristics to 
their extremes.
The main character of the story is Väino (Henrik Normann), who 
belongs to the second level of fiction and is a dedicated bachelor in his 
fifties, living in the capital. His misfortunes —  loneliness, being 
evicted from his home, given a substitute house in the countryside far 
away from the capital — and his adaptation in the new environment 
form the pivot of the storyline. His feckless, reserved, misogynist 
behaviour mocks and enacts one of the ironic Estonian self-descrip- 
tions: “hot (i.e. passionate) Estonian men”. A common conception of 
an Estonian male is that they are careless, lack passion, are uncompli­
mentary, etc. Väino’s fate mirrors in an inverse way that o f the radio 
DJ Norm (Henrik Normann), who creates Väino. Norm is a young 
man from the countryside who does not have a home in the city — he 
stays overnight in the radio studio where he works. Both men are 
lonely, searching for a home and secretly yearning for love. In the end, 
Väino gets both — he sells his unwanted rundown homestead to 
NATO who plans to build an airport on those lands. Afterwards Väino 
moves to a fancy villa (the surrounding landscape o f which is 
unknown) with the girl he fell in love with. This resolution implies a 
subtle parody of an Estonian cliche: as a rule a man with a house must 
have a wife. Having accidentally acquired enough money, Väino 
literally buys the villa and in a less direct sense also buys a wife, 
thereby conforming to the commonplace dream cultivated by today’s 
consumer culture. “ ’Home’ has indeed become a marketable, 
exchangeable, and sentimentalised good.” (Relph 1976: 83). But he 
does not acquire a new identity through this purchase because “home 
is not just the house you happen to live in” (Relph 1976: 39). 
Contemporary identity construction foregrounds the personality (with 
his/her biography, appearance, world view, etc.) that determines the 
home rather than the other way around. However, Väino’s external 
signs of success work as a psychological compensation mechanism for 
Norm, who more or less remains a loser. “Norm” is not normal at all 
as the name seems to suggest, which creates a comic ambiguity.
Casting is especially significant in this film, since the two male 
actors play a total of six main characters. They play “themselves” on
the first level of fiction as radio DJ-s Norm (Henrik Normann) and 
Mill (Madis Milling). On the second level of fiction they both 
impersonate one male and one female character. For the Estonian 
spectators both actors are generally known only through these two 
characters they impersonate in the TV series and in the film. Therefore 
there is a very strong disposition to identify the actor with this 
particular character, thereby creating an easily recognizable, fixed and 
stable role. All the devices for role creation an actor can employ to 
“transform” oneself into the character — use of voice, body (gestures, 
plastics, movement in space), mimics, make-up, costume — 
contribute to the creation of colourful, grotesque and exaggerated 
types — i.e. amplified stereotypes, which in their more moderate form 
have a clear position in the popular self-models of the community.
The conceptual strategy of world-making that can probably first 
and foremost be attributed to the director, script writer and cinemato­
grapher is derived from parody. It imitates and comments on several 
other cultural texts and practices. The most evident targets of the 
parody are soap operas and sitcoms. Even the Estonian title pattern 
“The Old and the Bold...” is a subversive allusion to the titles of soap 
operas such as “The Bold and the Beautiful”. Two US critics15 also 
easily recognize the soap opera mode, although they naturally miss the 
allusion in the original title, lost in the English translation. The 
constant presence of humour-evoking travesty or drag element (men 
playing women, comparable to the classical movie “Some Like It 
Hot”) disrupts the common sitcom-type fictional world which this 
film would otherwise plainly imitate. It “lowers” these two popular 
genres even more through parody and invites the Estonian audience 
prone to watching sitcoms and soap operas to reconsider its attitude 
towards these genres and to develop a more critical spectator-relation 
to their daily media content.
The general theme of the film is the sensitive issue of home and 
more specifically the relation to the land and countryside landscape
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15 Barnes, Harper 2004. ‘Made in Estonia’ isn’t quite an export quality film. Post- 
Dispatch 01/02/2004. http://newhomes.stltoday.com/stltoday/entertainment/ 
reviews.nsf/0/D8FB0E597F91CD6C86256E0E0018FD4F?OpenDocument&Head 
line='Made+in+Estonia'+isn't+quite+an+export+quality+film (access date:
15.10.2005); Felperin, Leslie 2003. Made In Estonia. Variety.com. December 3. 
http://www. variety.com/review/VEl 117922555?categoryid=31 &cs=l (access 
date: 15.10.2005).
Staging national identities in theatre and film  447
which in the stereotypical and canonical Estonian self-description is 
the true site of an Estonian home (i.e. a farmhouse surrounded by 
fields and forests) which is one o f the core elements of traditional 
national identity. The usual direction of population movement in 
present-day Estonia is away from the countryside and increased 
suburbanization. Väino’s route is exactly the opposite. This alone 
suffices to make him an “inverted” hero, since he, albeit unwillingly, 
acts against the common mentality. Still, according to the declared 
(but no longer lived) national identity, his return to the countryside 
would be a positive example. This turns him into an ambiguous hero, 
since most urbanized Estonians seem to long in their hearts for a true 
home in the countryside. Owning a house signifies a high social status 
in Estonia. But Väino’s house is on the brink of breaking down and 
more a source of problems than pride.
3.3. Lonely Hero and the Problematic Question of Home
We now present a brief comparison of the stagings of national 
identities performed in “The Old and the Bold...” and “Estonian 
Funeral”. In the former, the main character Norm/Väino is a loser, 
who normally evokes a distanced and ironic attitude, but due to the 
severity and tragedy of his problems (solitude, homelessness), a 
sympathetic identification with him emerges for Estonians (see Jauss 
1977: 271-277). The response of the foreign audience perhaps stayed 
more on the ironic side. The US critics, for example, did not notice the 
specific issue of solitude associated with the problems of land and 
home.16 The fictional hero, Väino, is a survivor-type, and follows the 
comic life strategy; with his adaptability and ability to turn chance 
occasions in his own favour, he seeks to resolve his problems with a 
minimum of suffering (Meeker 1997: 14-15). The real character, 
Norm, employs a strategy of escapism, finding consolation in the 
fictional characters he creates for the radio-show. The protagonist of 
“Estonian Funeral”, Andres, tends to be a rather tragic anti-hero, and 
in this sense he is similar to Norm. Andres is haunted by uncanny 
memories, surfacing from the depths of the national subconscious. As 
a protagonist he remains dramaturgically weak — his moralistic 
commentaries distance and perplex the spectators. The only perspec­
16 Seefn. 15.
tive he offers is an improbable wish to escape to a “far-away land 
where the orange trees grow”, a place where there is no need to do any 
work. The familiar workaholics from the national stereotype remain 
more alive and genuine, and provoke laughter through parodic 
exaggerations.
In the two considered and analysed stagings, the element of 
traditional peasant culture is still intrinsic to the national self­
descriptions, foregrounding the deep love-and-hate relationship with 
the land. Relations with the homestead are central to both of these 
texts. The image of home presented in them is a combination of ideal 
and real places. “Estonian Funeral” and “The Old and the Bold...” are 
both informed by “geopathology”, i.e. the “problem of place — and 
place as problem” (Chaudhuri 1995: 55), through the ruptures that 
occur in the character —  homestead relations. In the former Andres 
and in the latter Norm/Väino share a similarly dislocated connection 
with the traditional home in the countryside. The texts loosen the 
sacred bonds with the homestead by applying parody as a 
deconstructing technique that reveals the suppressed contradictions 
and anxieties. Similarly, as a deconstructive critique in general, it 
attacks essentialist philosophical concepts (see Hall 1996a: 3-4). 
These stagings disclose the relativity of the taken-for-granted national 
values. Nevertheless this strategy does not amount to the destruction 
of traditional national values. It only shows their inadequacy in the 
contexts of rapidly changing Estonian lifestyles and the corresponding 
everyday lived identities.
Finally, both “Estonian Funeral” and “The Old and the Bold...” 
function as forms of national therapy, saturated by self-irony. They 
reflect the multiplicity and contradictions of Estonian identities today. 
It is remarkable that the creators o f both artistic texts have an ethical 
concern — they care about the issues they stage. Therefore, the 
laughter that arises in the audience does not serve just an entertaining 
but also a cathartic function.
4. Hybrid national identity
In 20th century cultural theory, concepts of hybrid cultures, hybrid 
identity and hybridization are often associated with ethnically mixed 
identities, issues of linguistic mingling, etc. Hybridity has assumed a 
central position in postcolonial and globalization discourses, referring
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to the contact between two or more cultures (between the self and the 
Other) and the formation of new transcultural forms (Hall 1996b; 
Bhabha 1994; Young 1995). Cultural hybridization may be generally 
defined as a situation “when an individual or a group is exposed to 
and influenced by more than one cultural context” (Oyserman et al. 
1998: 1607); it is linked with the adaptations people undergo while 
moving from one cultural context to the other.
In addition, the concept of hybridity has received theoretical 
treatment in cultural semiotics through an engagement o f hybridity 
with the descriptions of interference between cultural languages. 
Mikhail Bakhtin, an influential figure for postcolonial theory, uses the 
term ‘hybridization’ to describe the textual encounter of two or more 
“consciousnesses, separated from one another by epoch, by social 
differentiation or by some other factor” (Bakhtin 2001: 358). Juri 
Lotman furthermore stresses that in order to stimulate the develop­
ment and generation of new meanings in a culture, the intervention of 
a foreign element becomes crucial (Lotman 1991: 290-291). Hybridi­
zation (or creolization) of cultural languages consists in the process 
whereby the principles of one cultural language begin to model the 
principles of the other in spite of extensive differences between their 
grammars. ‘Hybridization’ is characteristic of periods of cultural 
change. Culture evolves through the stages of hybridization (creoliza­
tion) and homogenization (Lotman 2002: 2652). Sooner or later 
hybridization ends with the formulation of a new homogeneous self­
model of a culture.
The concept of ‘hybridization’ is far from being unproblematic, 
because once one states that “all culture is a hybrid, and hybridization 
is universal” (Papastergiadis 1995: 9), the concept may lose its 
explanatory potential. Although the postcolonial treatment of ‘hybri­
dization’ focuses its attention on the colonial antagonism and inequity, 
the aspect of new hybrid identity, stressed by Homi Bhabha, questions 
the essentialist approach to culture and identity. The relationship 
between the colonizer and the colonized is always reciprocal and 
ambivalent (Bhabha 1994). In everyday life people are usually not 
consciously aware of the hybrid nature of the culture they live in, 
because internalized cultural self-descriptions stress the homogeneity 
of national culture, which in the case of Estonia seems to be built on a 
seemingly “uncorrupted core” that has remained the same in spite of 
multifarious foreign influences and colonisations. It should be evident
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that no national culture can identify itself without certain “others” and 
in an evolving dialogue partners change and influence each other 
mutually. We would like to stress that hybridity exists in ethnically 
“pure”, “homogeneous” groups (e.g. Estonians) as well, and to show 
how different levels of hybridity relate to national identity.
Ever since its conscious cultivation, Estonian national culture has 
been shaped by strong influences of German and Russian culture (19th 
century), later also by other European and Soviet cultural models and 
languages. Estonian culture has undergone multiple phases of 
intensive hybridization and can therefore be justifiably labelled as 
hybrid and creole (Hennoste 2003: 92-93), although many of the 
borrowed and adapted elements are now considered to be genuinely 
Estonian.
Forming a hyphenated,17 hybrid identity allows the person to adopt 
an integrative acculturation strategy (cf. Berry et al. 1977: 132) that 
fosters active participation in the public life of the society. The official 
Estonian historiography has silenced the ethnic diversity for the sake 
of projecting a homogeneous national identity, based to a great extent 
on the Estonian language, which is in fact fiill of loans and adapted 
speech patterns. This protective strategy of national self-description is 
constantly challenged in the contemporary media environment where 
“interpretive communities use the media to create new, interstitial 
identities that are linked to “official” cultural identity, but also linked 
to the images culled from international film and television, and to 
international and regional cultural movements.”(01son 2002) In 
contrast to the official discourse of historians and politicians, the 
artists have to a greater extent dealt with the actual diverse legacy of 
inter-cultural influences and mixtures that underlie the lived identities 
of the Estonian national community today. Through this disruption of 
homogeneity, the dynamics of and ability to adapt flexibly with a 
culture are celebrated and stimulated.
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17 “Hyphenated identity” refers to a specific type o f ethnic identity which relies 
on connecting two different ethnic origins (languages or cultures or regions) and 
claiming to hold more or less equal allegiance to both (e.g., Latin-American, 
Japanese-Canadian, African-American).
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4.1. “Goodbye, Vienna”18
Because of certain historical developments, it is the Germans who 
have traditionally been the “hostile foreigners” for Estonians.19 The 
colonizing relation of German culture with Estonian culture consists 
of the aggressive Christian mission by the Teutonic Order {Deutscher 
Orden) into the present-day territories of Estonia during the 13th 
century, the establishment of a new administrative division here, and 
turning local peasants into subalterns of recently settled German 
landlords. The mutual but asymmetrical influence o f the two cultures 
lasted for seven centuries. Since both Estonian and Baltic German 
culture evolved on a shared territory, they are both hybrid cultures. 
Nevertheless, national narratives created in Estonian literature and 
especially in national-ideologically inclined historiography have 
strongly supported the commonplace myth of Estonian (ethnic) culture 
that has preserved its „authentic core” in spite o f all the foreign 
influences. When the Estonian nationality was formed in the last 
decades of the 19th and in the beginning of the 20th century, Baltic 
Germans were the Other opposed two whom Estonian identity was 
constructed; Estonians used the colonizer’s culture to create their own 
(Annus 2000b: 123). The Estonian national movement was initiated 
by Baltic German Estophiles and many national cultural forms (e.g., 
the foundation of numerous song, drama and literary societies, 
creation of national poetry, etc.) were directly created on the basis of 
German models. Those hybrids are nowadays unconditionally 
accepted as part of national culture. At the turn of the 21st century, 
many Estonian intellectuals have stressed the importance of German 
influence in the formation of Estonian culture as part of the European 
cultural space, and have begun research that focuses on these bilateral 
cultural connections, especially in literary texts (see Lukas 2004). 
Whereas in Estonian literature the narrative representations of Baltic 
Germans are quite varied, visual representations of them in theatre and 
film seem to be rare and relatively stereotypical.
18 Premiere: August 20, 2002, Tartu Theatre Lab. Text: Jaan Undusk. Director: 
Tõnu Lensment. Scenographer and costume designer: Silver Vahtre.
19 In this particular context, „German” and „Estonian” are used as conventional 
labels for those communities that dwelt on the territories of present day Germany 
and Estonia and shared a common way of life, language and belief system.
Jaan Undusk, the author of the drama “Goodbye, Vienna. 
(Gertrud)” (published in 1999), has a twofold position with respect to 
the aforementioned context. He is both a creator of fictional texts and 
an outstanding literary researcher who at present leads a research 
project that focuses on the creation of the narrative of Estonian 
identity. Undusk has actively studied Baltic German literary and 
historical heritage and wants to bring this cultural Other into the focus 
of attention by showing how contemporary Estonian culture has 
developed from this interrelationship, as well as how the waning 
Baltic German culture today shares a common environment with the 
Estonian culture. Examples of this long-established co-evolution that 
has formed the foundation for hybrid identities are the common Baltic 
solidarity and a shared land history (Undusk 2002, Undusk 2000, 
Undusk 1993). All these research interests are reflected in “Goodbye, 
Vienna”. Undusk is also the translator and commentator of Friedrich 
Nietzsche’s “Ecce homo” into Estonian, so the thematic richness of 
the drama can already be foreseen. “Goodbye, Vienna” was staged in 
august 2002 as a production of Tartu Theatre Lab (Tartu Teatrilabor), 
directed by Tõnu Lensment.
The fictional time-space of the drama is set in Vienna in the 1990s, 
more precisely in August of 1991; the premiere on the 20th of August 
coincided with the day the Estonian national statehood was restored. 
The staging took place in a multi-layered symbolic space in Tartu — 
in the ruins of old Dome Church (built in the 13th to 16th century), 
originally one of the biggest gothic cathedrals in the Baltic states. The 
performance took place in the reconstructed chorus-part of the 
building, where the History Museum of the University of Tartu resides 
today. This building has another important role in the Baltic German 
and Estonian intellectual history — for more than a century it 
functioned as the Tartu University Library. Therefore the audience can 
find various strata of cultural past in this architectural space as the 
“condenser” of public memory (cf. Kotov 2002). In accordance with 
the fictional space in acts two and three (inside St. Stephens Cathedral 
in Vienna) the performance moves vertically from the hall to the attic 
of the Dome Church. At the same time the spectators feel the 
heightened sacredness of being surrounded by the soundscape of the 
church bells and organ music and the smellscape of frankincense 
candles. The result of the meeting of “foreign” (St. Stephens Cathedral 
in Vienna) and “own” (Tartu University History Museum) creates an
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estranged hybrid effect the fictional space conjures up the latent 
dimension of the real space, its very primal sacral dimension.
The casting of the main roles was of utmost importance in the 
staging of “Goodbye, Vienna”. Nietzsche was played by Tõnu Oja, an 
actor in his late thirties with a bohemian image, with something 
naturally hesitant in his behaviour. An outgrown haircut and coarse 
moustache emphasize his peasant-like look. Gertrud, on the other 
hand, is performed by Merle Palmiste, a charming actress who is 
dissimilar from a stereotypical Estonian woman. She is a tall brunette, 
with a beautiful figure, in her early thirties. Both actors are well- 
known, Palmiste especially is a beloved celebrity who performs in 
various media.
The Estonian connection in “Goodbye, Vienna” becomes evident 
from the very first act, where the characters discuss their origins. At 
first glance, the protagonist Adolf Nietzsche seems to have nothing 
Estonian about him. His name is a combination of two infamous 
names in German history — Adolf Hitler and Friedrich Nietzsche. 
The trick lies in a clever anagrammatic word-play where the 
transformation of letters changes “Nietzsche” to “Estnische” {adj. 
Estonian) (Kraavi 2002). Therefore we may define Nietzsche as a 
“crypto-ethnic” (Hutcheon 1998: 28-33) Estonian whose name does 
not tell us anything about his ethnic origin. Although he is an 
Estonian, Nietzsche’s national identity is somewhat uncertain. He is a 
contemporary young intellectual, a “postmodern pilgrim” —  to 
paraphrase Zygmunt Bauman (cf. 1996: 19-23) —  whose “desert” is 
the academic sphere and who, thanks to various scholarships, spends a 
considerable amount of his formation years in different (European) 
universities.20 But unlike for a vagabond (see Bauman 1996: 28-29), 
the idea of a home(land) is still important for him. We can therefore 
ask: is Nietzsche really even an Estonian academician, an Estonian 
philosopher? We can speak about asymmetric power relations 
between different philosophical traditions and also about a certain 
hybridity that emerges when foreign ideas are translated into a 
particular national language (culture). In today’s international
20 This is an allusion to Young Estonia (1905-1915), a movement of Estonian 
intellectuals, the members of which declared that they are Estonians but want to 
become Europeans. Many of its members educated themselves in European 
cultural centres such as Paris, Vienna, etc. The few Estonian intellectuals before 
the end of the 19th century were assimilated into the Baltic German culture.
philosophical space, important national traditions function as empires 
that possess international prestige, and their peripheral colonies lack 
wider acknowledgement (Schusterman 1997: 297).
During the German influence, many of their ideas were adopted in 
Estonia, but did they move in the opposite direction as well? Do 
national traditions exist in philosophy at all? Two different concep­
tions of nationality in philosophy can be proposed — one considers 
national to be the particular regional institutions or organisations (e.g. 
universities), whereas the other seeks the more metaphysical content 
of a nation’s way of thinking. In “Goodbye, Vienna” the question is 
not so much about schools of philosophy (even though there are 
numerous allusions to Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, etc.), but rather about 
philosophizing in the sense of playing with thoughts. The latter is 
specifically national or ethnic, because it originates from native 
language, it is possible only in this particular language and is 
untranslatable.21
Foremost in “Goodbye, Vienna” is the linguistic space, which 
seems to support the belief/argument that the Estonian language forms 
the very basis of national identity. Most of the characters are Baltic 
Germans but they speak Estonian for the audience. The dramatic text 
is full of untranslatable wordplays. For example, the central game 
repeatedly reformulated by Gertrud is supported by an acoustic 
similarity of two words: vabadus (freedom) can at any moment turn 
into labasus (banality). The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis of linguistic 
determination is paraphrased by Gertrud when she says: “I don’t 
understand it [Estonian], but I know that it is my mother’s tongue that 
sits in my flesh and bones. [...] If I don’t speak Estonian, then perhaps 
I look in Estonian, perhaps I hear and smell in Estonian?” (Undusk 
1999). “Goodbye, Vienna” as a unilingual play that contains various 
cultural languages. Here one can find the complex philosophical 
discussions inspired by Nietzsche and Wittgenstein side by side with 
the vulgarities of everyday discourse. Both the ancient Baltic German 
culture and culture of young Estonian intellectuals are represented 
here, etc.
In 1991 it was still rather unusual for a young Estonian scholar to 
have a chance to study abroad. Nietzsche has only three days to spend 
in Vienna and he is so caught by the city that the news brought by an 
acquaintance, the young Baltic German countess Gertrud — “Estonia
21 We wish to thank Peeter Torop for this comment.
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is in a revolution, yesterday they declared independence” —  hits his 
national nerve as an embarrassing surprise. He is disappointed that 
this historical event happened while he was away. Both Nietzsche and 
Gertrud are actually alien in Vienna and paradoxically they share a 
common homeland — Estonia {Estland). Though Gertrud has never 
visited Estonia, she and her relatives constantly stress that they are 
representatives of the “Baltic spirit”. When Gertrud wants to tease 
Nietzsche, she calls him “a German” or “the son of a reverend”.22 In 
this play/staging, Nietzsche is in a complicated position; he is invited 
to the “parlour of the Teutonic Order” where he would be forced to 
share both the common history and the common present with strangers 
(Baltic Germans) in a strange country (Austria). His host, baron von 
Middendorf calls the independence of Estonia “the last great event in 
the Baltic German history” and stresses that there would have been no 
national sovereignty if there had been no Baltic German barons who 
“embodied freedom in the Russian state”.23
22 There is a double connotation here. First, of course, Friedrich Nietzsche was 
the son of a minister. “Protestant reverend” in the most common sense refers to 
conservatism. Second, German reverends as representatives of colonizers were 
ambivalent persons in the history of Estonia, “culturalizing” Estonian peasants 
and later became interested in Estonian language and culture through translations 
of clerical texts. However, there is a possibility that already before the protestant 
reformation reached the Estonian territory, some Estonians may have become 
members of the clergy themselves, because theological education was the most 
readily available for vernacular people and served as an universal humanitarian 
education during those times. It is difficult to tell whether Estonian reverends 
were hybrid persons for other Estonians because they were now part of the culture 
of colonizers, or because of their position in the social hierarchy they no longer 
shared the grassroots position of Estonian peasants.
Middendorf s words once again refer to many historical aspects. It was the 
Baltic German community that brought the ideas of German national romanticism 
into Estonia in the 19th century. The Estonian national awakening movement 
adopted many forms of German culture, giving them a national-Estonian content. 
“Russian state” here signifies both the Russian Empire in the turn of the 19/20th 
centuries and the Soviet occupation from 1940-1991. This delicate hint is 
explicable only for Estonians who stayed in their homeland after World War II, 
satirizing those Estonians who emigrated and after the events in August 1991 
overemphasized their role in restoring the independence.
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Although the international title of the Estonian film “Agent Wild 
Duck” (“Agent Sinikael”, 2002) invites an association with the paro- 
dic and comic instances of the spy thriller genre, this first impression 
is misleading. “Agent Wild Duck” plays with generic and narrative 
expectations of the spectators on several levels. Traditionally, a spy 
story focuses on suspense, glamour, displaying the extraordinary 
circumstances and assignments of undercover work, culminating in 
the triumph of the protagonist super-hero. In contrast to this, “Agent 
Wild Duck” (based on an original screenplay by Marko Raat and 
Andres Maimik) is an unglamorized spy movie (cf. “Spy Game”, “The 
Bourne Identity”) with practically no episodes of gun slinging or 
explosive action. It displays only the grim and unpleasant characte­
ristics of living in the world of constant paranoia, lack of emotional 
satisfaction and mental loneliness.
Within this movie, hybridization processes operate especially 
vividly on the levels of world-making and character portrayal. A clear 
hybridization of genre-specific visual styles is discernible, since it is a 
feature film (fictional content, wide screen format, meticulously com­
posed shots, the usage of markedly artificial-looking rear-projection in 
car driving episodes, etc.) with many sequences composed in the 
visual style of documentaries. However, the aesthetic of the movie is 
not psychologically realistic or naturalistic. It rather relies on hyper­
bole, subtle satire or irony, painting a mocking and sad caricature of 
the new economic situation and its influence on values and ethics. 
Western audiences may find it comfortable to categorize this film as 
yet another statement against globalization.
For most of the time, the world created in this film is generalized 
and not explicitly stated as depicting any geographically specified 
place in the world. There are no conspicuous visual cliches of national 
self-representation (e.g. landmark buildings, ethnic costumes, etc.) 
that would indicate a connection with a specific nation state. But in 
the passport check episode, the customs officer replies to the arriving 
antagonist Florian Flug: “Welcome to Estonia”. This is a direct
4.2. “Agent Wild Duck”24
24 Premiere: 2002. Script: Andres Maimik, Marko Raat. Director: Marko Raat. 
Cinematographer: Arko Okk.
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citation of the Brand Estonia project slogan, the process of 
creation of which was heavily criticized in the Estonian media as a 
token of government ignorance and folly in spending tax payer 
money. The reply sounds ridiculous, since the antagonist has just told 
the customs officer the purpose of his visit: “I intend to fire a bunch of 
workers, organize a revolt and perform a human sacrifice”. However, 
it is strikingly well in accordance with the popular Estonian perception 
of bureaucratic ignorance and corruption in the state apparatus. The 
languages spoken, certain allusions to work ethics, social problems 
connected with miners, specific industrial and natural landscapes etc., 
signal to the Estonian audience that the setting is Estonia.
Most of the time the interiors used in the movie are stylized 
(espionage firm office, restaurant, protagonist's apartment), rather 
empty, and no ethnically marked decor is used. However, some props 
(e.g. second hand cars imported from the west), some of the set design 
(e.g. the factory director’s office, furnished with standardized Soviet 
furniture; the Soviet style cafe interior in the mining region), 
characters and specific social problems (the reorganization o f big and 
inefficient large-scale enterprises, illegal business deals) indicate that 
it is a post-soviet country, a society in transition in the second half o f 
the 1990s. For a West-European audience it may as well be set 
anywhere in eastern Europe.
Intercultural influences are the main phenomenon modelled by this 
film — more precisely the imbalance, “explosions”, unexpected 
developments that a sudden and strong influx of alien principles can 
cause in the receiving culture. The main conflict in the film unfolds 
between different worldviews and ethical positions which, among 
other dissimilarities, happen to originate from different cultures. The 
two main characters of the film embody two sharply contrasted 
ideologies of living and working. Their ideologies are already hybrids 
of diverse cultural sources and their clash in the fictional world creates 
yet another new potential for hybridization.
25 In 2001 and 2002, the Estonian governmental institution for supporting 
entrepreneurship — Enterprise Estonia — carried out the Brand Estonia project: a 
communications strategy and a visual identity was developed to promote the 
Republic of Estonia abroad. The strategy describes Estonia as a positively 
transforming country. The verbal and visual identity presented in the Estonia Style 
brand book is composed of a slogan, a logo, a predefined set of colours, patterns, 
photographs and a typeface to be used in all international media related to the 
country (http://www.eas.ee/). See also footnote 8.
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The protagonist Hans Gens26 (a crypto-ethnic Estonian with a 
rather German-sounding name) clearly incorporates features of Soviet 
culture and markedly “authentic” Estonian traits as well. Hans, with 
his ethics that is inadequate in the new economic system, is a hybrid 
person, as he combines: (1) the Estonian national (self-ascribed) zeal 
for doing one’s work with painstaking precision and fervour, devoting 
every aspect of one’s life to work; (2) the soviet high ideal of being 
totally faithful and loyal to the state or organisation you are part of. 
Because spies did valuable service to the state during the Cold War, 
they could retain a very high self-esteem and consider themselves 
noble warriors in the vanguard of the great battle against the ex­
ploiting and greedy capitalism. Hans admires the technical perfection 
of Stirlitz (from the film “The Seventeen Moments of Spring”), the 
most celebrated spy in Soviet popular culture. Since the end of the 
Cold War, the former spies were forced to retrain themselves and they 
lost their high social prestige.
Hans was lucky: he found work in a private enterprise called Kon­
fident Kapital, specialized in industrial espionage (publicly “adver­
tised” under the euphemism of “PR-services”). He could continue 
practising his formerly highly praised professional skills, but his 
attempts to preserve a high self-esteem and a solid identity start to 
crumble away. He no longer receives positive feedback from the 
system and his natural inclination towards paranoia (i.e. “delusions of 
persecution, grandeur, and hypochondria” (Dowbiggin 2001) which 
are to a certain degree essential for survival in the totalitarian Soviet 
culture as well as for spying) gradually exacerbates to the extreme.
The psychosomatic result is narcolepsy — brief but sudden and 
irresistible attacks of deep sleep —  caused by his work that eventually 
ruins his ability to do this very same work that caused it in the first 
place. Narcolepsy is the clinical outcome of constant suppression of 
emotions during leisure time, and work that is technical and stressful 
in its nature. Emotional reservedness is a rather stereotypical feature in 
the self-model of Estonians and the glorification of loyalty, as well as 
technical workmanship are a clear residue of the Soviet period. The 
protagonist is faced with the influences of this hybrid legacy on his
26 Played by a well-known and good-looking Estonian theatre actor Mait 
Malmsten, who has substantial experience in acting in TV series and feature films. 
His roles have mostly been positive ones and his appearance evokes sympathy 
rather than disgust in the minds of the Estonian audience.
personal identity, as he embodies these ideals in an extreme form, 
while the government has to deal with them on the collective level, 
such as for example the problem of the miners (or any other people 
doing physical work), who are relatively superfluous for the new 
economy.
A bold and brave herald o f the new economy is the “top specialist” 
from Germany — a “human resources consultant” Florian Flug.27 
Hans is irritated by the news that the new owners are sending their 
own “top specialist” and asks his manager angrily: “What do the 
Germans want from here?” This outburst of hostility sounds slightly 
xenophobic and resonates fairly well with the Estonian spectator, 
since Germans were the colonizers and the local oppressing rulers on 
the Estonian territory from the 13th to the 20th century. Although 
there are no direct reasons that should bring about this hatred today, 
the painful aspects of history stay firmly in the Estonian national 
consciousness. The former colonizer creeps back in a new disguise to 
take over the higher positions of power. Hans senses a threat to his 
position in the company and is reluctant to changes.
Florian is also distinctly hybrid. Although his nationality is 
German, he does not utter a single German word. His fluent command 
of the international language of business — English — evinces his 
identity as a cosmopolitan person, a postmodern “player” (cf. Bauman
1996). His ethnic origin is not his most important feature — repre­
senting West-European superiority of economic power and know-how 
is. Yet this superiority is not unambiguous since in his practice of 
managing human resources Florian combines rationality and effi­
ciency with magic rituals and sacrifices that he has probably adapted 
from some African tribes (the exact source is insignificant, what is 
essential is the exotic impression). This peculiar hybridization of 
working methods seems rather ridiculous and nonsensical for the 
Estonian spectator. However, none of the characters dares to protest, 
as Florian is labelled a “top expert” from Germany, a country famous 
for its highly disciplined, orderly and rational working culture. This
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: Played by the German performance artist Florian Feigl, who is unfamiliar to 
the film’s core audience and whose appearance and face look distinctly alien 
compared to the other characters. Therefore F. Flug is a rather well-chosen person 
to play the strange foreigner. Although in the film’s storyline he as the antagonist 
is successful, he is not endowed with the sympathy of the audience, mostly 
because of his alien features.
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depiction of quiet submission to crazy ideas from a figure of authority 
is a perspicuous critique of the Estonian serf-mentality.
The clash and contrast between the protagonist and the antagonist 
mainly takes place between being liberal, innovative versus being old- 
fashioned, conservative. Florian values the “beauty of the game”, that 
is aesthetics, not ethics. Hans, on the other hand, values loyalty above 
all, a deeply ethical criterion. Florian enjoys the process and con­
sequences of his work. For Hans, completing the mission is the only 
thing that matters. Emotional reactions are to be avoided and con­
sequences are not to be considered. Florian’s working methods imply 
interaction with and manipulation of people. Hans’s methods pre­
suppose strict avoidance of interaction, and manipulation of docu­
ments, the material carriers of information. Florian is charismatic, 
bold, self-confident, unpredictable — a radical. Hans is reserved, 
paranoiac, distrustful, ascetic, predictable and systematic — a conser­
vative. In the age of globalisation and ensuing hybridization and dyna­
mism, the position of Florian is superior to that of Hans, since the 
former is more flexible and adaptive to the ever-changing cir­
cumstances. As they are sharply contrasted opposites in the fictional 
world, no hybridization occurs between their character traits.
However, an intermediate and developing character is placed between 
them: Monika Sumberg28 (again a crypto-ethnic Estonian with a rather 
German sounding name). In the beginning of the story she is the 
“assistant” and girlfriend of Hans. In the end she inclines more 
towards Florian’s worldview and way of life.
Since the cast of the film does not contain a single positive 
character there is no direct and obvious point of identification for the 
audience. The audience understands that Hans is noble in his ideals 
(and the Estonians probably recognize their own national work ethics 
in his professional credo), but his introverted, unemotional, reserved 
character (once again the exaggerated features of the Estonian male 
stereotype) and failure to adapt are unlikely to elicit a sympathetic 
identification. The antagonist, Florian, certainly does not provide a 
comfortable role-model either. He is too bizarre, foreign, alien for the 
common sense of the majority of the spectators.
The woman in the triangle, Monika, provides little possibilities for 
sympathetic identification as well, since she becomes obsessed with
28 Monika Sumberg is played by a young and attractive Estonian theatre actor 
Kersti Heinloo.
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ruthlessly climbing the career ladder. However, she is a person in 
transition, in change, searching for a new identity. Therefore she can 
function as an embodiment of the flexible, adaptive type, who can 
point the way out of the antagonism of ascetic ethics (Hans) and no­
ethics (Florian). She is an ethical hybrid. She abandons the old 
conservative work-ethics but does not totally dispose o f her huma­
nistic concern: she still shows warmth, compassion and care for those 
who are not able to adapt (Hans, the miners).
The reception of “Agent Wild Duck” by the Estonian film critics 
was rather positive. It received the film critics award of Best Estonian 
Film in 2002 for its original film language, its skilful blend of 
sincerity and irony within its penetrating social criticism of the 
Estonian society today. However, the cinema audience in Estonia did 
not share the sentiment of the critics and the total number spectators in 
cinemas was around 4 000 (the estimated number of spectators during 
the September 12, 2004 screening on Estonian Television — 54 000). 
From this one can infer that the treatment of identities in “Agent Wild 
Duck” has not had a significant actual influence on the lived identities 
of most Estonians. However, its potential was clearly recognized on 
the metalevel of culture (i.e. critical appreciation).
4.3. Different Pasts Integrate with Various Presents
Neither of these two texts explicitly foregrounds being Estonian or 
Estonianness, yet our analysis points to a way national identity can be 
interpreted in these texts in the context of intercultural influences and 
globalization. The possibility of finding and describing hybrid identi­
ties created by the stage production “Goodbye, Vienna” and the film 
“Agent Wild Duck” shows that hybridity is an emergent topic in the 
present-day Estonian cultural self-models. The protagonists of both 
texts find themselves in a transformational situation where their 
hitherto well-functioning identities no longer provide them with 
security and balance. Both protagonists are unsuccessful in adapting to 
new circumstances that should actually coerce them to change their 
self-models. Unconsciously they apprehend the need to change, since 
they are no longer certain where they belong. They therefore start to 
contemplate their identification possibilities, but in practice fail to 
change. Instead, adherence to fixed values and in-grown behavioural
patterns makes them modemist heroes cast into the vortex of the 
progressing postmodern turn.
Both protagonists are aware of their hybrid nature, where many 
foreign influences have fused together with the national ones, but they 
keep their status quo, unwilling to change in spite of the changing 
situation surrounding them. Therefore, they both can be called local 
hybrids, whose personal identity is structured around the specific 
combination of historically conditioned values stemming from 
(currently or historically) adjacent, overlapping cultural spheres that 
have spread only in this particular border area. The changing socio­
cultural environment nevertheless forces them to deal with their 
identity. Hans is rooted in Estonian work ethics on the one hand, and 
Soviet loyalty to the organization on the other; this makes him a local 
hybrid who cannot easily be relocated someplace else. Nietzsche is an 
Estonian who does not realize how pervasive the influence of Baltic 
German culture has been on the development of contemporary 
Estonia. Despite being a knowledgeable intellectual, aware of the 
global influences on local culture, he subconsciously seems to believe 
in the mythological concept of a nation. Adolf Nietzsche’s situa­
tion —  an urgent need to (re)define his national identity while being 
abroad — is quite typical.
“Agent Wild Duck” seems to tackle problems of a more universal 
scope, capturing some essential insights into the process of globali­
sation, but it does so through a staging of the local cultural context of 
Estonia. The colonial history of Estonia, the extreme protestant work 
ethic (that has a well known intimate connection with the spirit of 
capitalism that still functions as the driving force behind global trends) 
and smallness of the nation, inducing a strong fear of extinction, are 
mobilised for this purpose. These three elements foster the domination 
of a rather reactionary and conservative conception of national identity 
among Estonians.
This inability for substantial changes exists side-by-side with the 
new, dynamic, daringly hybrid identities. Gertrud in “Goodbye, 
Vienna” and Florian in “Agent Wild Duck” represent the identities of 
postmodern players (Bauman 1996) for whom the connection with 
their home environment is less significant than for local hybrids. It 
should be noted that global hybrids in the analysed stagings are not 
ethnic Estonians. Florian’s personal identity is structured around 
values that originate from many spatially non-adjacent cultures and
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therefore as a combination seems much more random, contingent and 
also liable to change more easily. Two highly dissimilar cultural 
contexts meet and intermingle in Gertrud —  the Baltic German 
nobility and the proletarian Vienna mixed with Catholicism; and even 
though she is unable to articulate it properly, she senses that her roots 
are in Estonia. Nevertheless, she is a contemporary urbanised woman 
who enjoys playing with her identities, never adopting a single one for 
long.
Between the local and the global hybrid a third type —  transitional 
hybrid — can be distinguished. S/he almost never reaches the global 
end of the spectrum since breaking the local ties is not so easily 
accomplished. Monika Sumberg is an example of such type, being 
somewhere in-between the two aforementioned hybrids. This transi­
tional hybridity seems to be an emerging reality of new personal and 
national identities in Estonia.
To sum up, both stagings present the hybrid nature of Estonian 
national identity by focusing on basic interferences between German 
and Estonian as well as Soviet Russian and Estonian culture. In 
addition, both deal with the changes in national identity in the context 
of globalization, indicating various forms of cultural hybridity that 
may exist. Problems such as the protestant work ethic versus the post­
modern playful attitude towards work, the theme of nationality in 
philosophy, the dubious nature of Estonian language and ethnicity as 
the main components of national identity, are acutely raised in these 
stagings.
Conclusions
The essentialist conception, stressing the stable core of a homogenous 
national identity, is today replaced by constructivist approaches that 
emphasize the plurality of national identities. Nevertheless, the 
transforming national identities are not entirely novel and do not 
irretrievably replace historical components of national identity. Some 
elements of national past (history, myths, artistic narratives) are 
always mobilized for the creation of future visions of national 
identity.. The former core elements can be renegotiated from a 
contemporary viewpoint and emerging national identities, likewise, 
cannot entirely replace the pre-existing ones, some common con-
nectors of national memory are needed for the new national identities 
to be vigorous.
Estonian national identity has traditionally relied on cultural 
heritage (language, folk tradition, etc.) and the self-model of Estonians 
has been relatively fixed from the 1940s due to its functioning as a 
tool of resistance against the assimilation strategies of foreign 
occupations. Theatre as live and therefore not completely censorable 
art functioned as a substitute for free media in Estonia, and many 
films, that on first sight do not include any rebellious content for the 
foreign spectator, likewise carried coded messages, displaying 
national values and national heroes for Estonians themselves. In such 
oppressive circumstances, mainly homogenous self-models appeared 
on stage and on screen. During the past fifteen years of Estonian 
political independence, democratic society, and integration into Euro­
pean Union, the possibilities for self-models have multiplied tremen­
dously. Today, fixed, simplified and outdated national identities are in 
a process of transformation, intensively carried out in the arts, where 
both the presentation and reflection of self-models can be performed. 
The analyses of stagings of national identities in Estonian theatre and 
film in this paper were written from an internal viewpoint and can be 
seen as a study of auto-communication within the national commu­
nity, which is an essential precondition of the communication between 
different nations. Such a study of national identities can help us 
elucidate both of these forms of communication more appropriately.
Ever since the national awakening, literature has been the leading 
field of Estonian national culture, therefore it is characteristic that new 
national identities o f the postmodern kind (such as the playful, the 
ironic, the parodied) first emerged there. However, theatre, and later 
film as well, have in parallel been significant loci where national 
identities find concrete audiovisual and embodied manifestations, set 
to the stage for public reflection and evaluation. The creation, main­
tenance and development of national identities in all cultural spheres 
always involves a process of staging, comprising of three sub-pro­
cesses, namely setting on stage, performing and perceiving/inter­
preting. Although theatre and film primarily create aesthetic stagings, 
they can also be considered cultural stagings due to their collective 
nature, as they provide a nation with the opportunity for public esti­
mation of their declared and lived collective identities. In comparison 
with literature, where the creation process is first of all individual,
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theatre and film stagings are produced cooperatively, relying on 
collective memory. This may help explain the reasons why traditional 
historical components o f national identity are still intrinsic in the 
stagings of the past few years. Hence, theatre and film can be con­
sidered as transitional forms, where individual and collective stagings 
of national identities coalesce. Live and favourable reception of 
certain identities presented in theatre and film stagings prove that they 
have found a response in the audience’s collective memory, where the 
same aspects of national identity may be well-established.
Stagings of national identity can be realised in various genres, the 
most solemn of them being historical drama. Contemporary Estonian 
audience, however, seems to find the comic representations of national 
identity more enjoyable, though this does not mean that only 
simplified amusement is offered by those theatre performances and 
films. The majority of the stagings examined in the present paper were 
hilarious and bewildering reinterpretations of national themes, that at 
the same time had a rather anxious and even a tragic tonality. The 
analysis supported our hypotheses about two possible strategies of 
changing national identities in contemporary Estonia — deconstruc­
tion and hybridization.
Deconstruction was conceived of primarily as an intellectual 
strategy for interpreting canonical texts and self-models of a nation. 
The theatre production “Estonian funeral” (2002) and the film “The 
Old and the Bold Get on Their Feet” (2003) were comedies that 
applied deconstructive methods, such as parody, irony, travesty and 
slapstick humour to re-interpret traditional, conservative self-models 
of Estonians that exist within the imagined community and in classical 
texts of Estonian literature. However, the deconstruction presented 
here was not a strategy of annihilation, but rather the questioning of 
traditional values and convictions by provoking the audience’s refle­
xive laughter. Some key elements of the traditional national self­
model (for instance, devotion to physical work, having a home in the 
countryside, being a resisting/suffering hero) are playfully re-con- 
textualized, highlighting their constructedness and fictionality. In the 
traditional self-model, Estonians are defined by modesty, emotional 
reservedness, solitude, conservativeness. These qualities are not 
highly praised in any of the analysed texts; instead, a critical attitude 
is expressed through parodying or treating them with irony. Con­
currently, new aspects of national identity — the enjoyment of life, a
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modem home in the city, a successfully transforming hero — are 
presented. It is probably not incidental that actors from the younger 
generation, local celebrities known from television and other media, 
were primarily cast into the main roles, proposing new role-models for 
identification for the audience. Nevertheless, the protagonists in the 
deconstructive, as well as in hybrid stagings remain ambivalent, they 
are rather antiheroes, evoking sympathy but not admiration.
In addition to the diversity and contradictions brought out by the 
deconstructive strategy, the homogeneous self-model is called into 
question in a similar way by acknowledging and exhibiting hybridity 
as part of the Estonians’ lived national identities. “Goodbye, Vienna” 
(2002) in theatre and “Agent Wild Duck” (2002) in film staged 
various types of hybridizations, namely an intermingling of the 
colonizing German culture and the colonized Estonian culture; an 
amalgam of opposite mentalities (the inner exile of a Soviet citizen 
and the openness of a representative of an independent nation); a com­
bination of aesthetic and ethical values. In the process of hybridi­
zation, elements from the periphery of national identity move to the 
centre and vice versa. Borderline places and outsiders are presented, 
that do not qualify for the perfect image of a nation. The stagings 
showed us deserted and decaying rural homesteads, under-inhabited 
small towns and desolate industrial landscapes together with their 
marginalised inhabitants, such as Russian-speaking miners, un­
employed alcoholics, criminals, etc. The hybridization of national 
identity brings new characters to the stage who embody postmodern 
identities: a local hybrid identity (Adolf, Hans), a global hybrid 
identity (Gertrud, Florian), a transitional hybrid identity (Monika). 
The frequent occurrence of foreign-sounding names hints at the 
latently hybrid nature of Estonians and the Estonian language, the 
most central element in the declared self-model of Estonians. In the 
two films (and in Estonian cinematography in general) several foreign 
and colonizing languages (mostly Russian, German, English) are used 
in addition to Estonian. This vividly represents the reality of lived 
identities in contemporary Estonia: fluency in one or several foreign 
languages is a prerequisite for being successful in Estonia, although 
on the declared identity level, the mastery the Estonian language 
defines “authentic” Estonianness.
In conclusion, deconstructed and hybrid national identities intro­
duced in the present paper are not as much new identity types but
rather strategies o f creating possibilities for new identities to emerge; 
they indicate that existing self-models should change. Lived national 
identities are always in the process of transformation and in certain 
periods of their development a critical self-reflection is needed. The 
latter can be realised through the deconstruction of existing values, 
myths, symbols, etc. Hybridization, alike, is an inherent quality of 
national identity, primarily existing latently, and is brought into the 
collective consciousness only during periods o f active reflexivity and, 
thereby, identity transformation. Deconstruction and hybridization as 
identity strategies help us understand that national identities are not 
disappearing in the contemporary world, but are rather being refor­
med, and show us how these strategies, inherent to the postmodern 
attitude, do not completely eliminate the traditional aspects o f national 
identity but re-contextualise, re-examine and re-evaluate them. Ques­
tions about home, and what and where it is, and how much of our past 
influences our future, are still acute and painful. Playing with national 
identities in Estonia has just begun, and all the possibilities are
29open...
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Репрезентация темы национальной самоидентификации 
в современном эстонском кино и театре
Статья сосредоточивается на способах репрезентации (постановки/ 
экранизации) национального идентитета в эстонском театре и кино 
последних лет. Целью является дополнить общепризнанные трак­
товки национальности (Anderson 1983; Gellner 1983; Bhabha 1990), 
которые зачастую недооценивают роль театра и кино в образовании 
национального самосознания.
Понятие национального идентитета требует в наше время ком­
плексного подхода и точной формулировки в зависимости от кон­
текста, в котором его употребляют. Мы определяем современный 
национальный идентитет как динамическое понятие, выделяя его
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связь с этническим идентитетом, указывая на различия “реального” 
и декларируемого идентитета, а также на особенности националь­
ного идентитета, обоснованного культурой. Говоря о национальном 
идентитете как о постановке, мы исходим при использовании 
понятия “постановка” (staging) как из его эстетического значения, 
которое охватывает различные уровни и средства творческого про­
цесса, так и из его культурологического значения, в котором при 
помощи понятия постановки описываются процессы культуры, в 
которых нечто ставится определенным образом на “социальную 
сцену” для публичной рефлексии.
Объектами анализа нами были выбраны четыре поставноки — 
два фильма (“Made in Эстония”, “Агент Кряква”) и две театральные 
постановки (“Эстонские похороны”, “Goodbye, Vienna”), которые 
вышли на экраны/на сцену в 2002-2003 гг. Результаты анализа 
подтвердили нашу гипотезу о возникновении новых национальных 
идентитетов в пространстве эстонской культуры, указывая в то же 
время и на то обстоятельство, что ad hoc созданные понятия де- 
конструированный и гибридный национальный идентитет являются 
не столько новыми типами идентитета, сколько стратегиями иден­
тификационного процесса, которые позволяют образовываться но­
вым идентитетам. Деконструированный национальный идентитет 
указывает на высокую степень саморефлексии, когда доминирую­
щие в данный момент элементы национального идентитета пере­
сматриваются, заново контекстуализируются и переоцениваются. А 
понятие гибридного национального идентитета позволяет объяснить 
диверситет национального идентитета и сосуществование в нем 
различных компонентов. Обе стратегии постановки национального 
идентитета характерны прежде всего периодам трансформации 
национального идентитета, подтверждая тем самым, что гомогенная 
постановка национального идентитета заменяется репрезентацией 
нескольких новых авто-моделей.
Rahvuslike identiteetide lavastamine kaasaegses 
eesti teatris ja filmis
Artikkel keskendub rahvusliku identiteedi lavastamise viisidele eesti filmis 
ja teatris viimastel aastatel. Meie eesmärgiks on täiendada üldaktsepteeritud 
rahvusluse-käsitlusi (Anderson 1983; Gellner 1983; Bhabha 1990), milles 
sageli alahinnatakse teatri ja filmi rolli rahvusluse kujundajatena.
Rahvusliku identiteedi mõiste vajab tänapäeval kompleksset lähenemist ja 
täpset defineerimist sõltuvalt kontekstist, milles seda kasutatakse. Määratleme 
kaasaegset rahvuslikku identiteeti dünaamilisena, tuues välja selle seosed 
etnilise identiteediga ja juhtides tähelepanu elatud ja deklareeritud identi­
teetide erinevustele, samuti kultuuripõhise rahvusliku identiteedi eripärale.
Rääkides rahvuslikust identiteedist kui lavastusest, lähtume lavas­
tamise (staging) mõiste puhul nii selle esteetilisest tähendusest, mis hõl­
mab endas loomeprotsessi erinevaid tasandeid ja vahendeid, kui ka 
kultuuriteoreetilisest tähendusest, milles lavastamise mõiste abil kirjel­
datakse kultuuriprotsesse, milles miski seatakse teatud viisil “sotsiaalsele 
lavale” avalikuks reflektsiooniks.
Artikli analüüsi osas uurime me rahvusliku identiteedi lavastamist 
mõlemas eelmainitud tähenduses. Analüüsi objektiks valisime neli 
lavastust — kaks filmi (“Vanad ja kobedad saavad jalad alla”, “Agent 
Sinikael”) ja kaks teatrilavastust (“Eesti matus”, “Goodbye, Vienna”), mis 
esietendusid/linastusid aastatel 2002-2003. Analüüsi tulemused kinnitasid 
meie hüpoteesi uute rahvuslike identiteetide esilekerkimise osas Eesti 
kultuuriruumis, osutades samas ka sellele, et ad hoc mõisted dekonstruee­
ritud ja hübriidne rahvuslik identiteet ei ole mitte niivõrd uued identi- 
teeditüübid, kuivõrd idenditeediprotsessi strateegiad, mis võimaldavad 
uutel identiteetidel välja kujuneda. Dekonstrueeritud rahvuslik identiteet 
viitab kõrgele eneserefleksiivuse astmele, milles parajasti domineerivad 
rahvusliku identiteedi elemendid üle vaadatakse, uuesti kontekstualiseeri- 
takse ja ümber hinnatakse. Hübriidne rahvuslik identiteet aga võimaldab 
selgitada rahvusliku identiteedi diversiteeti ja erinevate komponentide 
kooseksisteerimist selles. Mõlemad identiteedi lavastamise strateegiad on 
iseloomulikud eeskätt rahvusliku identiteedi transformatsiooniperioo- 
didele, kinnitades, et rahvusliku identiteedi homogeenne lavastus asen­
datakse mitmete uute enesemudelite lavaletoomisega.
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A translation with (apparently) no originals
Review: Umberto Eco, Experiences in Translation. 
(Translated by Alastair McEwen.)
Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2001, x+135 pages.
Bruno Osimo1
The genesis o f this book about translation itself involves many translation 
processes. The present volume is based on the Goggio Public Lectures given 
by Eco at the University o f Toronto in 1998. So, one could argue, the proto­
text o f this book was an oral text published (performed) three years before the 
actual printing. However, the prototext o f  this book must be also an Italian 
text, since the book claims to be an English translation. Yet, looking for this 
book on the Italian publishing market, one sees none —  or, better, d idn’t see 
any until April 2003.
In April 2003 Eco published a book in Italian, whose title (Dire quasi la 
stessa cosa. Esperienze di traduzione) is echoed, in part, by the supposed 
translation’s one. Looking into more detail, one discovers that the supposed 
Italian “original” is 250 pages longer: in fact, in the preface one realizes that 
the “prototext” o f the Italian book consists, in its turn, also o f the eight 
Weidenfeld Lectures given at Oxford in 2002 and two annual seminars for 
Ph. D. students in semiotics at the Universitä di Bologna, which explains the 
greater pagination. I am no longer able to tell if  it is an original or not, having 
been published three years later, with many additions and examples in Italian.
The book is divided in two parts: the first part (Translating and being 
translated) is devoted to Eco’s experiences in translation and supervision of 
his own texts’ translations. In this part I noticed that Eco doesn’t have a 
descriptive approach to translation —  prevailing in the modem science —  
preferring rather a normative one. However, this may be not too difficult to 
explain. I therefore try by abduction to infer that the reason why Eco is often
1 Author’s address: Bruno Osimo, via Tolentino 19, 20155 Milano, Italy; e- 
mail: osimo@trad.it; homepage: www.trad.it.
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so sure o f the validity or censurability o f the various translators’ choices is 
that he is the Empirical Author in person. Therefore the intentio operis, 
usually left to the sometimes perverse, aberrant relation between Model 
Author and Empirical Reader, here has an indubitable authority —  the 
intentio auctoris —  able to tell what is Right and what is W rong beyond any 
doubt. W ho could tentatively argue in opposition to the will o f the Empirical 
Author, who is both living and writing (novels and semiotics) and translating 
and writing about translation —  who therefore is both metalinguistically and 
metaculturally self-conscious?
E co’s general approach is along the functionalist school and the skopos 
theory: he is a promoter o f the functional equivalence in interlingual transla­
tion, in which he lucidly realizes that the translator must make decisions 
about the metatext’s dominant —  although he never uses Jakobson’s term: 
“Obviously this means that translators have to make an interpretative hypo­
thesis about the effect programmed by the original text. M any hypotheses can 
be made about the same text, so that the decision about the focus of the 
translation becomes negotiable” (p. 45). In another passage, Eco refers to the 
dominant as spirit o f the text: “ [...] rewriting is certainly a case o f inter­
pretation, and is translation proper only in part, if  not in the sense in which 
(on the basis o f a critical interpretation o f the original text) it has pretensions 
to conveying, not the letter o f the original, but its ‘guiding spirit’ (whatever 
that means)” (p. 117).
Eco many a time goes round the notion o f “dominant” but hardly ever 
mentions it. In the Italian version an author’s footnote explains that the notion 
o f “dominant” is too vague, representing a huge spectrum o f features, 
techniques, arts, functions. However, having rejected this notion as a solution, 
he proposes to use it as an advice: “search what can be the dominant for you 
in this text, and on it stake your choices and exclusions” .
The Italian semiotician only apparently refuses the possibility that a 
translator should interpret the text in place o f the metatext’s reader: “Let us 
also assume that in an adaptation some levels —  deemed fundamental —  are 
isolated, and it is on these levels that we try to ‘translate’. But the fact of 
having isolated some levels means imposing one ’s own interpretation o f  the 
source text” (p. 125; author’s italic). That interpretation (and, sometimes, 
disambiguation) in the translation process is nonetheless implied and, in the 
Italian version, subject o f a whole chapter.
Eco’s functional position induces him to discard the translator’s footnote 
hypothesis, as a moment o f surrender, o f impotence. Speaking o f his own 
Italian translation o f Gerard de N erval’s Sylvie, he tells about a potential 
translation loss solved by the adding o f an adverb: “By adding a single
adverb, I avoided the footnote, which is always a sign o f weakness on the part 
o f a translator” (p. 50). This conception implies that the text being translated 
has as a dominant its fluent readability, which indeed is the case o f most 
Eco’s books, both in fiction and in non-fiction. These statements are 
undoubtedly true for Eco’s work, since the author tells us so. And for many 
works whose dominant lies in the reader’s entertainment —  both in a 
narrative and in an intellectual sense. The search for pleasure (almost in a 
sexual way) in a text is a fortunate topos  of Eco’s work, as far as both his 
essays and his novels are concerned.
It would be boring to argue that from a scientific point o f view it is not o f 
much use stating norms meant as general rules to be followed, and that from a 
semiotic point o f view there is no kind o f message (textual or metatextual, or 
intertextual for that matter) that is a priori  weak; the result must be found out 
in the empirical readers’ reception o f the text. Boring and, in the given case, 
inappropriate, since we are not talking about theory: these are experiences, 
empirical facts.
In many cases Eco implicitly uses the intersemiotic metaphor, like when 
he recurs to the simile o f the translator as a film director; here he explicitly 
states his position as far as metatextual or periphrastic rendering is concerned: 
“But the translator cannot use either images or detailed specifications, and 
must respect the rhythm of the story, because descriptive longueurs  would be 
fatal” (p. 52). In general, I think that this volume focuses on theoretical boun­
daries.
This is above all evident in the second essay, “Translation and inter­
pretation”. Here Eco starts from where most modem semiotic-oriented 
translation theories start, i.e. from the celebrated Jakobson’s 1959 essay On 
linguistic aspects o f  translation. In it Eco tries to set boundaries to the 
“totalizing” theory o f translation (although Torop is never explicitly quoted). 
My impression is that, as in 1992 with Interpretation and overinterpretation  
Eco had the sane intention to impose boundaries to the apparently boundari­
e s  Deconstructionist approach to literature, allowing any interpretation, 
included the ones not altogether justified by the text (“aberrant decoding”), so 
in this 2003 essay his aim is to set boundaries to the apparently boundariless 
“total translation” approach in which any kind o f communication act is 
assimilable to translation.
However, there might be a misunderstanding on this point. Eco says, for 
example, that “ it would be pure (and not very perspicuous) rhetorical licence 
to call [the short English description o f the Divine Comedy] a translation” (p. 
77) o f the original. W hat “totalist” semioticians say, however, is not that all 
kinds o f translations (textual, extratextual, metatextual, intertextual, intra-
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textual) produce a metatext that is the complete rendering o f the prototext: 
what these theorists say is that there is never a complete rendering o f a 
prototext, that any rendering is incomplete. Therefore, it can be useful to 
study the translation process just because it makes explicit what in inter­
lingual translation is sometimes implicit: the translation choice, as Eco 
him self states: “ In passing into a semiotic system that is totally ‘other’ with 
regard to those o f the natural languages, the interpreter would have to decide 
if  the ‘savants austeres’ sit in a large and chilly library, in a cramped little 
room like one o f Rem brandt’s philosophers, or in front o f a lectern like Saint 
Jerome [...]” (p. 99).
Eco, as always, is very pleasant to read, and this is even more evident in 
the Italian 2003 version o f the essays, containing many more examples. One 
could say that the Italian version is so rich in examples, that theoretical posi­
tions are simply interspersed among them. Through examples he clarifies 
questions like cultural translatability, archaization/modem ization, domestica­
tion/estrangement, addition/omission. He is capable o f justifying approaches 
that are hard to be argued, as in cases when the referential content o f a text is 
radically changed in translation, leaving untouched the work intentions. It is a 
book that, in its Italian version, is a big success, especially among translators, 
which is a great achievement, since seldom translators are so eager to read 
about what is sometimes dismissed as “translation theory”.
The greatest interest o f  this book is that it provides a rare chance to see 
translation simultaneously from the points o f view usually associated to three 
different persons: a translator, a writer, a semiotician. Eco can elegantly 
manage the three o f them.
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Floyd Merrell named sixth Thomas A. Sebeok 
Fellow of the Semiotic Society of America
John Deely1
The combined 29th & 30th Annual Meeting o f  the Semiotic Society o f 
America was held on the campus o f the University o f  W est Florida in 
Pensacola on October 20-22. At this meeting, Professor Floyd Merrell o f 
Indiana University/Purdue University (IUPUI) was inscribed as the sixth 
Thomas A. Sebeok Fellow. Professor M errell’s Fellow Address, forthcoming 
in The American Journal o f  Semiotics, entitled “The Magical Number Three”, 
addressed the nature o f the Peircean sign in light o f  a nonlinear, com ple­
mented, context-dependent lattice, with particular focus on how the lattice:
(1) reveals the function o f distinctions between signs; (2) supports Peirce’s 
triadic notion o f semiosis; (3) models the notion o f  signs incessantly be­
coming other signs; (4) takes its leave o f classical logical principles; and (5) 
accounts for the emergence o f novelty —  spontaneous, fresh, unique signs.
There are few names better known in the semiotic circles o f  North 
America than that o f Floyd Merrell. W hile all o f  Floyd’s writings involve 
semiotics, he considers the following from among his books to be “central to 
semiotics” : Semiotic Foundations: Steps Toward an Epistemology o f  Written 
Texts (1982; selected by Choice  as an outstanding academic book o f the 
year); A Semiotic Theory o f  Texts (1985); On Semiotic Modeling, edited with 
Myrdene Anderson (1991); Signs Becoming Signs: Our Perfusive, Pervasive 
Universe (1991); Sign, Textuality, World  (1992); Semiosis in the Postmodern 
Age (1995a); P eirce’s Semiotics Now: A Primer  (1995b); Signs Grow: 
Semiosis and Life Processes  (1996); Peirce, Signs, and Meaning  (1997); 
Sensing Semiosis: Toward the Possibility o f  Complementary Cultural 
‘‘Logics’’ (1998a); Introducciõn a la semiotica de С. S. Peirce  (1998b); 
Tasking Textuality  (2000a); Change, Through Signs o f  Body, Mind, and 
Language (2000b); Signs, Science, Self-Subsuming (Arti)Facts (2000c); Signs 
fo r  Everybody: Or, Communication, Quandaries, and Chaos (2000d); Living
1 Author’s address: John Deely, University of St. Thomas, 3800 Montrose 
Blvd., Houston, TX 77006, USA; e-mail: deelyj@stthom.edu.
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Learning, Learning Living: Signs, East and West (2002); Sensing Corpo­
really: Toward a Posthuman Understanding (2003).
Background to the Sebeok Fellow Award
The Sebeok Fellow Award is the highest honor given by the Semiotic Society 
o f America. The idea for this award was introduced in 1991 by the then- 
Executive Director, Dean MacCannell, and approved by the Executive Board. 
An Awards and Recognition committee was established to choose a first 
recipient. As the Society’s official newsletter, the Semiotic Scene 4.1 (1993), 
put it: “The Sebeok Fellowship is awarded to honor substantial career or 
lifetime contributions to semiotics and service to the semiotic community. 
The committee is not required to select a Fellow each year.” The practice has 
been to nominate a Sebeok Fellow only on such occasions as a strong 
consensus plainly emerges around a proposed name.
The title for the award was chosen in honor o f Dr. Thomas Albert Sebeok 
(9 November 1920-2001 December 21), founder o f the SSA, and himself a 
pioneer both nationally and globally in the establishment o f semiotics as a 
doctrine o f signs respecting which the development o f “semiology”, as a kind 
o f ‘social science’ in the modem sense o f language and culture, could be seen 
as no more than a part o f the larger process o f anthroposemiosis which itself, 
in turn, is no more than a part o f the still larger semiosis o f the world of 
nature itself and as a whole.
The list of Sebeok Fellows
The choice o f Sebeok Fellows had a lugubrious beginning. A dramatic turn of 
events within the Society, namely, the unexpected death o f its Vice-Presi- 
dent/President-elect, Dr. David Savan (1916-1992), in the late Spring of
1992, led the committee to make the first award a post-mortem honor. Thus 
the first Thomas A. Sebeok Fellow was chosen to be the late Dr. David 
Savan, a senior scholar o f considerable distinction2 and one o f the pioneers of 
semiotics in North America. Among his contributions, particular mention can 
be made o f  his An Introduction to C. S. Peirce's Full System o f  Semeiotic 
(1988).
2 Cf. http://www.pragmatism.org/genealogy/savan.htm.
The com plete list o f  Sebeok Fellows is as follows:
1. David Savan (1916-1992; posthumously awarded 1992);
2. John Deely (1993; St Louis Meeting);
Sebeok Fellow Address, 22 October 1993: “How Does Semiosis Effect 
R envoi?” (Deely 1994);
3. Paul Bouissac (1996; Santa Barbara Meeting);
Sebeok Fellow Address, 19 October 1996: “Can Semiotics Progress?” 
(Bouissac 2000);
4. Jesper Hoffmeyer (2000; Purdue Meeting);
Sebeok Fellow Address, 29 September 2000: “The Central Dogma: A 
Joke that Became Real” (Hoffmeyer 2002);
5. Kalevi Kull (2003; Ottawa Meeting);
Sebeok Fellow Address, 10 October 2003: “ Semiotics Is a Theory o f 
Life” (Kull 2005);
6. Floyd Merrell (2005; Pensacola Meeting);
Sebeok Fellow Address, 22 October 2005: “Chewing Gum, Ambulating, 
and Signing, all at the Same Time: Or, The Magical Num ber Three”, 
forthcoming in The American Journal o f  Semiotics.
7. To be named.
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Founding a world biosemiotics institution: 
The International Society for Biosemiotic Studies
Donald Favareau
While, as I continue to insist, all human beings —  
indeed, all living entities on our planet —  
modulate their environment by means o f  signs, 
only a handful grow up to be professional 
semioticians (and a good thing too).
Thomas A. Sebeok (1920-2001)2
In the late-life summation o f his work in which the above quote appears, 
semiotician extraordinaire Thomas Sebeok —  one o f whose dreams was to 
found an International Biosemiotics Society —  explicitly invokes philosopher 
of science Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure o f  Scientific Revolutions to argue 
that:
Both normal science and [scientific] revolutions are community-based activi­
ties. To discover and analyze them, one must first unravel the changing 
community structure of the sciences over time. [...Because] a paradigm 
governs [...] not a subject matter but rather a group of practitioners [and 
therefore] any such study of paradigm-directed or paradigm-shattering 
research must begin by locating the responsible group or groups. (Kuhn 1962: 
179-180)
As has been recounted elsewhere (see particularly Sebeok 2001a; Kull 2003; 
2005; Favareau 2006), the coming together o f enough individual researchers 
scattered across the sciences and the humanities so as to finally constitute a 
recognizable domain o f “biosemiotic inquiry” has been a gradual and often 
serendipitous project, and one that has really only begun to take on solid form 
over the course o f  the last ten years.
1 Author’s address: Donald F. Favareau, National University of Singapore, Uni­
versity Scholars Programme, Blk Adm 06-37, 10 Kent Ridge Crescent, Singapore 
119260, Singapore; e-mail: favareau@gmail.com.
2 Sebeok 2001b: ix.
Indeed, one o f the earliest attempts to solidify the efforts o f the various 
individual researchers independently studying the roles o f sign processes in 
life processes was the decision made by Thomas Sebeok and Thure von 
Uexküll (1908-2004) to found an International Biosemiotics Society in 1990. 
Proposed towards the end o f the series o f groundbreaking international 
conferences on biosemiotics arranged by the two men at the G lotterbad Clinic 
in Glottertal, Baden-W ürttemberg during the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, 
Sebeok announced proudly in 1991 that: “the foundation o f the IBS took 
place in M ay 1990 [ ...]  with the new society beginning to function fully in 
M ay 1991” (Sebeok 1991: 7).
Biosemiotician Jesper Hoffmeyer —  having just initiated his own Danish- 
language biosemiotic publication, OMverden  (“a literal translation o f the 
German term Umwelt” )  —  met Sebeok for the first time at this 1990 meeting, 
and recalls that conference organizers Sebeok and Uexküll had high hopes for 
the continued growth and success o f the Society (Hoffmeyer 2002: 384 and 
personal correspondence). Unfortunately, however, reports semiotician Jeff 
Bernard, “the whole thing never became formalized and fell apart [...] most 
probably [because] there were mainly elderly doctors o f medicine involved 
[and at that time] nearly no biologists [...]  except our own Anton Fuerlinger, 
because he happens to be both” (J. Bernard to J. Hoffmeyer, personal 
correspondence).
Thus, with m odern-day biosemiotics still in its infancy, Sebeok’s vision of 
an International Biosemiotics Society proved to be premature by several 
years, and remained a dream that never came to full fruition in his time.
The Glotterbad conferences had far-reaching effects, however, eventually 
bringing together the Copenhagen and the Tartu-M oscow researchers in 
biosemiotics, and —  again, with the direct encouragement and sponsorship of 
Thomas Sebeok —  launching the series o f conferences and journal issues in 
biosemiotics that raised the visibility o f biosemiotic inquiry substantially 
throughout the decade o f the 1990s (for an overview see Sebeok 1998 and 
Kull 1999).
That visibility -— and the growing number o f researchers it has since 
attracted —  led directly to the founding o f the annual Gatherings in Bio­
semiotics  series o f international conferences in 2001, as well to as the peer- 
reviewed Journal o f  Biosemiotics  in 2005 —  and the ongoing success o f both 
these endeavors promises to turn the previously loosely coordinated domain 
o f  biosemiotic inquiry into a cohesive and legitimate field.
The distinction between a “domain” and “field” o f course, derives from 
M ihaly Csikszentmihalyi’s work and has a long tradition in biosemiotics, as it 
acknowledges the triadic interaction between individuals, domains (symbolic 
structures) and their intermediaries, in the creation o f novel understandings, 
methodology and norms. Thus, in scientific, academic, artistic and 
professional circles (and probably elsewhere), a f ie ld  is that intermediary 
“which includes all the individuals who act as gatekeepers to the domain. It is
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^ec^ e whether a new idea or product should be included in the
As e SZ“ ,mihalyi 1996: 28 )'ommitted adherents o f self-organization through sign exchange,
owever, losemioticians intend their gates to be open ones and the “field” 
provi e to be a community locale where all possible semiotic approaches to 
biology can be explored. Only in this way can biosemiotic inquiry have a 
field proper to the underlying principles o f  its domain. And it is in that 
understanding that the International Society for Biosemiotic Studies has been 
founded and is hereby being officially announced.
Arising out o f  discussions that have been taking place intermittently —  
yet consistently—  since Sebeok’s original proposal in 1990, the revitalized 
effort to found an International Society wherein researchers from all areas o f 
living sign study can co-inform each other by sharing research data and 
analysis was resurrected at the Eighth International Congress o f the 
International Association for Semiotic Studies that was held in Lyon, France 
from July 7-12, 2004.
Representing the biosemiotic perspective with a Special Session on 
Neurosemiotics, the author and co-panelists Jesper Hoffmeyer and Kalevi 
Kull were approached by LASS organizers with the proposal to found an 
International Society for Biosemiotics under the auspices o f LASS. The 
suggestion was made again at a seminar organized by semiotician Paul 
Cobley in London the next spring,3 after which Jesper Hoffmeyer initiated a 
series o f e-mails with current Administrative Vice-President o f LASS Jeff 
Bernard, who enthusiastically supported the idea.
Several months o f back and forth e-mailing later,4 the following proposal 
was filed with the Executive Com mittee o f  the International Association for 
Semiotic Studies:
3 The symposium “Biosemiotics: The New Challenge” that was held in the 
London Metropolitan University on March 23, 2005, featuring papers by Kalevi 
Kull Soren Brier, and Jesper Hoffmeyer.
4 ’ . di an online “Skype-conference” linking biosemioticians from Copen- 
nC  T a r t u  and Singapore that took place on June 12, 2005 and that could be
age"jered to be the founding “cyber-meeting” of the ISBS.
484 Donald Favareau
Proposal for the formation of 
International Society fo r Biosemiotic Studies
The undersigned group o f  scholars, who are all engaged in studies 
o f  biosemiotics, hereby propose the form ation o f  the “International 
Society fo r  Biosemiotic Studies ” (ISBS).
The purpose o f  the ISBS is to constitute an organizational fra m e­
work fo r  the collaboration among scholars dedicated to biosemiotic 
studies, and to propagate knowledge o f  this fie ld  o f  study to 
researchers in related areas, as well as to the public in general. 
Specifically, the ISBS should assure the organization o f  regular 
meetings on research into the semiotics o f  nature as well as to 
prom ote all kinds o f  publication o f  scholarly work on the semiotics 
o f  life processes.
ISBS sees it as one o f  its important objectives to engage in cross- 
disciplinary exchange o f  ideas and welcomes the eventual member­
ship o f  scholars fro m  neighboring disciplines (e.g. biology, physics, 
chemistry, computer science, cognitive science, philosophy, anthro­
pology, semiotics, etc).
With this mail I  request the acceptance from  IASS o f  the ISBS as 
an associated society.
The proposal has now been agreed upon by the undersigned 12 
scholars engaged in biosemiotic studies:
Myrdene Anderson, Purdue University, USA 
Marcello Barbieri, University of Ferrara, Italy 
Soren Brier, Copenhagen Business School, Denmark 
Luis Emilio Bruni, University of Copenhagen, Denmark 
Charbel El-Hani, Federal University of Bahia, Brazil 
Claus Emmeche, University of Copenhagen, Denmark 
Don Favareau, National University of Singapore, Singapore 
Jesper Hoffmeyer, University o f Copenhagen, Denmark 
Kaie Kotov, University o f Tartu, Estonia 
Kalevi Kull, University o f Tartu, Estonia 
Anton Markos, Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic 
Frederik Stjemfelt, University of Copenhagen, Denmark
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h tem ational Association for Semiotic Studies (IASS) was founded in 
1969 by (among others) A lgirdas Julien Greimas, Roman Jakobson Julia 
Knsteva, Emile Benveniste, Thomas A. Sebeok, and Juri Lotman. It remains 
the premiere organization for the study o f semiotics worldwide, and their 
eager acceptance to include the International Society for Biosemiotic Studies
under their auspices —  an acceptance formalized on June 26, 2005s __speaks
well o f “biosem iotics’ roots, proliferation and prospects” (to borrow a phrase 
of Sebeok’s).
“Both Tom and Thure would have embraced this initiative” writes 
Hoffmeyer (personal correspondence) —  but, o f course, it is up to we living 
practitioners of biosemiotics to ensure that this tim e our International Society 
not only survives, but thrives.
Further information about, as well as an online fo rm  fo r  membership in, 
the International Society for Biosemiotic Studies is available at the website 
www.biosemiotics.org.
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1908-2004
Kalevi Kull,1 Jesper Hoffmeyer2
Looking back in 2001, Thomas Sebeok (1920—
2001) emphasized how important for the forma­
tion of contemporary biosemiotics had been the 
discussions that he, Giorgio Prodi (1929-1988) 
and Thure von Uexkiill conducted in Freiburg in 
the 1970s (Sebeok 2001: 63-65). As one o f these 
three main figures, Thure von Uexkiill signifi­
cantly contributed to the realignment o f  the se­
miotic threshold (i.e., the threshold below which 
genuine sign action cannot properly be said to 
take place) from the borderline between nature 
and culture to the borderline separating life from 
non-life —  thus effectively making the study o f 
living systems a study o f semiosis (Anderson et 
al. 1984; 1990). His writings on the development 
of the main concepts o f biosemiotics and on the 
interpretation o f Jakob von Uexkiill’s work in 
relation to thereof certainly qualify as biosemiotic 
classics. As a physician and philosopher, he 
developed a semiotic approach to medicine in
general and to psychosomatic medicine in parti- f i g  j  £>r honoris causa, 
cular. As a semiotician, he renewed ties with the University of Tartu, 
old roots o f semiotics deriving (since Antiquity) Dec. 1, 1994.
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from medical science. He died on September 29, 2004.3
Thure von Uexkiill was bom in Heidelberg on March 15, 1908, as the elder 
son o f Jakob von Uexküll. After his study o f medicine (1928-1936) in Ham­
burg, München, Innsbruck and Rostock, and residency and internship Charite in 
Berlin (1936-1943), he became an assistant professor at the medical hospital at 
the University o f Munich (1945-1952). Awarded a Rockefeller Grant, he 
worked in the USA from 1952-1953. From 1955 to 1965, he was Director o f 
the Medical Outpatient Department at the University o f Giessen, and from 1966 
to 1977 served as the Director o f the Department o f Internal Medicine and 
Psychosomatics at the University o f Ulm.
After his retirement in 1977 he lived in Freiburg as a Professor emeritus o f 
internal medicine and psychosomatics at the University o f Ulm. However, he 
stayed active in research, producing several books, lecturing in conferences in 
Germany and elsewhere, and remaining enthusiastically interested in new ideas 
and, until the last year o f his life, was a member o f the editorial board o f Sign 
Systems Studies.
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Fig. 2. In a summer seminar on biosemiotics, in Puhtu, Aug. 8, 1995.
In 1994, Thure von Uexküll was awarded an Honorary Doctorship from the 
University o f Tartu in the field o f semiotics and psychosomatic medicine 
(Fig. 1). Since his family comes from Estonia, he has had strong contacts there.
3 See obituaries by Krampen (2004), Hoffmeyer (2004), Geigges (2004), Tuffs 
(2004), Loringhoven (2005), Wesiack (2005). For a list o f obituaries see 
http://www.int-med.de/uexkuell/uexkuell.html.
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e spent many summers in Puhtu in the 1920s and 1930s at his family’s villa 
on t e coast o f the Baltic Sea, and was named Karl Kuno Thure after a former 
owner and designer o f Puhtu, Karl Thure Helwig (father o f grandmother o f 
grandfather o f  Thure v. Uexküll).
During his lifetime, he had a clear influence upon both the Copenhagen 
and the Tartu schools groups o f biosemiotics. In 1991, he attended the 
meeting “Biosem iotics and Biotechnology” in Denmark, and in September
1989, he visited Tartu to contribute to in a conference com mem orating the 
125th anniversary o f  Jakob von Uexküll. In the following years, he visited 
Estonia several tim es for biosemiotic seminars (Fig. 2), and both the Jakob  
von Uexküll Centre in Tartu (M agnus et al. 2004), and the Jakob von Uexküll- 
Archiv fü r  Umweltforschung und Biosemiotik in Hamburg University (Rüting 
2004) have been the recipients o f Thure von U exküll’s support.
Thure von Uexküll’s principal interests included internal medicine, psycho­
somatic medicine, philosophy, and semiotics. Besides his role as the leading 
thinker in the field o f psychosomatic medicine, his impact on semiotics include 
major achievements in at least the following important areas (see also Sebeok 
2001; Tiivel, Kull 1999):
(1) The analysis o f fundamental questions o f  semiotics, including the semiotic 
interpretation o f ‘se lf  (e.g., Uexküll 1984; 1986b; 1992a; 1995); in which 
he constructed a theory o f natural semiotic levels ranging from the cell 
which constitutes the lowest level (a “semiotic atom ”) and progressing 
through the ascending semiotic levels o f vegetative semiosis (phyto­
semiotics) and animal semiosis (zoosemiotics) to human sign systems 
such as language which allow for the capacity to represent absent objects 
and possible worlds (see Hoffmeyer 1998);
(2) The interpretation and development o f  Jakob von Uexküll ’s approach', by 
publishing a compendium o f his father’s works (J. v. Uexküll 1980) and 
writing extensive commentaries on them (Uexküll 1982a; 1987; 1992b; 
1993b; 2004);
(3) The analysis o f the relationships between semiotics and medicine; es­
tablishing a semiotic approach to psychosomatic medicine (Uexküll 1982b; 
1986a); developing a theory o f human integrated medicine (Uexküll 1994; 
Uexküll, Wesiack 1998) and o f subjective anatomy (Uexküll, Fuchs 
1997) —  for, as Uexküll pointed out, medical practices tend to focus myopi- 
cally on the indexical aspects o f disease, not seeing the importance o f sym­
bolic or iconic layers o f reference (Uexküll 1999; see also Hoffmeyer 
2001);
(4) The development o f biosemiotics (including the work on endosemiotics); in 
Thure von U exküll’s pioneering work on endosemiosis (1993, together 
with Geigges and Herrmann), the knowledge on sign transmission inside 
the organism was systematized, and microsemiosis defined as the sign 
processes occurring within the cell, and between its organelles (Uexküll 
1988; 1993a; 1997a).
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On the occasion o f Thomas Sebeok’s 65th birthday in 1985 a Festschrift was 
produced to which Thure von Uexküll contributed an article in which he gave 
a semiotic interpretation o f Jean Piaget’s theoretical work, connecting it at the 
same time to the work o f his own father, Jakob von Uexkiill. In this article, 
Uexkiill first explains P iaget’s idea o f circularity — i.e., that a stimulus 
presupposes a need, or “a readiness to react”, and that “the reflex can only be 
described as a circular event, in which a neutral phenom enon receives a 
property which it does not have independently from the reacting organ, and 
which it loses again after the completion o f the reflex, i. e. with the cessation 
o f the readiness to react” (Uexkiill 1986b: 122).
Uexkiill then makes the following remarkable observation: “The mere fact 
o f the insoluble concatenation o f stimulus and reaction has been, and still is 
today, to some extent overlooked through the prevailing dogma o f the 
constant causal connection o f reality —  a graphic illustration o f E instein’s 
statement that theory determines what can be observed” (Uexkiill 1986b: 122; 
our italics). W hat Uexkiill wants us to see, we presume, is the direct parallel 
between epistemology and life, i.e. needs со-determine stimuli in much the 
same way that theories со-determine observations.
Clearly, the deeper goal running throughout all o f Uexkiill’s work was to 
uncover “the pattern which connects”, to quote another great thinker o f his 
own generation, Gregory Bateson: “W hat pattern connects the crab to the 
lobster and the orchid to the primrose and all the four o f them to me? And me 
to you? And all the six o f us to the amoeba in one direction and to the back­
ward schizophrenic in another?” (Bateson 1979: 8).
Already by 1947, Thure von Uexkiill had published a chapter entitled 
“Von dem Bedürfnis der Physiologie nach einer philosophischen Natur­
betrachtung’’, in a book whose other half written by his father (J. v. Uexkiill, 
T. v. Uexkiill 1947) —  for Thure had begun to co-author with his father 
already during Jakob von U exküll’s lifetime. In 1943, they published ‘‘Die 
ewige F rage” (translated into English recently —  see J. v. Uexkiill, T. v. 
Uexkiill 2004). In addition, Jakob von U exküll’s unfinished book Das all­
mächtige Leben was completed by Thure and his mother Gudrun von 
Uexkiill, who together wrote the nine last chapters o f the book on the basis o f 
Jakob’s notes (G. v. Uexkiill, T. v. Uexkiill 1950; see the details in Kull 2001: 
33).
Specializing in medicine, and developing his father’s paths o f thinking, 
Thure von Uexkiill gave a theoretical basis to psychosomatic medicine. As 
Thomas A. Sebeok observed “no pillar o f the medical establishment would 
more crisply and trenchantly discern and signal a crucial paradigm shift in, or 
a consistently com prehensive semiotic overview of, the intellectual landscape 
than Thure von Uexkiill” (Sebeok 2001: 62).
Lehrbuch der psychosomatischen M edizin, the largest volume in its field, 
was edited by him, has been published in six editions (1979, 1981, 1986,
1990, 1996, 2003), and has appeared in English translation (1997c). His
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T 7 , ° ^ hl r“ ip be' Ween medicinc “ d biosemiotics may be illustrated by the following passage:
Medicine must replace its mechanical model for the body with a model of the 
living system. Living systems do not react in a mechanical way to mechanical 
inputs; rather, they transform inputs of the environment on their receptors into 
signs which inform the systems about the meaning of the environment for its 
needs. These signs enable the system to recognize and to assimilate the 
resources of the environment in order to maintain their autopoiesis as basis for 
their health. (Uexküll 1992: 455)
Similarly, the following quote comes from his “Medicine and semiotics” :
The ability to form symbols means that the direct connection between 
perceiving and operating is interrupted. The sensory signs lose their absolute 
unambiguity. They become as it were, un-homely ( ‘un-heimlich’). An inner 
world separates perception and operation, in which test operations are needed 
to find out whether one’s senses can be trusted or whether it is dangerous to 
follow their demands. (Uexküll 1986a: 213)
And, approaching medicine as a culturally related system, “ If  every culture 
produces its medicine, may it not be possible that every culture also produces 
its illnesses?” (Uexküll, Wesiack 1997: 36).
Thure von Uexküll was actively working until the last year o f his life4 In 
1998, at the Seventh World Congress o f Endocytobiology, a session was 
dedicated to his 90th birthday (Tiivel, Kull 1999). The opening talk was given by 
himself.
For the Uexküll-conference in Hamburg in January 2004, he sent a 
contribution noting that “Living beings do not discover their Umwelten. They 
have to construct it out o f the signs found” (Uexküll 2004: 374). And 
throughout Thure von UexküH’s life’s work as a physician and a semiotician, this 
is exactly what he did.
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